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Preface
This book is based largely on the 2012 conference of the European Net-
work for Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP), held at Poznań 
University of Technology, Poznań, Poland, on September 13–14, 2012. The 
ENRSP is a research network for independent researchers in the field of private 
pensions. Marek Szczepański, chair of Economic Sciences at Poznań Univer-
sity of Technology, organized the conference. It was the first conference of 
the network held in Eastern Europe. Financial support for the conference was 
provided by ENRSP and by the PZU Pension Society in Poland.
Szczepański has edited a conference volume for that conference, which is 
published in English in Poland under the title Old-Age	Crisis	and	Pension	Re-
form:	Where	Do	We	Stand? This volume differs from that in that it is oriented 
toward pension policy experts in the United States. It does not include all the 
papers from the conference, while it does include several papers not presented 
at the conference. The volume published in Poland has more of a focus on 
Central and Eastern Europe, while this volume, through the addition of several 
papers, has more of a global focus. In addition, all of the papers have been 
edited so that they use U.S. pension terminology. 
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1
Social Security and 
Pension Reform





Countries around the world are reforming their social security and 
pension systems. International studies often focus on social security re-
forms in Europe and North America, and may include Latin America. 
Reforms, however, are also occurring in Asia and Africa, and include 
reforms of voluntary and employer-provided pensions as well as so-
cial security programs. This book discusses both social security and 
employer-provided pension reforms, as well as reforms in most regions 
of the world.
This chapter provides an overview of the book. Many of the chap-
ters were originally presented at a conference of the European Network 
for Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP) in Poznań, Poland, 
in 2012, that was organized by Marek Szczepański. Other chapters have 
been added to expand the range of countries covered.
OVERVIEW
Part 1 of the book contains this introduction and a chapter written 
by John A. Turner and David Rajnes that examines social security and 
pension reforms around the world. It includes a survey of some of the 
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4   Szczepański and Turner
main points of chapters of this book, but has a considerably broader fo-
cus in terms of countries and issues. For example, an issue not touched 
on elsewhere is the trend in some countries toward adopting automatic 
adjustment mechanisms as a way of maintaining the solvency of their 
social security systems. In some countries, the level of social security 
benefits at retirement is automatically adjusted downward to reflect 
improvements over time in life expectancy. Turner and Rajnes’s chap-
ter also discusses the policy that a number of countries have adopted, 
which is raising the earliest age at which social security benefits can 
be received, and other policies to encourage workers to postpone re-
tirement, which are ways of dealing with the added costs to pension 
systems due to increased life expectancy. 
Turner and Rajnes discuss in Chapter 2 issues of concern in high-
income countries, and also the problem that most workers around the 
world are not covered by social security or pension programs. Countries 
such as China and Kenya have developed innovative programs to at-
tempt to deal with that issue. The programs in those two countries are 
discussed in greater depth in Chapters 10 and 11.
REFORMS IN EUROPE
Part 2, which focuses on reforms of social security and pensions in 
Europe, is the largest section of the book. The authors discuss reforms 
in Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Poland, and other countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe.
Chapter 3, by Gerard Hughes, discusses the reform in Ireland man-
dating that employers provide their employees the option to participate 
in an employer-provided pension plan, called a Personal Retirement 
Savings Account (PRSA). Although the reform requires employers who 
do not provide a pension plan for all their employees to designate a per-
sonal pension provider for their employees, less than half of the firms 
have done so. This may be in part because employees have shown lim-
ited interest, as no one is contributing to a PRSA in four-fifths of the 
firms that have designated a PRSA provider. Thus, the hopes that policy 
analysts had for this approach to extend pension coverage have not been 
realized. Requiring employers to offer pensions, but making the take-up 
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Social Security and Pension Reform   5
by employees voluntary, has not succeeded in significantly raising pen-
sion coverage in Ireland.
By comparison, the United Kingdom has adopted a policy that goes 
further: all private employers will be required to offer retirement plans 
meeting minimum requirements for their employees. Those plans can 
be defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans. In addition, going 
beyond the requirements in Ireland, employers will be required to auto-
matically enroll their employees in the new system, with the employees 
having the option to withdraw. It is anticipated that this change will 
increase pension participation in the United Kingdom by 5–9 million 
workers (Segars 2012). An additional requirement is that mandatory 
contributions in the case of defined contribution plans will be made 
by employers, employees, and the government. When fully phased 
in, contributions will be 4 percent of pay for employees, 3 percent for 
employers, and a 1 percent government subsidy, making a total contri-
bution of 8 percent of pay. Initially, contributions will start at a total of 
2 percent of pay, reaching 8 percent by 2018. 
The requirements apply to workers who earn more than minimum 
wage and are at least 22 years old; the maximum age for men is 65, 
with the maximum of 65 being phased in for women. The requirement 
for automatic enrollment into a qualifying pension plan was initially 
phased in on October 1, 2012, and will continue to be phased in through 
2016. It will apply first to large companies, and over time to all others. 
Eventually automatic enrollment will apply to all employees who do 
not have another plan. 
For companies that do not offer a qualifying plan, all money 
contributed to pension plans for employees will go into the National 
Employment Savings Trust (NEST), a jointly trusteed investment ve-
hicle that will offer a number of funds. Employees who use the NEST 
plan will have the option to choose investments or have a default invest-
ment chosen for them, which will be a retirement date fund based on 
what the employee indicates is his or her expected retirement date.
Chapter 4, by Gabriella Sjögren Lindquist and Eskil Wadensjö, fo-
cuses on low-income retirees in Sweden. The chapter begins with an 
outline of the Swedish system, which some countries have considered 
as a possible model for reform. The system includes a notional defined 
contribution system as the primary source of benefits and a mandatory 
individual account system, neither of which contain redistributive ele-
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ments. Redistribution toward low-income pensioners occurs through 
other government programs, such as the guarantee pension, which is 
based on the level of other pension income a person receives, and a 
housing allowance. Women, the self-employed, immigrants, and per-
sons at advanced ages are more likely to have low income in retirement 
than other groups. 
Nonetheless, poverty in Sweden is low compared to other Euro-
pean Union (EU) countries. It is defined on a relative basis as having 
an income below 60 percent of median income. Because Sweden is 
a high-income country, if poverty were defined alternatively as being 
below 60 percent of median income in the EU, the poverty rate would 
be even lower. 
Chapter 5, by Maria Clara Murteira, discusses social security reform 
in Portugal and how the EU has affected it. The demand for macroeco-
nomic budgetary reform has put pressure on countries to reform their 
social security programs. In addition, demand for fiscal austerity has 
put further pressure on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing of social secu-
rity because of increased unemployment.
Murteira argues that while the social security reform of 2007 was 
presented as a technical reform, it in fact involved a fundamental change 
in principles and objectives for the social security program. By means 
of parametric changes, a structural reform was achieved. She criticizes 
the reform because it focused on the means of social policy (financ-
ing) and not on its goals (providing adequate retirement income). While 
PAYG financing was not replaced by funding, the overall logic of the 
system was changed. The goal of social security retirement pensions 
in Portugal is no longer to provide income maintenance. Instead, the 
goal now is to provide a modest level of income protection against old-
age poverty. Murteira concludes that ultimately social security policy is 
about political choices, as it is influenced by the beliefs and ideas about 
the role of government in society.
Chapter 6, by Magdalena Mosionek-Schweda, describes the Nor-
wegian Government Pension Fund, which is a sovereign wealth fund 
and is one of the largest pension funds in the world. The fund has two 
parts: one that is (Norway) is entirely invested in Scandinavia and an-
other part (Global) that is entirely invested outside Norway. She focuses 
on the Global fund, which is financed by revenues from the extraction 
of oil in Norway. It currently is worth about $120,000 per person in 
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Norway, and is expected to grow on a per capita basis before it is drawn 
on to help pay for retirement benefits. The fund does not have a legal 
liability for future pension benefits, but it is designed to be used for the 
purpose of helping to pay for these benefits. As discussed in Chapters 2 
and 10, Ireland, China, and several other countries have similar funds. 
If the United States were to return to an era of budget surpluses, as it 
did during the Clinton administration, it could establish a similar fund.
Chapter 7, by Maciej Żukowski, describes social security reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter provides a survey of a num-
ber of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, with a more detailed 
discussion of the reforms in Poland. While many aspects of the socialist 
economies in this region were not functioning well before the breakup 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, they did have functioning social security 
systems. However, starting in 1998, most of the countries in the region 
have had major reforms to their social security systems, introducing 
funded individual accounts as part of the systems. Of the 10 Central 
and Eastern European countries that are now members of the EU, all 
but Slovenia have adopted mandatory funded individual accounts as 
part of their social security systems, along with a reduced PAYG social 
security program (U.S. Social Security Administration 2012).
Because of the global financial crisis, since 2010, some of these 
countries have reduced the contributions to the funded individual ac-
counts. They have encountered the double payment problem, which is 
needing to finance the PAYG systems while at the same time also con-
tributing to a funded system. These countries did not adequately take 
into account this problem when they established their individual ac-
count systems. The European Union Stability and Growth Pact, which 
sets target limits on government debt and deficits, has influenced them 
to cut back on their individual account plan contributions. This issue is 
also discussed in Chapter 5, where EU policies are seen to have led to a 
reduction in the PAYG system in Portugal.
Chapter 8, by Marek Szczepański and Tomasz Brzęczek, discusses 
the risks in employer-provided pension plans in Poland. Like Sweden, 
Poland has a mandatory notional defined contribution system and a 
mandatory individual account system. However, unlike Sweden it has 
relatively few voluntary employer-provided pensions. Those pensions 
in Sweden cover most workers, in part due to widespread collective 
bargaining agreements. Szczepański and Brzęczek survey representa-
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tives of businesses that provide pension plans, who indicate that the two 
most important risks facing pension plans are financial market risk and 
economic market risk. They find a high degree of mistrust by employ-
ers sponsoring pension plans of the advice provided by the pension plan 
managers. They also find that pension plans in Poland have invested in 
low-risk, low-return portfolios.
REFORMS IN AUSTRALIA, CHINA, EAST AFRICA, AND 
THE AMERICAS
The following four chapters comprise Part 3 of the book and dis-
cuss pension and social security reform in Australia, China, East Africa, 
and the Americas. 
Chapter 9, by Ross Clare, discusses the retirement income system 
in Australia and issues of equity or fairness. Recent reforms in Australia 
have reduced the extent of tax preferences going to high earners. He 
finds that less than 15 percent of the government assistance for pension 
contributions flows to those paying the top marginal tax rate. Govern-
ment assistance includes tax preferences and a government matching 
contribution for low earners. This compares to the approximately 30 
percent of aggregate personal income tax collections that is paid by that 
group of taxpayers. Thus, a far smaller percentage of tax preferences 
and government contribution assistance in Australia goes to upper- 
income persons than in the United States. A study in the United States 
finds that two-thirds of the benefits from pension tax preferences accrue 
to the top 20 percent of the income distribution (Orszag 2000).
To further limit the tax benefits accruing to high earners in Australia, 
a proposal is being considered that would reduce the amount of tax-
preferenced contributions that could be made by persons with a pension 
account of A$500,000 or more. (Australian dollars are roughly equal in 
value to U.S. dollars at 2013 exchange rates, although exchange rates 
fluctuate over time.) When viewing the Australian retirement income 
system in a broader framework, also taking into account the Age Pen-
sion, which is received by most persons but whose value declines with 
increases in personal income, the amount of government subsidy to the 
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retirement income system is fairly equal across deciles of the income 
distribution. 
Chapter 10, by Tianhong Chen and John A. Turner, describes social 
security reform in China, which has roughly one-fifth of the world’s 
population aged 60 and older. Also adding to the importance of un-
derstanding China’s retirement income system, China is undergoing 
a period of important changes in its provision of old-age benefits. At 
the start of 2009, less than 30 percent of the adult population in China 
was covered by a social security old-age benefits program, but by 2012 
that number had increased to 55 percent. Affecting its ability to pro-
vide old-age benefits, China is also undergoing important labor force 
changes—because of its one-child policy, the labor force declined in 
2012 for the first time, and declines are projected to continue for many 
years.
China has a decentralized system of social security, where the 
central government establishes general guidelines, but subprovincial 
governments (county governments) have some discretion in establish-
ing the programs, for example, in setting contribution rates. This feature 
alone would make the system complex. However, within that frame-
work, there are separate systems for urban workers, rural workers, and 
rural workers working in urban areas. Each of these three systems has 
two parts—an individual account portion and a PAYG system. In ad-
dition, government employees have separate systems, and Hong Kong 
has a separate system.
An unusual feature of social security provision in China is that its 
new program for rural workers, which is voluntary, has been highly suc-
cessful in attracting participants. Because voluntary programs generally 
fail to cover more than half of the eligible population in high-income 
countries, and a much lower portion in middle- and low-income coun-
tries, China’s program may provide a model for other countries.
Chapter 11, by John A. Turner, describes social security and pension 
reform in the five countries of the East African Community—Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. The chapter discusses social 
security and employer-provided pensions for both private and public 
sector workers. Many of the issues these countries face are similar to 
retirement income issues in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A 
different aspect, however, is that these five countries are attempting to 
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move toward greater economic integration, with the possibility of even-
tually having a single currency and a common market.
Most workers in the region and throughout sub-Saharan Africa—
and in most middle- and lower-income countries—are not participating 
in social security or in another pension program. Therefore, extending 
social security or pension coverage to rural and informal sector workers 
is arguably the most important issue facing social security programs in 
most countries around the world. 
Kenya has recently developed an innovative voluntary pension 
program that may hold promise for extending pension coverage to low-
income workers in other parts of the world. In this system, workers 
can contribute small amounts, as little as $0.25, using their cell phones 
and a mobile money system. Advances in cell phone technology have 
greatly reduced the cost of cell phones and usage rates so that even poor 
people in Kenya have cell phones, and so that small transactions are 
economically feasible. Many more people have cell phones than have 
bank accounts. This program is a promising development for extending 
pension coverage to poor people in other countries.
Chapter 12, by Denise Gómez-Hernández and Alberto M. Ramírez 
de Jurado Frías, analyzes defined contributions in a sample of countries 
from North, Central, and South America. Instead of using a replacement 
rate to measure the effectiveness of the defined contribution systems, 
they compare projected pension benefits to a measure of the basic 
market basket of goods. They find that differences in the level of fees 
charged to pensions across countries have an important effect on the 
outcomes of the pension systems. 
REFORM ISSUES
Part 4 contains the final two chapters, which discuss particular 
issues in social security and pension reform rather than focus on par-
ticular countries. Chapter 13, by Adam Samborski, discusses issues 
in pension fund governance, focusing on principal-agent problems in 
pension fund governance. In agency theory, agency relationships are 
understood as contracts under which a principal engages a third-party 
(agent) to perform certain actions on its behalf in dealing with a second 
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party, which is the provider of the service. The agent provides a mana-
gerial or advisory role. In pension arrangements, the plan participant is 
the principal, the plan sponsor is the agent, and the financial institution 
managing the pension funds is the second party. This implies the need 
for the principal to delegate specific powers to the agent to make certain 
decisions. However, both the agent and the second party may have con-
flicts of interest so that they are motivated to not act in the best interests 
of the pension participant.
Chapter 14, by John A. Turner and Dana M. Muir, discusses issues 
in financial literacy, financial education, and financial advice. A lack of 
financial literacy is widespread in countries around the world. This is 
particularly a problem in countries that rely on mandatory individual 
accounts and defined contribution pensions, where workers have added 
responsibility for financial decision making. Financial education has 
been considered as a remedy, but studies have shown that many work-
ers lack interest in gaining the required knowledge. Financial education 
may be more successful if it is incorporated into school education pro-
grams for students. Financial advice has been recognized as another 
way of dealing with financial illiteracy. However, many financial advis-
ers have conflicts of interest that cause the advice they provide to not be 
in the best interest of their clients. Because of the way financial advisers 
are compensated, the advice that provides them the highest income may 
also lead to pension participants and plan sponsors paying higher fees, 
but with no improvement in investment outcomes. Surveys have docu-
mented that persons receiving financial advice may receive lower rates 
of return net of fees than those not receiving advice.
CONCLUSION
Many countries around the world are undertaking social security 
and pension reforms. These reforms are motivated in part by population 
aging, but they also are occurring in response to economic development 
in Africa, China, and elsewhere, and are due to changing views about 
how retirement income should be provided. Countries often look to in-
ternational experience when considering reform options, and this book 
discusses social security and pension reform issues in different parts of 
the world. 
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2
Social Security and Pension 





Retirement income systems are in a state of change. Increasing lon-
gevity and declining birth rates cause population aging and put pressure 
on retirement income financing. For this reason, countries around the 
world are reforming their retirement income systems of pensions and 
social security old-age benefits. Changing views about the provision of 
retirement income and innovations in program design are also influenc-
ing the trends.
This chapter surveys trends in social security and pension pro-
grams around the world. It first discusses social security reforms and 
mandatory individual account programs, and then discusses reforms of 
employer-provided pension plans.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MANDATORY INDIVIDUAL  
ACCOUNT PROGRAMS
Social security programs and mandatory individual account 
programs are considered together as part of government mandated pro-
vision for retirement. 
Raising Retirement Ages
With people living longer in many parts of the world, the cost 
of providing social security and pension benefits in traditional pen-
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sion systems is increasing because those benefits are being provided 
for more years. To offset this cost increase, many countries in Europe, 
Eastern Europe, and elsewhere have legislated increases in the early 
retirement age for social security benefits, sometimes called the eligi-
bility age or minimum age for retirement. That is the earliest age at 
which social security retirement benefits can be received. Often those 
increases are legislated to occur a number of years into the future, or are 
phased in over a number of years. In some countries, changes have also 
occurred in the age at which the worker can receive a full benefit, but 
those changes are more aptly described as changes in benefit generosity, 
rather than changes in retirement ages.
Japan is raising the eligibility age for both of its social security 
programs (Rajnes 2007). Japan passed legislation in 1995 that raised 
the eligibility age for its flat rate pension (National Pension) by one 
year every three years, with it increasing from age 60 to 61 in 2001 
and reaching 65 in 2014. Based on legislation passed in 2000, Japan is 
raising the eligibility age for its earnings-related pension (Employees’ 
Pension Insurance) by one year every three years starting in 2013. With 
these changes, men born after 1960 and women born after 1965 have a 
retirement age for both programs of 65 by 2025 for men and 2030 for 
women. 
New Zealand raised its eligibility age from 60 in 1991 to 65 in 2001. 
Those workers who turned 60 before March 31, 1992, were eligible for 
a social security benefit at age 60. The legislation, which passed August 
1, 1991, took effect the following April, when eligibility increased from 
age 60 to 61. Beginning July 1, 1993, eligibility rose by three months 
for each six-month period until April 1, 2001, when the eligibility age 
reached 65. Thus, a five-year increase in the eligibility age phased in 
over nine years. A Transitional Retirement Benefit was paid over this 
period to those affected by the changes, with the age of eligibility for 
this benefit also rising until it was phased out on April 1, 2001.
Some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries have had a longstanding eligibility age of 65, and 
some are raising the eligibility age even higher. In Australia, Austria, 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the eligibility age for 
men has been 65 since at least 1949. In 2012, the Netherlands passed a 
law that will raise the retirement age in 2020 from 65 to 66. In Ireland, 
starting in 2014, the age of entitlement for social security benefits will 
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be raised from 65 to 66. In Australia, it will be gradually rising to 67 
from 2017 to 2023 for both men and women.
Some countries have had a higher eligibility age in social security 
in the past than they do currently. In 1913, when social security was 
introduced in Sweden, the eligibility age was 67 (Lindquist and Waden-
sjö, this volume). The eligibility age in the United States was 65 in 1940 
but now is 62.
In Central and Eastern Europe, a number of countries—Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and Poland—
are increasing their retirement eligibility ages as a move toward insuring 
the solvency of their social security systems. In 2012, Latvia enacted 
legislation raising the eligibility age for social security benefits from 
62 to 65, rising by three months a year, and reaching 65 in 2025 (U.S. 
Social Security Administration 2012).
Some low-income countries in Africa retain low benefit eligibility 
ages for social security benefits. For example, the early retirement age 
is 50 in Swaziland. However, some high-income countries also have 
low eligibility ages. In Kuwait, the retirement age is 50, but it is increas-
ing to 55 by 2020.
Equalizing	Benefit	Eligibility	Ages	for	Men	and	Women
Many countries historically have had lower early retirement ages 
for women than for men. However, many of these countries have 
equalized the ages for men and women by raising over time the early 
retirement age of women so that it reaches the level for men. China, 
Cuba, Vietnam, and the former communist country of Russia are among 
the countries that maintain lower early retirement ages for women than 
men.
Changes to Encourage Later Retirement
Many countries have enacted changes other than increases in early 
retirement ages to encourage later retirement. Among OECD countries, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Po-
land, and Spain have enacted tighter requirements to qualify for early 
retirement benefits (Whitehouse and Antolin 2012). In Canada in 2012, 
an earlier enacted change took effect, raising benefits for workers who 
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postpone taking benefits past age 65, cutting them for workers who retire 
before age 65, and introducing a new benefit for workers who are still 
working. Bulgaria in 2012 also raised benefits for workers postponing 
retirement. In 2012, Denmark scaled back its government-subsidized 
program providing early retirement benefits. Sweden has instituted in-
come tax credits for workers aged 65 and older. Portugal has reduced 
social security contributions for workers aged 65 and older. France has 
increased the actuarial reduction of benefits for early retirement. In Ke-
nya, pension benefits received at age 65 or older are tax free, in order to 
encourage postponement of receipt of those benefits.
In raising the retirement age, one option is to provide for early re-
tirement for workers who have worked for many years. Some countries 
with special early retirement benefits have raised the number of years 
required to be eligible for those benefits. France has raised the number 
of years from 37.5 to 40, while Belgium has raised the number of years 
from 20 to 35 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005).
In 2011, Spain passed a law that increased incentives for older 
workers to remain in the labor force. An innovative aspect of this re-
form is that the incentives are greater for workers with more years of 
service. For workers with less than 25 years of service, for every year 
an individual continues working beyond the full retirement age, the in-
centive will remain at 2 percent; from 25 to 36 years, 2.75 percent; and 
37 or more years, 4 percent. Some countries encourage work at older 
ages by reducing the social security contribution rate. In Portugal, the 
rate the employee pays has dropped from 11 percent to 8 percent since 
2009. 
Retrenchment in Traditional Social Security Programs
A number of countries have cut back on the generosity of their so-
cial security benefits, resulting in falling income replacement rates in 
old age. These countries include France, Japan, Sweden, Greece, South 
Korea, and the United States. Among OECD countries, cutbacks in 
benefit generosity have typically reduced future benefits between one-
fifth and one-quarter (Whitehoues and Antolin 2012). 
Sometimes the cutback is expressed in another way, perhaps to re-
duce the political reaction to the change. For example, one way to cut 
benefits is to postpone access to full benefits to a later age, coupled 
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with actuarial reductions in benefits received at an earlier age. This ap-
proach has been used by Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the 
United States. The United States has reduced benefits at the eligibility 
age by raising the Normal Retirement Age from 65 to 67 over the period 
2000–2022. 
Many countries have reduced benefits in traditional social insurance 
old-age benefits programs by increasing the years used in the earnings 
averaging period for calculating benefits. Spain has done so, result-
ing in more years of relatively low earnings being included, lowering 
average earnings in the benefit calculation. Finland, Austria, France, 
Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom have also increased the num-
ber of years used in benefit calculation. In Italy, the increase was from 
the worker’s last five years of earnings to lifetime earnings. Portugal 
increased the number of years from 10 years to all years of work. How-
ever, it also defined a transitional period, from 2002 to 2016, during 
which the most favorable method of calculation—the former, the latter, 
or a weighted average of both—could be applied in order to guarantee 
beneficiaries the most favorable rule to determine the pension level. In 
2007, it subsequently passed a law that shortened the transitional period 
(See Murteira, this volume).
Benefits can be reduced by changing the calculation of cost-of-
living adjustments. Germany and Japan have both moved from basing 
postretirement benefit adjustments on the growth of net wages rather 
than gross wages. With the growth of taxes and social security contri-
bution rates, net wages grow less rapidly than gross wages. Reductions 
in cost-of-living adjustments reduce benefits more at older ages than at 
younger ages because for each retiree, the effect of the cuts is cumula-
tive over the time period since retirement.
Countries with traditional benefit formulas have a parameter in 
those formulas that determines the generosity of the rate at which future 
benefits accrue with additional work. Japan, Norway, and Portugal have 
cut future benefits by reducing the benefit accrual rate in the benefit for-
mula. For example, Japan cut the accrual rate from 1 percent per year of 
work to 0.7125 percent (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005). 
Austria has reduced the accrual rates used to calculate the initial benefit 
from an annual rate of 2 percent to 1.78 percent starting in 2009. 
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Benefit Reductions That Affect Current Retirees
Traditionally, social security benefit cuts have been targeted so that 
they did not affect people who were already receiving benefits because 
those people were considered to be particularly vulnerable. Because of 
their age, for many returning to work to offset the benefit cuts was not 
an option. That policy of protecting current beneficiaries has changed 
in some countries. 
In most countries, benefits in payment are indexed so that they at 
least keep pace with the rate of inflation and thus maintain their real 
(inflation-corrected) value during retirement. Greece and Norway have 
cut benefits by reducing the indexing of benefits in payment. Sweden’s 
automatic adjustment mechanism can involve a reduction in indexing 
of benefits in payment so that it is less than the rate of inflation. 
Increasing Contribution Rates
Some countries have raised contribution rates, particularly countries 
that have relatively low contribution rates, but increases are not limited 
to those countries. Kenya is an example (Turner, this volume). Contri-
bution rates have been increased in many OECD countries, including 
Denmark, Finland, France, and Sweden. They have also increased in 
some countries with mandatory individual accounts and mandatory 
pensions, such as Mexico, Singapore, and Australia. Australia is raising 
further its contribution rate for its mandatory pension system from 9 
percent to 12 percent (Clare, this volume).
Increasing the Contribution Base
Social security contributions can be increased by raising the con-
tribution base rather than raising the contribution rate. Countries that 
have completely eliminated the ceiling on taxable earnings for social 
security financing include Finland and Norway. In 2001, Ireland elimi-
nated the ceiling on taxable earnings for social security for employer 
contributions. The United Kingdom also requires employers to pay 
social security taxes on employee earnings without a ceiling on those 
earnings. Some countries have expanded the range of earnings included 
in taxable earnings. Japan, for example, included the twice-yearly bo-
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nuses in taxable earnings. France, in addition to raising the contribution 
rate, increased the contribution base to include employer contributions 
to occupational pension plans.
New Revenue Sources
Some countries have decided that they cannot raise the payroll tax 
any further. For example, Japan has been concerned about the effects 
of increases in the payroll tax, which would raise labor costs, on the in-
ternational competitiveness of its workforce. By comparison, however, 
China, which has large trade surpluses, has a social security tax rate that 
varies across provinces but averages 28 percent (Chen and Turner, this 
volume), substantially higher than in Japan.
In 2012, Japan legislated an increase of its value added tax (VAT) 
from 5 to 10 percent, starting in 2014, with the increased revenue being 
used to finance its social security program. Although all OECD coun-
tries use contributions from employers and employees to finance social 
security old age benefits, nearly all those countries also use general rev-
enue funding. France has levied a tax of 1 percent on all income that 
is dedicated to financing old-age benefits (U.S. Government Account-
ability Office 2005). More recently, Portugal in 2012 levied a tax on 
pensions of more than 1,500 euros per month. 
Unification	of	National	Social	Security	Systems
When social security systems were started they often excluded 
certain groups, such as government workers, workers in particular in-
dustries that already had good pensions, or workers in industries with 
low wages, such as agriculture. Some countries developed multiple 
pension systems to cover different workers. Reforms in the United 
States, Chile, Nigeria, and Greece have expanded the coverage of na-
tional social security systems to include more groups of workers, in 
the process unifying. Part of this movement has been a trend to include 
government workers in the national social security program. Thailand 
is currently phasing out some special programs for government work-
ers. In 2011, China established a national unified social security system 
for urban workers, which facilitates workers moving between different 
parts of the country (Chen and Turner, this volume). In Africa, Cape 
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Verde, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia have all consolidated 
their social security programs for formal sector workers (Republic of 
Kenya 2012).
Ending Provident Funds
Provident funds are defined contribution plans that typically pro-
vide lump sum benefits and have a single investment pool for all 
participants. These types of plans were established in many countries 
that were formerly British colonies or British protectorates, in part be-
cause of their simplicity. Provident funds were established in most of 
the former British colonies or protectorates in Africa—Gambia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zam-
bia. Swaziland retains such a plan; however, many countries, including 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania, have ended those plans and switched 
to social insurance types of plans. Kenya and Uganda in 2012 were 
considering converting their provident funds to defined contribution 
pensions, rather than to a defined benefit social insurance pension 
(Turner, this volume). Nigeria subsequently switched to a mandatory 
individual account system. In the Caribbean, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are among countries 
that converted a provident fund to a traditional defined benefit social 
security program (Gillion et al. 2000). 
Social Security Privatization with Mandatory Funded 
Individual Accounts
Most countries provide social security benefits through traditional 
defined benefit pay-as-you-go systems (PAYG) based on principles of 
social insurance. However, many countries in Latin America, Central 
and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere have added mandatory individual 
accounts as a component of their social security programs. One of the 
motivations for social security privatization was the belief that this 
innovation would lead to a closer connection between contributions 
and benefits, which would lead to less distortion of incentives in labor 
markets.
In 1981, Chile was the first country to privatize its social security 
program with mandatory individual accounts. Chile completely ended 
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its PAYG system for private sector workers, replacing it with an in-
dividual account system, while most other countries that followed it 
cut back on the PAYG system and combined it with a mandatory indi-
vidual account system. Since 1990, 10 other countries in Latin America 
have followed Chile (Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha 2011). The first coun-
tries following Chile to switch to individual accounts (with the year 
implemented) were Peru (1993), Colombia (1993), Argentina (1994), 
Uruguay (1996), and Mexico (1997). These were followed by two of 
the poorest countries in the region, Bolivia (1997) and El Salvador 
(1998). In 2008, Panama added mandatory individual accounts as part 
of social security for new entrants into the social security system. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union, 
a number of countries that were part of the Soviet Union or that were 
in Central and Eastern Europe added mandatory individual accounts 
as part of their social security systems. Kazakhstan (1997), Hungary 
(1998), and Poland (1999) were early leaders, but they were followed 
by Bulgaria (2000), Latvia (2001), Croatia (2002), and Estonia (2002) 
(Szczepański and Brzęczek, this volume). Other countries include 
Bulgaria (2002), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003), 
Slovakia (2005), and Romania (2008) (Żukowski, this volume). In 
addition, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Russia have en-
acted reforms. 
Mandatory defined contribution plans have also been introduced in 
countries in other regions, either in addition to or in replacement of ex-
isting traditional social security programs. In 2011, Thailand introduced 
the National Pension Fund as a mandatory defined contribution plan to 
supplement its traditional social security plan. In 2010, Egypt passed a 
law replacing its PAYG system with a system of mandatory individual 
accounts. In 2010, Brunei added mandatory individual accounts to its 
existing mandatory social security system. Between 1988 and 2008, 29 
countries followed Chile and established a funded first pillar social se-
curity system (Holzmann 2012).
Retrenchment on Privatization
Some countries that enacted reforms privatizing social security 
by adding individual accounts have later cut back on those reforms, 
reducing or eliminating the contributions to privatized individual ac-
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counts. Argentina ended its system of privatized individual accounts in 
2008, while Bolivia nationalized its system of individual accounts in 
late 2010. Retrenchment has been more common in Central and Eastern 
Europe than in South America, in part because of the financial crisis 
there and the subsequent economic downturn. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia 
all retrenched their privatized systems in some way since 2010 (Fultz 
2012). Starting in 2010, Hungary ceased funding for its second-tier pro-
gram and returned most of the accumulated funds to the participants. 
Retrenchment has occurred in part because of the double payment 
problem, where payments are being made into the new individual ac-
counts, while payments are still required into the traditional PAYG 
system to pay the benefits promised from that system. Some govern-
ments have found that it was too expensive to pay for the existing PAYG 
system and for the new individual accounts, particularly in an economic 
downturn. In 2012, the Slovak Republic reduced the contributions to 
the mandatory individual accounts and transferred those contributions 
to the PAYG system. It also temporarily permitted workers to withdraw 
from the system.
In 1997, China established a multipillar reform, adding funded in-
dividual accounts to a PAYG system. However, it later decided not to 
fully fund those accounts, taking some of the money originally des-
ignated for the individual accounts and using it to finance the PAYG 
benefits. Those accounts now are more like notional accounts, with an 
unfunded liability arising due to their total liabilities exceeding their 
total assets (Chen and Turner, this volume).
 It was initially thought that competition among service providers 
would reduce high fees in mandatory individual account systems, but 
that has not proved to be the case. The reason may be that participants 
are not sensitive to fees when choosing among service providers, per-
haps because they do not understand how much fees can reduce future 
account balances.
Chile and Mexico have taken steps to reduce fees. In Chile, every 
two years a bidding process determines the lowest-fee pension fund 
provider. All new entrants must use that provider. Mexico has taken 
steps to increase competition among pension fund providers as a way 
to reduce fees. The United Kingdom has limited the maximum fees that 
can be charged on stakeholder pensions, which are a form of voluntary 
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individual account pension. Australia has introduced a low-cost fund as 
an alternative in its mandatory employer-provided pension system. The 
United States and the United Kingdom have taken steps to have more 
disclosure of fee information to pension participants.
Defaults to Deal with Decision-Making Problems
Defaults have been used in mandatory individual account systems 
for workers who do not wish to make an investment choice. For ex-
ample, in the Swedish Premium Pension system, which is a mandatory 
individual account system, if a worker fails to choose an investment, the 
worker is placed in the default investment. In 2010, Sweden changed 
that default so that the risk of the portfolio varies by the age of the par-
ticipant, with the percent invested in low-risk assets increasing as the 
participant ages. In Australia in the mandatory pension fund system, if 
an employer does not wish to choose a pension fund for its employees, 
it can use the default fund for employers in its industry. In New Zea-
land in the KiwiSaver program, workers who do not choose a pension 
provider are automatically enrolled in the employer’s preferred plan, 
but if the employer has not chosen a plan they are randomly assigned 
to one of six default plans. In Peru, recent reform measures encourage 
more competition among AFPs (Pension Fund Associations) by assign-
ing new labor force entrants to the AFP with the lowest administrative 
fee. From October through December 2012, all new entrants to the sys-
tem of individual accounts were assigned to Prima, the pension fund 
management company (AFP) that offered the lowest administrative fee 
in the tender held in September.
Raising Limits on International Investments
Some countries have raised the limits on international investments 
allowed both for mandatory pension plans and for voluntary pension 
plans. A few countries have no limits on these investments. In 2008, 
Uruguay raised from 0 to 15 percent the limit on international invest-
ments in its mandatory individual account system, and Colombia raised 
its limit to 40 percent. In 2009, Brazil raised to 10 percent the limits 
on international investments for certain pension funds provided volun-
tarily by employers. In 2010 and 2011, Chile raised the limits on the 
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percentage of a pension fund’s assets in its mandatory system that can 
be invested in international investments, with the limit reaching 80 per-
cent in 2011. Peru raised the limit in its mandatory system to 30 percent 
in 2010. In Sweden in mandatory individual accounts, and in the United 
States in voluntary individual account defined contribution plans, indi-
viduals can invest entirely in international investments.
Notional Account Plans
In notional account or notional defined contribution systems (or 
nonfinancial defined contribution systems), each worker has an account, 
but the account is not fully funded, generally only having limited fund-
ing. Rather, it has a notional or accounting value for each participant. 
This system is essentially a PAYG system, though there may also be a 
reserve fund. A notional rate of return is assigned to each account. One 
of the motivations for this type of plan is that it attempts to make a closer 
connection between contributions and benefits, based on the view that 
such a connection may encourage workers to view the contribution not 
as a tax but as a payment for a future benefit. When Sweden reformed 
its social security system by enacting a notional account system, it ex-
tended the years taken into account in calculating benefits from 15 years 
to all years of work (Lindquist and Wadensjö, this volume).
Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Norway, and Italy—a diverse set of coun-
tries—have adopted this type of system. Egypt adopted this type of 
system in 2010, with implementation expected in 2013 (Holzmann 
2012). 
Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms
At least 12 countries have adopted automatic adjustment mecha-
nisms as a way to maintain the solvency of their PAYG social security 
programs. In 1998, Brazil adopted life expectancy indexing of its so-
cial security benefits for private sector workers. At retirement age, the 
calculation of social security benefits takes into account the average 
life expectancy for the population at that age, with an annual updat-
ing of life expectancy at retirement age. Life expectancy is officially 
estimated by the annual household survey of the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics. 
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Finland, Portugal, and Norway adjust the generosity of benefits 
received at retirement automatically for changes in life expectancy. 
Portugal passed legislation in 2007, introducing a sustainability coef-
ficient in the benefit formula for calculating pensions. This coefficient 
equals the ratio between life expectancy in 2006 and life expectancy in 
the year preceding retirement. The level of statutory pension is multi-
plied by the coefficient, reducing the benefit level as life expectancy 
increases (Murteira, this volume). The August 2011 pension reform law 
in Spain required that a sustainability factor be introduced to the system 
in 2027 that will adjust the relevant parameters of the system to changes 
in life expectancy every five years.
In Sweden, life expectancy indexing of benefits is done by using an 
annuity divisor that reflects improvements in life expectancy at age 65. 
No further reductions in benefits for improvements in mortality occur 
after age 65. Thus, the life expectancy adjustment does not take into 
account life expectancy improvements that occur after age 65. It is ex-
pected that the failure to adjust for life expectancy improvements after 
retirement will be expensive, costing about 1 percent of payroll in contri-
butions (Palmer 2000). The initial generation in the system will benefit 
from this feature, but subsequent generations will pay for it through the 
automatic adjustment process required to maintain solvency.
In Sweden, mortality experience is averaged over the previous five 
years to avoid year-to-year fluctuations that do not reflect longer-term 
trends. The Swedish system uses, as do the other systems, period mor-
tality tables, which are mortality tables based on the experience of the 
cross section of older persons. For each birth cohort in Sweden, the 
annuity divisor adjustment is established at age 65, with a provisional 
adjustment made for retirements starting at age 61, which is the benefit 
entitlement age. 
In addition to the automatic adjustment of benefits for longevity 
improvement, every year the Swedish government tests whether the 
system is in balance. If it falls out of balance, adjustments are auto-
matically made to decrease benefits, without the intervention of elected 
government officials needing to decide what to do. Thus, automatic ad-
justment mechanisms reduce the political risk that no action will be 
taken until a crisis—rather, actions will be taken automatically, without 
the intervention of politicians.
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In 2012, Greece adopted a pension system with a notional rate of 
return and an automatic adjustment mechanism to maintain solvency. 
Italy, Poland, and Latvia also have automatic life expectancy indexing 
in a notional account system. France in 2003 legislated an increase in 
the number of years of earnings required to receive a full pension from 
40 to 41, rising by one quarter per year from 2009 to 2012. Thereafter, 
through 2020, the contribution period for full benefits will increase au-
tomatically as needed to keep the ratio of the contribution period to the 
average retirement period equal to its ratio in 2003, which is approxi-
mately two to one. This adjustment mechanism effectively results in 
a reduction in benefits that is tied to increases in life expectancy. The 
French government retains the right to not make these adjustments if 
labor market conditions, such as high unemployment, do not support 
the extra years of work.
In 2012, the Netherlands passed a law that will automatically adjust 
its normal retirement age for increases in life expectancy, starting in 
2020. This provides an alternative approach for indexing benefits to 
improvements in life expectancy. Every five years, the government will 
assess whether life expectancy improvements have been sufficient to 
warrant an increase in the retirement age. According to projections, the 
retirement age will increase from 66 to 67 in 2025 and from 67 to 68 in 
2040. Workers will still be able to receive benefits at age 65, but these 
changes in the normal retirement age result in a cut in benefits at that 
age by 6.5 percent for every one-year increase in the normal retirement 
age. 
Japan, Germany, and Canada have also adopted different types 
of automatic adjustment mechanisms. While in many countries with 
automatic adjustment mechanisms the adjustments occur annually, in 
Canada, because of the stability of its long-term financing, it is expected 
that its automatic adjustment mechanism will be used rarely, if at all.
One issue with these mechanisms has been how automatic they 
actually were in practice, with Sweden, Germany, and Italy making 
changes to the adjustment mechanism when unpopular adjustments 
were required. In 2009, Germany passed a law that for the second con-
secutive year overrode the automatic adjustment mechanism. 
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National Savings Funds for Retirement Financing
Ireland, France, China, and New Zealand have introduced separate 
national savings funds, separate from their social security programs, for 
the purpose of prefinancing future social security benefits. Subsequently, 
however, some of these countries ended up drawing down these funds 
earlier than expected (Whitehouse and Antolin 2012). In Ireland, for 
example, the National Pension Reserve Fund was used to help bail out 
Irish banks in 2011 because of the financial crisis. In 2007, Argentina 
established a national social security sustainability fund to help guar-
antee the payment of future social security benefits. In 2008, Russia 
established the National Welfare Fund to help pay for future public 
pension benefits. Norway has a large national savings fund, one of the 
largest pension funds in the world (Mosionek-Schweda, this volume).
Extending Coverage to More Workers
The majority of workers around the world, particularly outside of 
the high-income countries, lack social security coverage. This is one 
of the key problems facing social security programs, particularly for 
middle- and lower-income countries. On average, social security pro-
grams in Africa only cover 10 percent of workers (Gillion et al. 2000), 
partly because many workers are employed in the informal sector, which 
many social security programs do not cover. Part of the reason also is 
that many workers who should be covered by law are not participating 
because of contribution evasion, which is the failure of employers and 
workers to make mandatory social security contributions. 
Many countries are attempting to extend coverage to more workers. 
Burundi has an innovative system where motorcycle taxi cab drivers 
are covered through contributions to their national association (Turner, 
this volume). To encourage coverage among agricultural workers, who 
are typically more difficult to bring into the social security system, 
Tanzania has a public relations campaign to encourage more people to 
participate in the social security system. Tunisia charges agricultural 
workers a lower contribution rate than urban workers. Egypt allows 
self-employed workers to declare their level of income, with the mini-
mum level varying by occupation. Vietnam has a program that allows 
agricultural workers to make contributions in kilos of rice, and later 
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receive benefits in rice. Thailand, China, and India also have a matching 
contribution for voluntary programs for informal sector or rural work-
ers. In 2010, the Indian government introduced a new pension initiative, 
which runs from 2010 through 2014, to increase participation in the 
national New Pension Scheme, aimed particularly at the 300 million 
workers in the unorganized sector who are generally excluded from for-
mal pension provisions. The initiative includes a partial contribution 
match to encourage participation in the plan.
In 2012, Peru enacted a law extending mandatory coverage to self-
employed workers earning more than 1.5 times the minimum wage. 
Chile is also extending coverage of its mandatory individual accounts 
to self-employed workers earning above a minimum amount, but with 
the choice to opt out during a five-year transition period. In 2010, Ma-
laysia extended coverage to part-time workers. That same year, South 
Korea extended coverage of its mandatory employer-sponsored pen-
sion system to small employers having four or fewer employees.
Some countries in Africa have not had social security programs for 
private sector workers, only for workers in government and government- 
controlled enterprises. In 2011, Ethiopia extended social security cover-
age to private sector workers.
It was initially thought that individual account systems would suc-
ceed in extending coverage to more workers because of the link between 
contributions and account balances and thus benefits. In fact, the link 
is quite variable. It is variable because of financial market risk, which 
affects both the link between contributions and account balances at re-
tirement and the link between account balances and annuitized benefits. 
Perhaps for other reasons as well, the extension of coverage in countries 
adopting individual accounts has not occurred. Reforms with individual 
account plans did not increase coverage in any of the reforming coun-
tries in Latin America (Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha 2011).
Some countries have extended coverage to uncovered workers on a 
voluntary basis. China has a voluntary pension system for rural workers 
(Chen and Turner, this volume). Kenya in 2011 launched a voluntary 
individual account system, called the Mbao Pension Plan (Kwena and 
Turner 2013; Turner, this volume), where poor workers can contribute 
small amounts (as little as $0.25) using mobile phone technology. This 
system is feasible because mobile phone costs have decreased to the 
extent that they are available in Kenya for as little as $5 or $10.
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Noncontributory Social Security Pensions
A number of middle- and lower-income countries have established 
noncontributory means-tested old-age pensions to provide benefits 
to poor people in old age and to extend the coverage of social secu-
rity programs (International Labour Office 2007). This trend has been 
motivated by an attempt to reduce poverty in old age and appears to 
be gaining greater acceptance around the world. These programs are 
sometimes called social pensions. Countries with social pensions in-
clude Brazil, India, Nepal, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, 
and Mauritius. Swaziland and Lesotho have tax-financed programs that 
provide cash transfers to older persons (Vincent and Cull 2011). Chile 
adopted such a program in 2008, and also established a minimum ben-
efit for participants who had contributed to the mandatory individual 
accounts and met certain other requirements. In 2008, Belize extended 
to indigent older men its noncontributory poverty program that already 
applied for indigent older women. The Maldives adopted a program in 
2010. Peru and the Philippines both adopted programs in 2011.
International Agreements to Facilitate Work and Retirement in 
Other Countries
Although for many years countries have had international agree-
ments concerning social security benefits for workers moving between 
countries, there is an increased interest in global collaboration to pro-
vide these benefits. Mercosur—the Southern Common Market—signed 
an agreement in 2007 whereby retirees could receive their social secu-
rity benefits in any country in the region without charge. The benefits 
are wired from the social security agency in the home country to the 
social security agency in the new country of residence. Formerly, the 
benefits were wired to a bank in the residence country, which charged 
money transfer and foreign exchange fees. In addition, all documen-
tation is sent electronically, rather than by mail, which expedites the 
process of workers receiving benefits from other countries. In 2007, 
22 countries signed the Ibero-American Multilateral Social Security 
Agreement, which will facilitate the provision of social security bene-
fits to international workers in Hispanic countries. In 2011, a new Ibero 
multilateral agreement provides social security benefits to migrant 
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workers and their families in eight countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ec-
uador, El Salvador, Spain, Paraguay, and Portugal.
The EU has regulations regarding the coordination of social secu-
rity in EU countries. The East African Community is considering this 
issue (Turner, this volume). As well as these multilateral agreements, 
increasingly countries have bilateral agreements, sometimes called to-
talization agreements. New Zealand and Australia are also discussing 
the portability of pension benefits between those two countries as part 
of an effort to move those countries to a single economic market. 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSION PLANS
Unisex	Pensions	from	Defined	Contribution	Plans
Because women on average live longer than men, life insurance 
companies selling annuities generally charge a higher price to women 
than men for an annuity paying an equal annual benefit. Gender-based 
benefit calculations when annuitizing defined contribution accounts, 
which results in equal expected lifetime benefits for men and women 
the same age, is viewed as discriminatory against women by some 
people because it provides lower annual benefits to women than men. 
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed gender-based pensions for 
employer-provided defined contribution plans on the grounds that it 
constituted discrimination in compensation against women. In 2012, 
the EU outlawed that practice for all annuities, including annuities both 
provided through pension plans and purchased individually. 
Extending Voluntary Pension Coverage
Extending voluntary pension coverage, as a supplement to manda-
tory pension coverage, has long been a goal for many countries. Ireland 
mandated that by 2003 all employers were required to provide their 
employees the option to participate in a Personal Retirement Savings 
Account, but many employers have failed to comply with this require-
ment, and among those that have, some have no participants in the plans 
provided (Hughes, this volume). In 2008, the Philippine Congress passed 
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a law creating private voluntary retirement accounts as a supplement to 
the country’s public PAYG system. Under the law, public- and private-
sector employees and the self-employed may set up Personal Equity 
and Retirement Accounts (PERAs). In 2009, a program took effect in 
Israel through an agreement between labor unions and manufacturing 
associations to extend pension coverage to workers not already having 
such coverage. In 2011, Chile established new rules to encourage em-
ployers to voluntarily provide pension plans. In 2012, India extended a 
defined contribution system designed for government workers so as to 
make it available to private sector workers, and Malaysia established a 
voluntary pension system to supplement its mandatory system. 
Some countries, however, provide voluntary pension systems to 
workers who do not participate in social security as a substitute for 
social security. In 2007, Pakistan introduced a new voluntary pen-
sion system. In 2009, China extended voluntary pension coverage to 
650 million rural workers by establishing the National Rural Pension 
Scheme. By 2011, there were more than 258 million contributors and 
100 million beneficiaries (Turner and Chen, this volume).
Pension Regulators
As employer-provided pensions are increasing, many more coun-
tries gradually are adopting pension regulators. With the growing 
importance of defined contribution plans, pension regulators more often 
are not part of Labor Departments but are part of government depart-
ments focusing on financial market regulation. Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania have all instituted pension regulatory authorities. Burundi, 
however, does not have a pension regulator (Turner, this volume).
The	Decline	in	Defined	Benefit	Plans	and	the	Trend	toward 
Defined	Contribution	Plans
In countries with established pension systems, defined benefit plans 
were traditionally the primary plans in the private sector but have since 
declined in importance, being supplanted by defined contribution plans. 
Generally, the decline has been considerably less in the public sector, 
where defined benefit plans still predominate. These countries include 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, and Kenya. In the 
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United States, a type of defined contribution plan called the 401(k) plan 
has replaced defined benefit plans as the most important type of plan 
in the private sector, but Individual Retirement Accounts, which are 
defined contribution plans established by individuals without reference 
to a particular employer, have since replaced 401(k) plans as the most 
important type of retirement plan in terms of assets. The decline in pri-
vate sector defined benefit plans has not occurred in all countries where 
they have been prevalent. For example, it has not occurred in Germany 
or Japan. There has also been a movement away from defined benefit 
plans for public sector employees, with Kenya and Brazil taking steps 
to end those plans for public sector employees.
Automatic Enrollment to Extend Coverage
To solve the problem of workers not participating in voluntary 
employer-provided pension plans when they have the opportunity to do 
so, there has been a trend toward automatic enrollment. In traditional 
plans, workers need to actively enroll in employer-provided defined 
contribution plans. If they do nothing, they are not enrolled. Thus, tra-
ditionally the default is nonenrollment. 
A number of employers sponsoring defined contribution pension 
plans in the United States have adopted automatic enrollment. In the 
KiwiSaver program in New Zealand, starting in 2007, workers are 
placed in the system by default but can opt out. In the United Kingdom, 
starting in October 2012, all employers are required to offer a pension 
plan to their employees, and they are required to automatically enroll 
their employees (Szczepański and Turner, this volume). The require-
ment starts with large firms and is being phased in over four years so 
that it will eventually apply to all employers. The mandatory contribu-
tion rate to the plan is 8 percent, also being phased in, with 1 percent of 
that provided by a government subsidy. 
Defaults
Along with automatic enrollment, which is a form of default, de-
faults have been used for investment options. Many participants are 
uncertain as to what a good investment choice would be. With defaults, 
if they take no action they automatically are signed up for the default 
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investment. Initially, in the United States that investment was a low-risk 
option, but there has been a move toward higher-risk defaults because 
low-risk defaults resulted in small accounts due to low returns. The de-
faults now generally being used are ones that reduce the portfolio risk 
as the participant approached retirement. These are sometimes called 
target-date funds, or retirement date funds. 
In 2012, the United Kingdom established a nationwide default, 
known as the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), which pro-
vides retirement date funds for workers whose employers do not offer 
a plan and who do not choose one of the other funds offered by NEST 
(Szczepański and Turner, this volume). This system is largely based on 
the KiwiSaver system in New Zealand.
Financial Education
Financial education has been a response to the problem of financial 
illiteracy for participants in defined contribution systems, both in man-
datory and voluntary defined contribution systems (Turner and Muir, 
this volume). The increase in financial education provided by govern-
ments and employers is a direct result of the growing importance of 
defined contribution plans as voluntary or mandatory parts of retire-
ment income systems. Financial education can cover such topics as 
investment terminology, asset allocation, risk tolerance, and retirement 
goal setting. Using financial education to address the lack of financial 
literacy of pension participants is not a quick fix but needs to be a long-
term, sustained, and costly effort.
Several international organizations, such as the OECD and the In-
ternational Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS), have taken an 
interest in financial education for pension participants in individual ac-
count pension systems. In 2008, the OECD created the International 
Network on Financial Education. A survey by IOPS found that 16 out 
of 19 financial supervisors of pension systems provided some type of 
financial education (IOPS 2011). The pension supervisors not providing 
financial education tended to be fairly young, with intentions of provid-
ing financial education in the future. 
Chile, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and the United States have all 
developed financial education programs. In 2009, Colombia enacted a 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
34   Turner and Rajnes
law providing incentives for organizations to establish low-cost pro-
grams for financial education.
Greater Transparency
With some countries moving to defined contribution plans, they 
also are leaning toward providing greater transparency, particularly con-
cerning fees. The United States in 2012 released regulations requiring 
greater disclosure to private sector pension participants of information 
concerning fees. Transparency is also an issue in terms of conflicts of 
interest that financial advisers may have. The issue of transparency is 
being considered in a number of other countries, as well. In the UK, pri-
vate pension companies will be forced to reveal fees and charges taken 
from employees’ retirement savings under an agreement with the As-
sociation of British Insurers. The requirement will be implemented in 
2014 for autoenrollment pension plans, and in 2015 for all other work-
place pension plans.
Hybrid Plans
Traditionally, pension plans have been divided into either defined 
benefit plans or defined contribution plans, but hybrid plans do not fit 
neatly into either category. These include defined contribution plans 
with rate of return guarantees, such as the Riester plans in Germany. 
Hybrid plans developed in the Netherlands include collective defined 
contribution plans, which have a defined benefit plan formula but with 
the workers collectively bearing the investment risk. The most common 
hybrid plan in the United States is the cash balance plan.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has surveyed trends in social security and employer-
provided pensions around the world. Many countries have reformed 
their social security and employer-provided pension systems. Reforms 
of social security programs include raising the benefit entitlement age, 
adopting automatic adjustment mechanisms, and raising contribution 
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rates. While most countries have retained traditional social insurance–
type social security systems, there have been two other significant trends 
relating to plan type. First, countries with provident funds have been 
converting those funds to social insurance–type social security systems. 
Second, some countries with traditional social security systems have 
added mandatory individual accounts, but more recently a number of 
countries have cut back on the contributions to those accounts. An ad-
ditional trend is that low-income countries have continued to look for 
ways to include more of their workers in their social security systems, 
with some countries adopting innovative programs targeted at groups 
who have not participated in or been covered by social security.
Trends in employer-provided pensions include a shift toward de-
fined contributions and away from defined benefit plans, increased use 
of hybrid plans, and a greater usage of unisex mortality tables in calcu-
lating annuities.
Note
We have received valuable comments from Dalmer Hoskins of the U.S. Social Secu-
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3
Have Personal Retirement 




In its report Averting	 the	Old	Age	Crisis, the World Bank (1994) 
argued that OECD and Eastern European economies and several Latin 
American economies faced imminent problems with their retirement 
income systems. It said that the public pillars of national social security 
pension systems should not be relied on to solve these problems, as 
high tax rates are required to finance them and they inhibit growth and 
reduce rates of return to workers. Believing that the social security pil-
lar of retirement income would become more costly in the future, the 
report recommended that these countries make the transition to a mul-
tipillar system, which would include a privately managed, mandatory 
personal retirement savings plan. 
In Ireland, the publication of the World Bank report coincided with 
a survey of occupational and personal pension coverage. The results of 
this survey were published in 1996 (Hughes and Whelan 1996). The 
report revealed that less than half of those in employment and less than 
one-tenth of those not economically active were covered by a pension 
plan. Following publication of the survey results, the Pensions Board 
and the Department of Social, Community and Family affairs jointly 
sponsored a National Pensions Policy Initiative. The purpose of this ini-
tiative was to facilitate a national debate on how to develop the national 
pension system. In its report Securing	Retirement	Income, the Pensions 
Board (1998) recommended that a legal framework be put in place that 
would encourage private sector financial institutions to introduce on a 
voluntary basis a new type of pension product, the Personal Retirement 
Savings Account (PRSA). The retirement income system in Ireland 
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consists now of a mandatory social security program, a means-tested 
social assistance program, voluntary occupational pensions provided 
by employers, PRSAs provided by employers mandatorily but with vol-
untary participation by workers, and voluntary personal pensions.
OBJECTIVES SET FOR PRSAs
The primary objective set for the PRSA was to increase coverage 
of private pension plans for those aged 30 and over from 54 percent to 
70 percent within 10 years of their introduction. In terms of all those at 
work, this objective can be expressed as a requirement to increase the 
coverage rate from less than half to 60 percent in a 10-year period. 
A wide range of other objectives were set for PRSAs, but no sys-
tematic effort has been made to publish information that would facilitate 
evaluation of how successful they are in achieving these objectives. 
However, a number of key objectives of PRSAs for which enough in-
formation is published facilitate an evaluation of how well PRSAs have 
performed since their introduction. There are six key objectives set for 
the PRSA product:
1) It should be a lower-cost product than was available in the past.
2) In addition to traditional providers of pensions, the PRSA 
should be supplied by the post office and other retail outlets, 
such as supermarkets.
3) It should have a flexible retirement age. 
4) Owners of PRSAs should eventually buy an annuity for life.
5) It should be mandatory for all employers, except those with 
occupational plans for all employees, to provide access for all 
their employees to a PRSA provider. 
6) The primary market for the PRSA should be employees in 
nonpensionable employment, and individuals who change or 
lose their jobs should be able to continue contributing to their 
pensions.1 
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Some of the key objectives set for PRSAs can be evaluated on 
the basis of the terms and conditions on which the new pension sav-
ing product was introduced after negotiations between the government 
and pension providers, while others require data stretching back to 
September 2003 when the new product was introduced. We begin our 
evaluation by considering objectives 1–4 in the list above and then pro-
ceeding to consider objectives 5–6 together with the primary objective 
of increasing pension coverage from less than half to 60 percent within 
a 10-year period.
PRSA FEES AND PROVIDERS 
The terms and conditions on which PRSA products were issued 
by pension providers differed in important respects from those envis-
aged by the Pensions Board in its report Securing	Retirement	Income 
(1998).	 Instead of one PRSA product with government certification 
to indicate that it met certain quality requirements, two products were 
introduced—the standard PRSA and the nonstandard PRSA. The differ-
ence between the two is that the fees for a standard PRSA are capped 
at 5 percent of PRSA contributions and 1 percent of PRSA assets, and 
it can invest only in unit funds, whereas a nonstandard PRSA has no 
cap on fees and it can invest in a wide choice of assets. Far from being 
a lower-cost product than personal pension products previously avail-
able, the standard PRSA turned out to have higher fees than was usual 
for existing personal pension products. 
Table 3.1 shows how fees for a standard PRSA compare with those 
for an Additional Voluntary Contribution (AVC) plan for teachers oper-
ated by Cornmarket Group Financial Services, an off-the-shelf personal 
pension marketed by one of the largest providers of pensions in Ireland, 
the Irish Life Assurance Company, and fees for existing personal pen-
sion products. For an Irish Life personal pension, a flat rate fee of €3.81 
per contribution was charged, whereas 5 percent of each contribution 
was deducted for the standard PRSA, and the annual management fee 
for the Irish Life pension was 0.9 percent compared with 1 percent for 
the PRSA. The capped fee for a standard PRSA of 5 percent of each 
contribution is the same as the usual fee for a personal pension contract, 
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Charge for each 
contribution
5% €3.81 5% 5% 0 0.9% 3.5%
Annual management 
charge (%)
1 0.9 0.75 1.25 1 0.2 0.45a
Once off charge 0 0 0 €732 0 0
aAn increment of 0.05 percent can be added for the best performing funds. 
SOURCE: Brady (2001a), Fultz (2012), and O’Quigley (2003).
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but the annual 1 percent fee levied on the value of the fund is higher 
than the usual annual fee of 0.75 percent of the value of the fund for a 
personal pension contract. The note by O’Quigley (2003), which pro-
vides the information on the usual fees for personal pension contracts, 
points out that the fees for a standard PRSA are “not particularly low” 
and that fees per contribution for personal pensions are “frequently less” 
than 5 percent. Although the annual fee of 1.25 percent of the value of 
the fund by Cornmarket Group for an AVC for a teacher is higher than 
the annual fee for a standard PRSA, the source of the information for 
this group, Brady (2001a, p. 12), points out that they were charging “at 
the top end of what is normal practice in the pensions business.” Fees 
for a standard PRSA were also higher than fees for a Stakeholder Pen-
sion in the UK, which was introduced in 2001, two years earlier than 
the PRSA. The only fee for a Stakeholder Pension was the 1 percent 
annual management fee.2 PRSA fees are also higher than the revised 
maximum fees imposed in 2010 in Hungary on mandatory and volun-
tary private pension investment accounts and on mandatory accounts in 
Poland in 2012. The deductions from contributions in Ireland are nearly 
40 percent greater than in Poland while the annual management fees 
are two-thirds greater. Both sets of fees are five times greater in Ireland 
than in Hungary. 
Why did the standard PRSA turn out to be a higher-cost product 
than envisaged by the Pensions Board? The main reason appears to be 
that the pension providers were not prepared to offer a PRSA at a much 
lower cost than they previously charged for a personal pension, and 
they were able to insist on this because the government was not willing 
to offer the PRSA product without their cooperation 
During the negotiations between pension providers and the govern-
ment on the terms and conditions that would be attached to the new 
PRSA product, financial journalists discovered from their own sources 
that the providers were opposed to both a government certification and 
any cap on their fees. For example, Kerby (2001, p. 52) reports in Busi-
ness	and	Finance magazine that “the pension companies lobbied hard 
against a kite-mark or a maximum charge (they certainly didn’t want 
anything like the total 1 percent limit imposed on Stakeholder, the UK 
version of the PRSA).” 
What emerged eventually from the negotiations was a compromise 
under which the providers would offer a standard PRSA, with fees gen-
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erally higher than usual for previous personal pension products, and 
they would offer a nonstandard PRSA, which allowed the providers to 
levy higher fees than previous personal pension products. In the same 
article, Kerby (2001, p. 52) points out that “the non-standard PRSA is 
certainly a compromise—a way for the pension companies (who have 
had this market to themselves up to now) to earn higher margins and to 
reward their commission-paid brokers.”
Subsequently, another journalist (Brady 2001b) investigating the 
negotiations between pension providers and the government, found a 
letter under the Freedom of Information Act from the Irish Insurance 
Federation that warned that “if the eventual regime does not give suf-
ficient scope for profitability” there is a danger that “only a limited 
number of providers [will] choose to enter the market.”
Very little additional information has emerged about the negotia-
tions between pension providers and the government, but it is likely that 
the traditional pension providers were also opposed to new providers 
entering the pensions market. Neither the post office nor other retail 
outlets, such as national supermarket chain stores, entered the pensions 
market. The traditional providers may also have been opposed to a flex-
ible retirement age for the PRSA product, as when it was introduced it 
was stipulated that owners of PRSA products could not retire before 
age 60. The providers also appear to have been opposed to owners of 
PRSAs being obliged to take out an annuity. This was a requirement 
when the PRSA was introduced but the pensions industry frequently 
insisted that owners of PRSAs should be able to avail of the Approved 
Retirement Fund (ARF) and Approved Minimum Retirement Fund 
(AMRF) options in the same way as the self-employed. This objective 
was achieved in 2011 when the ARF and AMRF options were extended 
to owners of PRSAs.3
The hope, expressed by the Pensions Board and others, that pro-
moting the PRSA would help to simplify the pension system was not 
realized. Instead, it greatly increased the complexity of the choices that 
ordinary savers faced. One professional advisor, Gilhawley (2003), ar-
gued that what eventually emerged from the negotiations “isn’t a pretty 
sight” and that it “ensured that the PRSA market will be a jungle for the 
ordinary saver” (p. 7).
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PRSA ACCESS AND COVERAGE
Following agreement with pension providers on the terms and 
conditions on which a standard PRSA could be offered in the market, 
providers were accredited by the Pensions Board. Accredited providers 
started to advertise their PRSAs in April 2003 so that they would be 
ready to be nominated by employers as designated providers by Sep-
tember 2003. This was the date set by the Pensions Board by which the 
great majority of employers would be required by law to have nomi-
nated at least one provider to supply a PRSA to their employees. 
In June 2003, a few months before that date, the Irish Financial 
Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA), which was jointly responsible 
with the Pensions Board for regulating PRSAs, issued instructions to 
PRSA providers that suggested the regulators were concerned to avoid 
a repetition in Ireland of practices by personal pension providers, which 
led to the pensions misselling scandal in the UK in the 1990s (Ward 
2000). These instructions required providers at the point of sale to
• inform prospective clients about the difference between a stan-
dard and a nonstandard PRSA,
• have a statement signed by both parties that all risks have been 
pointed out and that all relevant information has been provided, 
and
• give clients the IFSRA consumer fact sheet about PRSAs to 
help them assess which type of PRSA would best suit their 
needs.
Kerby (2003) reports that the reason the IFSRA stipulated what in-
formation should be available to prospective purchasers of PRSAs was 
that the director of the consumer division of the IFSRA had said, “We 
do not want consumers encouraged to purchase a nonstandard PRSA 
when it is not required, simply to generate additional revenue for the 
financial institutions.” 
The objective that all employers, except the 4 percent or so with oc-
cupational plans for all employees (Hughes and Whelan 1996), should 
designate a PRSA provider has fallen well short of target. Figures 3.1 
and 3.2 show, starting in September 2003, the cumulative number and 
percentage of employers who have designated a PRSA provider and 
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the cumulative number and percentage of firms in which employees 
have taken out PRSA contracts. It should be noted that we do not know 
how many employees continue to make PRSA contributions because 
the Pensions Board does not publish this information. Experience in 
the UK shows that about half of contributors to personal pensions have 
ceased to make contributions within four years of taking out a contract 
(Financial Services Authority 2006).
By the end of 2003, when all employers were legally obliged to 
designate a PRSA provider, only 58,770, or less than half of all the 
firms listed in the Companies Registration Office, had nominated a pro-
vider. In those firms that had a designated provider, only 2,502, or less 
than 2 percent of all firms, had employees who had taken out a PRSA 
contract. This outcome of the long planning stage for the designation 
Figure 3.1  Number of Employers Designating a PRSA Provider and 
Number of Employer Designations Where Employees Have 












Employers designating a PRSA provider
Number of employer designations where contributions are being made
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/ 
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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of PRSA providers was so abysmal that in September 2004, a year after 
the launch, the Pensions Board contacted 64,000 firms to remind them 
of their legal obligation to designate a PRSA provider for their employ-
ees. In the period up to March 2012, about a decade after the launch of 
PRSAs, there has been an increase in the number of employers desig-
nating a provider and in the number of these firms in which employees 
have taken out a PRSA contract to 93,401 and 17,209, respectively. 
However, after an initial spurt in the number of employers designating a 
provider up to December 2005, the percentage of employers designating 
a provider has remained fairly stable at less than 50 percent, while the 
percentage of firms in which employees have taken out a PRSA contract 
has increased from less than 2 percent to around 10 percent. Looking 
at the figures in terms of employers who have designated a PRSA pro-
Figure 3.2  Percentage of Firms Designating a PRSA Provider and 
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vider, they show that 81 percent of employer-designated plans have no 
one contributing to them. Where employers do have employees who 
have taken out a PRSA contract, the average number of employees with 
contracts is about four. 
Figure 3.3 shows the cumulative number of standard, nonstandard, 
and total PRSAs sold. Sales were slow at first but they increased rapidly 
so that by December 2012 over 200,000 PRSA contracts had been sold, 
of which over 150,000, or three-quarters, were standard, and almost 
50,000, or one-quarter, were nonstandard. On the face of it, this looks 
like a satisfactory outcome. That is what the Pensions Board implies in 
its quarterly press releases about the sales figures. However, the group 
for which PRSAs were originally intended are employees in nonpen-
sionable employment. But this is not the group to which most PRSAs 
have been sold. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the number of employees and 
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self-employed and other individuals not in the labor force who have 
taken out PRSA contracts. 
In the first year following their introduction, the number and per-
centage of employees and self-employed and those not in the labor 
force taking out a PRSA contract were about the same. After September 
2004, the number and percentage of self-employed and purchasers not 
in the labor force began to increase much more rapidly than employ-
ees. By March 2012, the cumulative number of purchasers of PRSA 
contracts who were self-employed or not in the labor force was double 
the number of employees who had taken out contracts—132,345 versus 
67,973—while the percentage of self-employed and purchasers not in 
the labor force relative to all those not in the labor force was three times 
greater, 9.4 percent versus 3.2 percent. 
Figure 3.4  Number of Employees and Self-Employed and Those Not 
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Gilhawley (2007) has identified four separate markets where PRSAs 
are being sold: 1) employees in nonpensionable employment—the tar-
get group for which PRSAs were originally intended; 2) self-employed 
individuals who can contribute to a Retirement Annuity Contract or a 
PRSA or both; 3) employees who are already in pensionable employ-
ment who have an AVC plan; and 4) employees and the self-employed 
who already have either an occupational pension or a Retirement An-
nuity Contract who can transfer their pension funds to a PRSA. The 
Pensions Board has not published sufficient information to identify how 
many PRSA contracts have been taken out by each of these groups or 
by those not in the labor force who can also contribute to a PRSA. 
However, as employer-designated plans are obliged to offer at least one 
standard PRSA, it is reasonable to assume, as Gilhawley (2007) does, 
Figure 3.5  Percentage of Employees and Self-Employed and Those Not 
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that all PRSAs purchased through an employer-designated plan are 
standard PRSAs. This assumption also enables us to identify how many 
standard and nonstandard PRSAs have been sold to the self-employed 
and other individuals not in the labor force.
Figure 3.6 shows that when the PRSA product was launched in Sep-
tember 2003, about one-third of all PRSA contracts were taken out by 
employees for whom they were intended, and about two-thirds were 
taken out by self-employed and others who were not in the labor force. 
In the first two years of operation, there was a significant increase in 
the percentage of all contracts bought by employees and a significant 
decrease for the other group to almost 50 percent in each case. There-
after, the percentage of all PRSA contracts sold to employees gradually 
Figure 3.6  Standard PRSA Contracts Taken Out by Employees and  
PRSA Contracts Taken Out by Self-Employed and Those 
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decreased to around one-third, while the percentage sold to the self- 
employed and others gradually increased to about two-thirds. In De-
cember 2011, the cumulative figures for PRSA contracts sold indicated 
that only one-third of the contracts have been sold into the target mar-
ket, while two-thirds have been bought by individuals for whom the 
PRSA product was not intended. 
Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of PRSA contracts purchased 
by the self-employed and individuals outside the labor force that are 
standard and nonstandard. In September 2003, when the PRSA was 
launched, about 54 percent of the contracts bought by people who were 
not working were standard PRSAs, while 46 percent were nonstandard. 
However, in the next quarter ending in December 2003, about two-
thirds of the PRSA products bought by the self-employed and others 
Figure 3.7  Percentage of PRSA Contracts Sold to Self-Employed 
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not in the labor force were standard PRSAs while one-third were non-
standard. Subsequently, these proportions did not change much, so that 
by December 2011, about two-thirds of the PRSAs bought by the self-
employed and those not in the labor force were standard PRSAs, while 
one-third were nonstandard.
The influence of the self-employed on sales of PRSAs can be seen, 
as Gilhawley (2007) has noted, from the spikes in the quarterly figures 
for nonemployer designated sales, which occur in the last quarter of the 
year (Figure 3.8). These spikes are related to the October 31 tax dead-
line for backdating pension contributions by the self-employed to the 
previous tax year. 
Before the property bubble burst in Ireland in 2007, sales in the first 
three quarters averaged around 3,000 per quarter, but this figure jumped 
to around 7,000 in the last quarter. After the property collapse, sales in 
Figure 3.8  Quarterly Sales of PRSA Contracts to Self-Employed and 
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the first three quarters of the year fell back to around 2,000, while sales 
in the last quarter were about double this at around 4,000.
Almost 10 years after their introduction, sales of PRSAs to em-
ployees in nonpensionable employment, who are the target market, 
have been and continue to be low. On the other hand, sales to the self-
employed and others not in the labor force, for whom they were not 
intended, account for the significant growth in sales of PRSAs.
EFFECT OF PRSAs ON PENSION COVERAGE
The primary objective that was set for PRSAs by the Pensions 
Board was that within 10 years of their introduction they would help 
to increase the coverage rate of private pension plans to 60 percent of 
those in employment. Special surveys of pension coverage in 2002, 
2005, and 2009 have been undertaken by the Central Statistics Of-
fice (2004, 2006, 2011). These surveys enable us to evaluate whether 
PRSAs have helped to increase the coverage rate of private pension 
plans in a way that will lead to the achievement of the 60 percent target 
by the end of 2013. Table 3.2 shows that, contrary to expectations, there 
was no increase in the coverage rate of personal pension plans between 
2002 and 2005, whereas there was an increase in the coverage rate of 
occupational plans. 
We know from the quarterly PRSA sales figures that 1.3 percent of 
employees had taken out a PRSA contract by the end of 2005, which 
Table 3.2  Coverage of Occupational and Personal Pension Plans as a  












Occupational pension only 35.4 40.1 38.9
Personal pension only 12.9 12.1 9.6
Both 2.9 2.8 2.5
Total pension coverage 51.2 55.0 51.0
SOURCE: Central Statistics Office (2004, 2011) and author’s calculations.
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should have resulted in an increase in the personal pension coverage 
rate. The fact that the Central Statistics Office survey did not pick up 
such an increase but instead recorded a much bigger increase in the 
occupational pension coverage rate suggests that the coverage of oc-
cupational pensions increased independently of the introduction of 
PRSAs. It may also indicate that many respondents to the survey who 
purchase a personal pension through an employer-designated plan may 
identify it as an occupational rather than a personal pension. 
In 2007, the Irish property market collapsed, and a year later the 
global financial crisis began. Both of these events resulted in massive 
financial and job losses across the Irish economy. For example, total 
employment fell by over 300,000, or by 15 percent, between the begin-
ning of 2008 and the end of 2010, and the real value of pension fund 
assets fell by 37.5 percent in 2008 compared with 22.3 percent in Hun-
gary, 17.7 percent in Poland, and a weighted average of 23.7 percent 
in the OECD as a whole (OECD 2011). The effect of these losses was 
that the gains made in private pension coverage between 2002 and 2005 
were lost so that the coverage of occupational and personal pension 
plans fell from 40 percent to 39 percent and from 12 percent to 10 per-
cent, respectively. Overall the private pension coverage rate fell from 
55 percent in 2005 to 51 percent in 2009. This brought the coverage rate 
in 2009 back to its level in 2002 before PRSAs were introduced. 
PRSAs HAVE REINFORCED EXISTING INEQUITIES
In order to promote PRSAs, the government gave them entitlements 
similar to other pension plans to tax reliefs (preferential tax treatment) 
on employer and employee contributions and investment income and 
capital gains, and made the PRSA pension taxable on payment. Table 
3.3 shows estimates of the cost of tax relief on PRSA contributions 
since 2004 together with the number of contributors who claimed tax 
relief. These figures do not include contributions made by employers 
or by employees through their employer-designated PRSA for rea-
sons explained in the note to Table 3.3. As employees contributing to 
a PRSA through an employer-designated plan are excluded from these 
figures, they refer to the cost of tax reliefs for contributors who are self- 
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employed or not in the labor force. An estimate of the extent to which 
the figures in Table 3.3 are underestimated can be derived from ad-
ditional information that the Revenue Commissioners sought in 2006 
from employers about employer and employee contributions to PRSA 
and other pension plans. The improved data for 2006 show that the 
cost of tax reliefs for PRSA contributions amounted to €120 million 
and that there were 71,500 beneficiaries (Government of Ireland 2007, 
Table 7.2). In 2006, therefore, the cost of tax reliefs for PRSAs ap-
pears to have been twice as great as the figure published in the Revenue 
Commissioners’ report, and the number of beneficiaries appears to have 
been nearly 60 percent greater.
Table 3.3 shows that between 2004 and 2009, the Exchequer (the 
government treasury) has subsidized PRSAs by at least €320 million 
in the form of foregone tax. PRSA employer and employee contribu-
tions in 2006 amounted to €330 million, so in that year the Exchequer 
subsidy for PRSAs of €120 million amounted to 36 percent of total 
contributions.
In Ireland, government subsidies (through tax preferences) for 
private pensions overwhelmingly accrue to taxpayers with the largest 
incomes (Callan, Keane, and Walsh 2009; Hughes 2000; Hughes and 
Sinfield 2004), and some commentators (Hughes and Sinfield 2004) 
warned that the introduction of personal pension accounts would re-
inforce the existing inequalities. This warning has proved to be well 
founded. 
Table 3.3  Cost of Tax Relief on PRSA Contributions and Number of 
Beneficiaries,	2006







NOTE: The figures do not include contributions made by employees through employ-
ers’ payroll systems and in respect of which tax relief is provided on the net pay basis. 
Information on such contributions is not captured in such a way as to make it possible 
to provide disaggregated figures. 
SOURCE: Revenue Commissioners Statistical Reports 2007–2010.
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Using data from the Revenue Commissioners, Figure 3.9 shows 
the distribution of the cost of tax reliefs by income decile for the self-
employed and others not in the labor force in 2006. Nearly 36 percent 
of the tax reliefs were captured by the top income decile, and over half 
of them accrued to the top income quintile. In sharp contrast, the bottom 
income decile received about 1.5 percent of the tax reliefs, and the bot-
tom income quintile received less than 3 percent of them.
CONCLUSION
The great hopes that advocates of private personal pensions in Ire-
land had for a new voluntary pension product, the Personal Retirement 
Figure 3.9  Percentage of Tax Relief on PRSA Contributions by Self-
Employed and Others Not in Labor Force Accruing to Each 
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Savings Account, have not been realized. Few of the key objectives 
set by the government regulator of private pension plans have been at-
tained. The fees for a standard PRSA have generally been higher than 
the usual fees for personal pension products available before PRSAs 
were introduced. Neither the post office nor other retail outlets, such 
as supermarket chain stores, entered the new market for personal pen-
sions. Standard PRSAs do not have a flexible retirement age, as owners 
cannot receive their benefits until they are age 60. Owners of PRSAs 
are not obliged to buy an annuity if they can satisfy the conditions for 
transferring their PRSA pension fund into an ARF or an AMRF pension 
fund. While it was made mandatory that all employers who did not pro-
vide an occupational pension for all their employees should designate 
a personal pension provider for their employees, less than half of the 
firms registered with the Companies Office have actually designated 
a PRSA provider. Employees in nonpensionable employment have 
shown limited interest in the PRSA product, as no one is contributing to 
a PRSA in four-fifths of the firms that have designated a PRSA provider.
Up to the beginning of 2012, the take-up of PRSAs by employees 
has been very poor, with only 3 percent of employees deciding to buy a 
PRSA. The take-up has been much greater by a group for whom PRSAs 
were not intended—the self-employed and those not in the labor force. 
Approximately 9 percent of these have taken out PRSA contracts, and 
this group is now the largest market for personal pension products in 
Ireland. Up to the end of 2009, the introduction of PRSAs had failed to 
make any progress toward their primary objective of increasing pension 
coverage of the employed population to 60 percent—indeed, the cover-
age rate was slightly lower in 2009 than it was in 2002. Given the lack 
of trust in the private pension system’s ability to deliver on its promises, 
it is most unlikely that the coverage rate will reach anywhere near the 
60 percent figure by the end of 2013. 
In addition to failing to meet the objectives set by the government 
and the Pensions Board, PRSAs have reinforced inequities in the pri-
vate pension system that existed before PRSAs were introduced. As 
with previous private pension products, PRSAs have predominantly 
been bought by taxpayers in the top half of the income distribution. The 
benefits of government subsidies for PRSAs have been captured mainly 
by high-income earners, with over half of the tax reliefs for PRSAs 
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accruing to the top 20 percent of those who have claimed tax relief on 
their PRSA contributions.
Ireland has spent the last 15 years trying to shift the public/private 
balance of pension provision toward private pensions on a voluntary 
basis. This policy has failed; the pension coverage rate now is no greater 
than it was before the new personal pensions were introduced in 2003. 
Some advocates of private pensions argue that coverage should be 
made mandatory, as it is in some other countries like Poland, Hungary, 
and Australia. Consideration was given to mandatory approaches in the 
Pensions Board’s (2005) National	Pensions	Review in 2005 and in a 
report by Fitzpatrick Associates (2006) commissioned by the Pensions 
Board in 2006. The Fitzpatrick report considered a number of different 
mandatory models and concluded that “ . . . in general it would seem 
that the implementation of a mandatory scheme would generate simi-
lar effects to those of any new national tax. The extent of the negative 
impact on growth rates will be determined by . . . design and delivery 
issues . . .” (p. 23).
In addition to this negative assessment of mandatory plans, the ex-
perience of countries with mandatory private pensions suggests that 
this approach suffers from the same problems of high costs, lost tax 
revenue, and uncertain benefits as the voluntary approach (Fultz 2012). 
These problems could be avoided if Ireland were to adopt another ap-
proach that members of the Pension Policy Research Group at Trinity 
College Dublin have advocated for many years (Hughes and Stewart 
2007; Stewart 2005). 
They argue that it would be more equitable if tax relief for private 
pension saving was given only at the standard rate of tax and that the ad-
ditional tax revenue that this would generate should be used to increase 
the basic state pension to above the poverty level. As the great majority 
of employees in nonpensionable employment will be dependent in their 
retirement on the state pension, this solution has a number of merits. 
It would give them an assurance that they could look forward to a 
modest defined benefit pension related to the average industrial wage 
rather than having to bear all the risks of a voluntary, soft mandatory, or 
mandatory PRSA defined contribution plan.  If the state pension were 
increased to around 40 percent of the average industrial wage it could 
significantly reduce pensioner poverty. New Zealand has a flat-rate pen-
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sion benefit similar to Ireland’s, but at a higher level relative to the 
average wage, and it has one of the lowest rates of pensioner poverty in 
the OECD. It would reduce the cost of tax reliefs on private pensions 
in Ireland, which comparative research suggests are among the highest 
in the OECD (Yoo and de Serres 2004). It would provide the revenue 
needed to maintain the state pension at a time of economic crisis when 
there are calls to reduce it. Finally, it would introduce a greater measure 
of fairness into Ireland’s pension system by redistributing resources 
from the top 20 percent of households which receive nearly 80 percent 
of the pension tax reliefs to the 80 percent of households whose main 
source of retirement income is the state pension. 
Notes
I am grateful to Jim Stewart of Trinity College Dublin and Elaine Fultz of JMF Research 
Associates, Philadelphia, for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Previously, individuals who changed or lost their jobs had to cease contributing to 
their pension arrangement.
2. In 2005, the annual management fee for a Stakeholder Pension was increased to 
1.5 percent for the first 10 years, after which it falls back to 1 percent.
3. An Approved Retirement Fund (ARF) option is an alternative to an annuity 
purchase. On retirement, the self-employed owner of a Retirement Annuity 
Contract or an owner of a PRSA can decide to invest the pension fund into a 
fund administered by a qualifying fund manager and take one-fourth of the value 
of the fund as a tax free lump sum. Income and gains from an ARF are tax free 
within the fund whereas drawdowns from the fund are subject to income tax. If 
the individual has a guaranteed retirement income less than 1.5 times the state Old 
Age Contributory Pension, the pension fund has to be invested in an Approved 
Minimum Retirement Fund (AMRF) until the person reaches age 75 when the 
AMRF can be transferred into an ARF. 
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From an international perspective, the poverty rate among pension-
ers in Sweden is low. This is explained by both the pension system, 
especially by the guarantee pension, and housing allowance for pen-
sioners, as well as other parts of the Swedish welfare system. According 
to a comparative study of 15 European countries (van Vliet et al. 2011), 
Sweden has the lowest proportion of poor among the elderly, along 
with Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, in Sweden many re-
tirees have a vulnerable position with a standard only slightly above the 
guidelines for when social assistance may be granted. The disposable 
income at the 20th percentile is only slightly above the norm for social 
assistance. Mainly older retirees (aged 75 and older) are in this group. 
In the first half of the 1990s, more and more people were under the 
poverty line, which is defined as those who have an income of below 60 
percent of the median income, but since 1998, poverty measured in this 
way has decreased (Gustafsson, Johansson, and Palmer 2009).
Thus, even though pensioner poverty is rare, there are good rea-
sons for investigating who the poor pensioners are, why they are poor, 
and how they are likely to do in the future. The future development 
of pensions depends strongly on the transition that Sweden, like many 
other countries, has gone through from defined benefit to defined con-
tribution pensions in both the social security pension system and the 
occupational pension system. This means that pensions depend on an 
individual’s work and labor income history to a greater extent than be-
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fore. To be able to receive a high pension, working in Sweden for many 
years is required. Concern for future pensions is also due to the fact 
that economic growth affects defined contribution pensions in differ-
ent ways. Not least, there is concern about the fate of pensions that are 
based on individuals’ choices of pension funds. In some other countries, 
this has led to a considerable reduction of the pensions for people who 
have already left the workforce for retirement, and some people have 
returned to work because of economic necessity. 
In this chapter, we outline the Swedish pension system, the changes 
in employment among those aged 60 years and older, definitions of 
retirement, the data used, and the measures we use to study income dif-
ferences. We then examine how the income distribution differs between 
pensioners and those of working age, and whether and how the differ-
ence has changed over time, and we discuss the differences in pensioner 
income distribution among different cohorts and men and women, and 
why the income gaps between pensioner groups have increased. Pen-
sion income is the main source of income for those aged 65 and older, 
but many also have substantial income from labor or capital, and many 
have assets primarily in their homes, which we also report. We then 
study how the level of pension income is influenced by the individual’s 
work history, record of self-employment, and number of years in Swe-
den. In the last sections, we study in more detail some groups with low 
pension incomes. We end with a summary and offer some conclusions. 
THE SWEDISH PENSION SYSTEM
To understand the income differences and their changes over time 
among retired people in Sweden, we give a short introduction to the 
structure of the Swedish pension system.1 The Swedish pension system 
is a three-tier system consisting of social security pensions, occupa-
tional pensions, and personal pensions. As the system has changed a 
great deal since the 1990s, different cohorts belong to different pension 
systems, and some cohorts have pensions from different generations of 
pensions systems. 
Social security pensions were introduced in Sweden 100 years ago 
in 1913. The retirement age when benefits first could be received was 
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67. After some minor changes to the system in the 1920s and 1930s, 
a major change followed in 1948, when a non-income-tested and 
non-income-dependent pension was introduced. This basic pension 
(folkpension) was the same for everyone except that married pensioners 
got a lower pension than those who were not married. An earnings- 
related additional pension (ATP), a defined benefit system, was intro-
duced in 1960 and was based on the 15 years with the highest income. 
There was a ceiling regarding the income included for the calculation 
of the pension per year in the ATP system. The ATP pension required 
that a person work for at least 30 years in order to obtain a full pension; 
with fewer years of work, the pension was proportionally reduced. The 
normal pension age was lowered from 67 to 65 in 1976, but it was 
possible to take a reduced pension earlier or postpone the take-up and 
receive an enhanced pension at an older age. The pension benefits were 
price indexed.
A new social security pension system—a defined contribution sys-
tem—was decided on in two steps by the parliament in 1994 and 1998 
and implemented from 1999 onward. The pension contribution rate is 
18.5 percent of the worker’s income up to a ceiling, 16 percent of which 
is allocated to a notional defined contribution system, and 2.5 percent 
of which is for an individual account system (called the premium pen-
sion), where each individual can choose between many investment 
funds. The pension derived from the notional defined contribution is in-
come indexed. Pension benefits from the notional defined contribution 
system can be received starting at age 61 but are higher the later they 
are taken (it is an actuarially fair system with respect to benefit receipt 
at different ages). 
For those who have had no income or a low income, there is a 
guarantee pension. Qualification to receive this pension is based on 
the benefit levels from the income-related social security pension. To 
receive a full guarantee pension, 40 years of residence in Sweden is 
necessary, otherwise it is proportionally reduced. The guarantee pen-
sion is price indexed. Those aged 65 or older who have a low pension or 
other low levels of income and have taken up their entire social security 
pension may be eligible for a housing allowance.
There has been a gradual change from the old to the new social se-
curity pension system. Those born in 1937 or earlier are completely in 
the old system. Those born in 1938 are to 4/20 in the new system, those 
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born in 1944 are to 10/20 in the new system and those born in 1954 are 
totally in the new system.2 
When the ATP system was introduced, those employed in the pub-
lic sector and white-collar workers in the private sector were already 
covered by occupational pension plans. These plans deliver additional 
income replacement for income under the ceiling and a high replace-
ment for income over the ceiling in the social security pension system. 
Blue-collar workers in the private sector achieved an agreement con-
cerning occupational pensions in the 1970s. After the pension reforms 
in the 1990s, the occupational pension plans were changed so that many 
are defined contribution plans, but there are still important defined ben-
efit elements in all systems, with the exception of blue-collar workers 
in the private sector. Sweden has high occupational pension coverage 
of its workforce, as around 90 percent of all wage-earners are employed 
at workplaces with collective agreements and thus are covered by oc-
cupational pension plans. 
Many people also have personal pensions. There are tax reductions 
for savings for personal pensions, but the maximum tax reduction has 
gradually been reduced. 
The Law of Employment Security (LAS) covers people up to age 
67. Mandatory retirement under age 67 has not been allowed since 2003 
(before 2003, this age was 65). In some sectors, 67 is becoming the 
normal age of retirement.
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AMONG OLDER 
PEOPLE IN SWEDEN
In Sweden, it is possible to follow labor force participation and 
employment in labor force surveys for over 50 years. Statistics Sweden 
carried out its first labor force survey in 1961, after the Labor Mar-
ket Board (AMS) had conducted pilot studies in 1959 and 1960. In 
1961, the male employment rate was high for those aged 60–69, but this 
gradually declined in the mid-1990s for those aged 60 and older. The 
male employment rate has increased since the mid-1990s for those aged 
60–64, and since 2003 for those aged 65–66. It is, however, still much 
lower than it was in the early 1960s (Figure 4.1). 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
Social Security and Pension Income in Sweden   67
The female employment rate was low in the early 1960s, when it 
was common for women to be housewives, but for those under age 65 
it has gradually increased since then with some business cycle varia-
tions (Figure 4.2). The employment rate is still higher among men than 
women in all age groups, but the difference has gradually decreased 
with new cohorts and also within each cohort. 
WHO HAS RETIRED?
This study deals with income distribution among pensioners. The 
line between being retired and being in the labor force, however, is in 
many cases unclear, and retirement age varies widely among individu-
als. Taking a pension and retiring is not the same thing. When someone 
Figure 4.1  Employment Rate for Men, 1961–2011
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takes a pension it does not mean that he or she leaves the labor force—a 
pension from the social security system can be taken while working, 
and the pension is not means-tested against other pension, other in-
come, or wealth. One definition is that someone is retired when his or 
her pension income exceeds the sum of labor income and unemploy-
ment benefit or other social insurance benefits.
The Swedish Pensions Agency uses four different measures of 
retirement in its analysis (Karlsson and Olsson 2012). The first mea-
sure is the Average Exit Age, which is the age that a person leaves the 
workforce, given that he or she was working at age 50. The other three 
measures are different average pension age measures. Average Pension 
Age I is the average age for taking an old-age pension (not only the 
individual account premium pension), Average Pension Age II includes 
those who receive a disability pension (taken up from age 30 or older), 
and Average Pension Age III also includes those receiving a disability 
Figure 4.2  Employment Rate for Women, 1961–2011 
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pension, but only when they are 50 or older. Average Pension Age III is 
more in line with the definition of the Average Exit Age, which also has 
50 as an age limit. Occupational and personal pensions are not included 
in the definition of pension income. 
According to the Swedish Pensions Agency, in 2011 the Average 
Pension Ages I, II, and III were 64.6, 62.5, and 63.9, respectively.
Age limits in the pension system and in the Employment Protection 
Act (LAS) influence when someone leaves the workforce. The social 
security pension can be claimed at age 61, but the guarantee pension 
cannot be taken before age 65. In the next few years, it is expected 
that about 25 percent of new retirees will receive the guarantee pen-
sion. In 2008, 778,000 individuals had a guarantee pension, of which 
180,000 (15 percent) had a full one. Of those who received a guarantee 
pension, 80 percent were women (Olsson 2011). Nearly half of female 
pensioners aged 65–69 received a guarantee pension in 2008. Housing 
allowances for older persons may be granted from age 65 if the full so-
cial security pension is drawn. The Employment Protection Act, on the 
other hand, covers employees up to age 67.
In addition to these age limits, occupational and personal pension 
plans have different age limits. Personal pensions and occupational 
pensions from the private sector (ITP and SAF-LO) and the defined 
contribution component of the pensions for municipal and county 
employees (KAP-KL) can be claimed from age 55. Employees in 
the public sector can take their pensions from age 61. Occupational 
pensions should, according to collective agreements, be taken out for 
retirement purposes.
In our analysis of patterns of income receipt among older persons, 
we chose to draw the line at age 65 for several reasons: the majority 
take their pensions at age 65, a guarantee pension can first be granted 
at age 65, the age limit for unemployment insurance and disability pen-
sion is 65, and special rules apply to those 65 years and older regarding 
sickness benefit and compensation from work injury insurance. In the 
labor market policy programs, there are no formal age limits, but those 
aged 65 and older are in practice not assigned to labor market programs. 
In addition, many (wrongly) think that the retirement age in the social 
security pension system is 65.
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MEASURING INCOME DISTRIBUTION
When studying the income distribution and how it changes, we 
can use several different kinds of income measures. The most common 
one is the household’s disposable income, that is, household market in-
come minus taxes plus transfers (see, for example, Björklund and Jäntti 
[2011]). When we compare the income distribution for those who are 
under 65 with the incomes of those who are older, we can use both 
the disposable income per individual in the household and the indi-
vidual household member’s own disposable income. When we look 
more closely at the income distribution for those aged 65 and older, 
we can analyze different types of income and the distribution of those 
incomes. Here, in addition to average disposable income per person in 
a household, we analyze individual disposable income, pension income 
from the social security and occupational pension systems, and income 
from capital. We also study the distribution of wealth. The information 
on disposable income, pensions, and capital income is derived from 
the Longitudinal Income Database (LINDA) for the years 1982–2009 
(see Kruse [2010]). LINDA consists of register data of a representative 
sample of the population, including information regarding the person’s 
family. The data on wealth come from HEK (the incomes of the house-
holds), which is an annual telephone survey of a representative sample 
of the population (see Rosén Karlsson [2011]).
In this study, we use percentile ratios when we look at income 
inequality and how it has changed over time. We chose this measure 
rather than the often used Gini coefficient because of its simple inter-
pretation, and because by using percentile ratios, we can investigate 
both the lower and the upper sections of income distribution.3
The ratio between the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile (P90/
P10) shows how many times higher the income of a person with the 
90th percentile income is compared to the income of a person who has 
the 10th percentile income. If the ratio is 2, the person with the 90th 
percentile income has twice as much in income as the person with the 
10th percentile income.4
In order to investigate those with high incomes and those with 
low incomes, we compare the 90th and 10th percentiles with the me-
dian, P90/P50 and P50/P10, respectively. By using percentile ratios as 
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a measurement of wage dispersion, one can examine whether income 
inequality increases or decreases from year to year. The measure is not 
influenced by general income growth.
DOES THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION DIFFER 
BETWEEN OLDER AND YOUNGER PERSONS?
Disposable incomes are lower for those aged 65 and older than for 
those aged 55–64. Those aged 75 and older have particularly low in-
comes. Figure 4.3 shows household disposable income per person for 
different income groups. Income inequality has increased for those 
aged 50–64 and 65–74. For those aged 75 and older, the income differ-
ences have been more or less the same until the last few years. Many 
in this age group only receive the basic pension from the old pension 
system, which leads to a compressed income structure. Over the past 
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SOURCE: LINDA.
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few years, however, income inequality has first increased and then de-
creased slightly. The share of this age group with income-related social 
security pensions and occupational pension systems has increased.
Having already demonstrated the changes over time in income in-
equality among households, Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the disposable 
incomes of men and women. Income inequality for men aged 50–64 
and 65–74 has increased sharply. In recent years, the trend has been 
particularly pronounced among those who are aged 50–64. For those 
aged 65–75, the income gap has mainly grown in the upper part of the 
distribution (P90/P50).
Figure 4.5 shows that income inequality among women aged 50–64 
was high in the beginning of the 1980s. Many women were not em-
ployed, and many of those employed worked part time, often short part 
time. As women gradually entered the labor market, income inequal-
ity among women aged 50–64 decreased strongly. Among women 65 
and older, in contrast, income inequality increased, especially in the 
upper part of the distribution. More women now have income-related 
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pensions, but many still have a guarantee pension only or one that is 
combined with a low-income pension.
Has income inequality increased or decreased? The main tendency 
is that it has increased significantly among both men and women aged 
65–74 and also among women 75 and older. This applies particularly 
to those with high incomes (P90), who now have much higher incomes 
than those in the same age with low incomes (P10). In the lower part of 
the income distribution, the changes are much smaller (P50/P10).
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG OLDER PEOPLE 
IN SWEDEN
We now compare further the incomes of men and women and 
foreign born and native people, respectively. Here, we estimate the per-
centile distribution separately of each of those four groups and then 
SOURCE: LINDA.
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compare them. There are a number of reasons for conducting these two 
comparisons. Women have had and still have a weaker labor market at-
tachment than men, and pensions are based on earned income over the 
years. In the old pension system, 30 years of earnings were required for 
a full pension, and the best 15 years counted for the calculation of the 
pension. In the new system, the income for all years is counted. Women 
more often have had career breaks and are more likely than men to have 
worked part time. This leads to lower pensions for women than for men 
in the new system. This means that women often receive a guarantee 
pension, which, unlike the income pension, is not indexed to income 
growth in the economy but is price indexed. This situation will prob-
ably lead to a gradual reduction of the average economic standard for 
women compared to that of men.
The foreign born in many cases have a weak labor market attach-
ment. They often are not in the labor force or unemployed, more so 
than natives, and many of those who are employed have low incomes. 
Coming to Sweden as an adult can also lead to a low pension—it is 
often difficult to enter the labor market, and therefore many have few 
years with a contribution to the pension system. Those who immigrate 
after age 25 cannot reach the 40 years’ residence in Sweden needed to 
receive a full guarantee pension at age 65. 
The foreign born in Sweden are a heterogeneous group. Those who 
come from other Nordic countries and other countries in Western Eu-
rope have generally had a much better situation on the labor market 
before their retirement than those from countries outside Europe. The 
rules for pensions also differ depending on country of origin due to the 
existence of various international agreements. The rules are different 
for those coming from other Nordic countries, other EU/EEA countries, 
other countries with which Sweden has a pension agreement, and coun-
tries with which Sweden has no agreement regarding social security 
pensions.
COMPARING THE INCOMES OF WOMEN AND MEN
Figure 4.6 shows that women’s disposable incomes are lower than 
men’s. This applies to all three age groups—50–64, 65–74, and 75 and 
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Figure 4.6  Disposable Incomes for Women as a Share of the Disposable 
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older—and all three percentiles that we report—P10, P50, and P90. 
However, there are some differences. Women aged 50–64 in the 10th 
percentile had low incomes at the beginning of the period compared to 
men in the same percentile. It was a period when many women were 
not employed; housewives were common. Women’s relative earnings 
later increased among those in the 10th percentile. Since the mid-1990s, 
women’s disposable incomes have been 70–80 percent of men’s in-
comes in all three percentiles for those aged 50–64. For those aged 
65–74, women’s incomes have fluctuated between 65 and 75 percent of 
men’s incomes for the three percentiles over the past 27 years.
Among those 75 and older, women’s incomes declined relative 
to those of men throughout the period. During the 1980s, income dif-
ferences were small in this age group. Among those with the lowest 
incomes (P10), women even had slightly higher incomes than men. 
This is explained by the fact that women more often than men are not 
married (including widows) in this age group, and that a single per-
son received a slightly higher pension than a married person according 
SOURCE: LINDA.
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to the rules of the basic social security pension. In the late 2000s, the 
income differences between men and women were large in all three per-
centile groups. The difference was largest for those with high incomes 
(P90), where women’s incomes were only about 65 percent of men’s.
The next step is to compare the pensions of women and men aged 
65–74 and 75 and older in the same percentiles as before—P10, P50, 
and P90 (Figure 4.7). There was a large sudden change in pensions be-
tween 2002 and 2003. This is explained by the fact that payment from 
the new pension system started in 2003. The basic pension and the pen-
sion supplement were replaced by the guarantee pension in that year. In 
the statistics for 2002 and earlier, only the basic pension and the ATP 
pension, but not the pension supplement, were included as parts of the 
pension income. The graphs in Figure 3.1 outline disposable income, 
including pension supplements and housing allowances for pensioners. 
This explains why we do not see large sudden changes in the graphs in 
Figure 3.1.
We finally show the pension income distribution for women and 
men aged 65–74 and 75 and older (Figure 4.8). Pension income in-
equality increased for female pensioners, both for those 65–74 and for 
those 75 and older, but the differences in pensions are slightly lower for 
the older group. For women aged 65–74, income inequality decreased 
in the upper part of the distribution. 
For the oldest women, pension income inequality increased. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, a large majority of the oldest women only had 
a basic pension. Therefore the pension income distribution was com-
pressed. As more women in that age group received income-related 
social security pensions and occupational pensions, they pulled away 
from those with only a basic pension, and pension income inequality 
increased.
For men aged 65–74, pension income inequality has remained fairly 
constant. The exception is the P90/P10 ratio. This ratio first declined for 
some years and then rose for several years. However, there are larger 
changes for those aged 75 and over for P90/P10 and P50/P10. A marked 
rise in the ratio P90/P10, and to a lesser extent P50/P10 is followed by 
a jump down and then stabilization.
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Figure 4.7  Pension (Social Security and Occupational) Incomes of 
Women as a Share of the Pension Incomes of Men at the 10th, 
50th, and 90th Percentiles, 1982–2009
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Figure 4.8  Changes in Pension Incomes (Social and Occupational) for 
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INCOME FROM CAPITAL
Income from capital has become an increasingly important part of 
pensioners’ income and now represents one-fifth of the income of those 
aged 65 and older. It is unevenly distributed between pensioners, and 
mainly concentrated on those with the highest incomes. The fact that 
capital income has risen sharply for those with the highest incomes has 
contributed the most to increased income inequality among pensioners 
(Gustafsson, Zaid, and Franzén 2007).
Those who are 65 and older have on average about the same finan-
cial assets but lower debt and higher real assets (property) compared to 
those under 65 (Flood 2004). This means that their net wealth is high, 
especially when compared to those below age 50. On average, the net 
wealth is SEK 1.2 million for those 65 and older, and slightly lower for 
those 75 and older. The net wealth of men 65 and older is on average 
half a million SEK higher than for women the same age.
Flood (2004) examines the total net assets in different age groups in 
2000 and establishes that wealth is greatest at age 56 and remains at a 
high level to about age 65. Those 65 and older had less wealth, and their 
levels of wealth declined even more as they got older. This corresponds 
with the theory of redistribution of income over the life cycle—you 
save when you are of working age and use the savings when you have 
retired. The differences could also be partly explained by differences 
in the cohorts’ wealth positions when they reach retirement age. It is 
important to note that the data in Flood’s study are from a cross-section, 
and individuals are not followed over several years.
Many banks provide “senior loans” with the home of the retirees as 
security. Homeownership can thus contribute to increased consumption. 
The share of those who owned a house was almost as great among those 
aged 65–74 (41 percent) as among those aged 30–65 (46–49 percent) 
(Table 4.1). A quarter of those 75 and older owned a house. On average, 
the value of the house was slightly higher for those 65 and older than 
for younger age groups. The share of those 65 and older who owned a 
house was higher among men compared to women. The houses men 
own are also somewhat more valuable than the houses women own.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
84   




Mean value  
for those  
with a value 
(thousand SEK)





Mean value for 
those with a value 




Mean value for 
those with a value 




Mean value for 




44.0 1,381 29.0 1,165 12.0 944 7.0 761
0–19 0.4 697 0.1 677 0.2 641 0.1 429
20–29 24.0 950 8.0 730 14.0 1,017 2.0 572
30–49 63.0 1,297 46.0 1,128 15.0 1,035 8.0 718
50–64 69.0 1,559 49.0 1,206 16.0 951 15.0 785
65–74 64.0 1,507 41.0 1,262 18.0 811 14.0 785
75 + 49.0 1,287 24.0 1,245 21.0 787 7.0 804
Women 42.0 1,260 26.0 1,132 13.0 951 7.0 757
0–19 0.4 676 0.1 660 0.2 615 0.1 424
20–29 24.0 940 9.0 720 14.0 1,063 1.0 561
30–49 62.0 1,218 45.0 1,112 14.0 1,028 7.0 703
50–64 66.0 1,396 44.0 1,173 17.0 966 15.0 781
65–74 56.0 1,316 31.0 1,202 20.0 828 13.0 791
75 + 41.0 1,173 17.0 1,228 21.0 824 5.0 816
Men 46.0 1,492 31.0 1,193 12.0 937 8.0 765
0–19 0.4 721 0.1 694 0.2 676 0.1 434
20–29 24.0 959 7.0 741 15.0 978 2.0 582
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30–49 64.0 1,370 46.0 1,143 15.0 1,041 8.0 732
50–64 73.0 1,705 54.0 1,233 15.0 935 15.0 789
65–74 73.0 1,665 51.0 1,300 16.0 790 16.0 780
75 + 61.0 1,407  36.0 1,257  20.0 726  10.0 795
aA house with one or two (semidetached house) homes.
SOURCE: Statistics Sweden’s wealth statistics.
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WHAT CAUSED THE INCOME GAP BETWEEN PENSIONERS?
Pension income is the main income of those aged 65 and older. 
In this section, we examine the importance of labor income, labor 
market attachment, disability pension, the sector they retired from, self- 
employment, marital status, sex, country of birth (grouped level), and 
the age for retirement with regard to the probability of belonging to the 
groups of low- and high-income pensioners. We investigate the prob-
ability of belonging to the 10 and 20 percent group with the lowest 
pension income and the 20 or 10 percent group with the highest pension 
incomes for those who retired between 2005 and 2008. Our measure 
of pension income includes social security and occupational pensions. 
Being retired is defined here as receiving a pension income (social se-
curity and occupational pension) that exceeds labor income. We use the 
pension income for the year after retirement when we examine the like-
lihood of persons being low- or high-income pensioners. The analysis 
includes only those whom we have information for at least five years 
before retirement.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of probit estimates. Marginal 
effects are reported. Men are less likely to belong to the group of pen-
sioners with the lowest pensions and more likely to belong to the group 
with the highest pensions. Being married has no effect on the pension 
income group to which a pensioner belongs.
The later persons retire, the lower the probability of their belonging 
to the group of pensioners with low incomes. However, the retirement 
age does not matter for the probability of belonging to those with the 
highest pension incomes. This is a result of effects working in different 
directions. Those with high pensions can better afford to take their pen-
sions early, so that many with high pensions leave the workforce early. 
On the other hand, the pensions for those who leave the workforce late 
will be higher given their earlier incomes, as pensions are based on pre-
vious incomes, and the incomes will be higher if the pension is taken 
up at a higher age (fewer years with a pension are expected). The esti-
mates show that the higher the income is five years before retirement, 
the lower the probability is of being among those with a low pension.
One group with low pensions, which we return to later, is the self-
employed. Those who were self-employed five years before retirement 
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belong more often to the group with the lowest pension incomes and 
are less likely to belong to the group with the highest pensions. Those 
leaving the labor force with a disability pension are another group with 
low pensions.
We have also included a variable for those who have a weak labor 
market attachment five years before retirement. This group includes 
those who did not have any income from work (either as an employee 
or as self-employed). Among those who belong to this group, some 
have low pensions and others have high pensions. These mixed results 
suggest that this group includes both those with a poor labor market 
attachment, due to difficulties in getting a job, and the wealthy who 
choose to not work but five years later receive a good pension.
The risk of being one of those with the 10 percent lowest incomes 
is higher for those born outside Sweden. Being born in another Nordic 
country has a negative effect on the probability of belonging to those 
with the highest pension incomes. However, there is no difference be-
tween natives and those born outside the Nordic countries with regard 
to the probability of being in the group with the highest pensions.
Even if pension income is the main income for pensioners, other 
sources such as other income transfers, labor income, and capital in-
come are important parts of the retirees’ incomes.5 The share belonging 
to the group with the 10 percent lowest pension incomes who belongs 
to the group with the 10 percent lowest disposable incomes is 43 per-
cent. Of those with the 20 percent lowest pension incomes, 57 percent 
belong to the group with the 20 percent lowest disposable income. We 
see a similar pattern for those with the highest pensions. Of those with 
the 20 percent highest pensions, 61 percent belong to the group with the 
20 percent highest disposable incomes, and of those with the 10 percent 
highest pensions, 53 percent belong to those with the 10 percent highest 
disposable incomes. In Table 4.3 we show probit estimates for the prob-
ability of belonging to the group of those with the lowest and highest 
disposable incomes.
Those who have a weak labor market attachment five years before 
retirement more often belong to the group of those with the lowest pen-
sions but less often to the group of those with the lowest disposable 
incomes. One explanation may be that those who have had a weak labor 
market attachment receive other income transfers, and that the group 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
88   
Table 4.2  The Probability of Belonging to the Group with 10 or 20 Percent Lowest and Highest Incomes from 
Pensions (Social Security and Occupational Pensions), among Those 65 and Older
10% lowest pension 20% lowest pension 20% highest pension 10% highest pension
Men −0.018*** −0.099*** 0.103*** 0.036***
0.003 0.006 0.007 0.004
Married −0.003 0.006 0.012 0.009
0.003 0.006 0.008 0.004
Age at retirement −0.013*** −0.021*** 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Annual labor income/10,000 



























Weak labor market attachment 









Born in Sweden Ref.a Ref.a Ref.a Ref.a
Born in another Nordic country 0.017** 0.004 −0.064*** −0.015*
0.009 0.013 0.012 0.007
Born in EU15 and OECD6 0.037*** 0.028 −0.032 −0.014
0.017 0.023 0.021 0.010
Born in other countries 0.076*** 0.166*** −0.030 −0.008
0.017 0.028 0.019 0.010
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Number of observations 13,286 13,286 13,286 13,286
LR chi2(10) 2,097.65 3,331.56 5,064.41 2,050.18
a Reference category.
NOTE: *significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level; **significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level; ***significantly different 
from zero at the 0.01 level. The EU15 and OECD6 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK, and the United States. The annual labor income 
is divided by 10,000 to facilitate the reporting of the estimates. 
SOURCE: LINDA.
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Men −0.052*** −0.117*** 0.074*** 0.023***
0.004 0.006 0.007 0.005
Married 0.018*** 0.032*** −0.015* −0.009
0.003 0.005 0.009 0.006
Age at retirement −0.002*** −0.003*** 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001




























Disability pension −0.015*** −0.018*** −0.038*** −0.016**
0.003 0.006 0.010 0.006
Born in Sweden Ref.a Ref.a Ref.a Ref.a
Born in another Nordic country 0.005 0.025* −0.052*** −0.029***
0.007 0.014 0.015 0.009
Born in EU15 and OECD6 0.017 0.033 −0.006 0.001
0.013 0.023 0.026 0.017
Born in other countries 0.076*** 0.131*** −0.046** −0.008
0.017 0.025 0.020 0.014
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Number of observations 13,286 13,286 13,286 13,286
LR chi2(10) 2,040.15 3,240.44 3,238.41 2,050.18
a Reference category.
NOTE: *significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level; **significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level; ***significantly different 
from zero at the 0.01 level. The EU15 and OECD6 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK and the United States. The annual labor income 
is divided by 10,000 to facilitate the reporting of the estimates. 
SOURCE: LINDA.
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may also contain some of those with a strong economic position who 
have chosen to stop working early.
Many of those with low and high pensions have low and high 
disposable incomes, respectively, but there are some differences. The 
self-employed have low pensions on average, but a higher probability 
of belonging to the groups of those with the lowest and highest dispos-
able incomes. This reflects the heterogeneity among the self-employed. 
While some people have been able to save for old age, others have not.
GROUPS AT RISK FOR LOW PENSIONS AND 
LOW INCOME
Self-employed
The income differences among self-employed workers are large. 
Many have low incomes, and many do not have a supplementary 
pension of the same type employees tend to have. The number of self-
employed is large and growing, making it important to study this group. 
Many of the self-employed are foreign born.
Employees who become self-employed have different backgrounds. 
Those who take into account characteristics such as education have low 
labor income as employees and those who have a high labor income as 
employees are overrepresented among those becoming self-employed 
(Andersson Joona and Wadensjö 2013). The latter group is doing 
considerably better than the first one in being self-employed, which in-
dicates that the conditions for being self-employed vary greatly, as do 
the opportunities and knowledge of how best to prepare financially for 
life as a pensioner.
More than half of small business owners pay into pensions for 
themselves, but a quarter of the self-employed have no retirement 
savings; they save neither privately nor through their firms. Of the self-
employed who save, 45 percent save less than 2,000 SEK per month. 
In order to receive the same pension that their employees receive from 
occupational pensions, the self-employed have to save 5 percent of their 
gross incomes from age 25 until retirement. If they start to save later, 
the annual savings required are higher (Svärdman 2011). The main rea-
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son the self-employed give when asked why they are not saving for a 
pension for themselves is that they cannot afford it. Other reasons are 
that they do not see any need, as their incomes as retirees are guaranteed 
by other means; they do not know how it works with occupational pen-
sions; and they do not have time to gain an understanding of pension 
issues (Burreau 2011).
Today’s retirees who have been self-employed have significantly 
lower pensions than those who have been wage earners. Both men and 
women who were self-employed five years before retirement had on 
average a total pension (social security, occupational, and personal) 
corresponding to about 70 percent of the average total pension for 
those who were wage earners five years before retirement in the period 
2005–2009.6
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show how much the average social security, 
occupational and personal pensions are for those who were wage earn-
ers or self-employed. Those who were wage earners had higher social 
security and occupational pensions but lower personal pensions than 
those who were self-employed. The social security pensions of the self-
employed were about 75–80 percent of the social security pensions of 
wage earners for both men and women. For self-employed women, the 
occupational and personal pensions together constitute about 45–55 
percent of the pensions of women who are wage earners, with an excep-
tion for self-employed women aged 75 and older who had occupational 
and personal pensions that were higher than those for wage earners. The 
corresponding figures for men are between 40 and 50 percent.
Guarantee Pensioners, Those without Occupational 
Pensions, and the Foreign Born
Some groups other than the self-employed have low pensions, such 
as those who have had low or irregular earnings and therefore receive a 
guarantee pension. The guarantee pension is only price indexed and not 
income indexed like the income pension. The group may therefore lag 
behind in income growth compared to those receiving an income pen-
sion. For the next few years it is expected that about 25 percent of new 
retirees will receive a guarantee pension. In 2008, 778,000 individuals 
received a guarantee pension, of which 180,000 (15 percent) received 
a full one. Of those who received a guarantee pension, 80 percent were 
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women (Olsson 2011). Nearly half of female pensioners aged 65–70 re-
ceived a guarantee pension in 2008. Among women aged 70 and older, 
it is even more common to receive a guarantee pension, as the older 
cohorts have had low labor force participation. For example, just less 
than 60 percent of women aged 70–75, over 80 percent of those aged 
80–85, and over 90 percent of those aged 90 and older receive a guaran-
tee pension. The proportion of men who receive a guarantee pension is 
much lower. In the age group 65–70, only slightly more than 10 percent 
receive a guarantee pension. Among men aged 80–85, a quarter receive 
a guarantee pension, and among those 90 and older, half receive a guar-
antee pension.
Figure 4.9  Pension Incomes for Men, 2005–2009
NOTE: Employees are defined as those who had their main incomes from employment 
five years before retirement. Self-employed are those with their main income from 
self-employment five years before retirement. Someone is defined as retired when 
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Employees not covered by collective bargaining labor agreements 
are a second group at risk for low pensions. Occupational pension is 
most important for those who have had incomes above the ceiling in 
the income pension system, but it is important not just for them. Most 
receive their occupational pensions through a collective agreement. 
Over 90 percent of employees are employed in workplaces covered by 
collective bargaining agreements and thus have occupational pensions. 
Those who lack an occupational pension are primarily those who work 
in firms with few employees, those with the highest and lowest wages, 
and the self-employed and unemployed. Only a third of small business 
owners have signed up for an occupational pension. Employers without 
a collective agreement may pay for an occupational pension plan for 
Figure 4.10  Pension Incomes for Women, 2005–2009
NOTE: Employees are defined as those who had their main income from employment 
five years before retirement. Self-employed are those with their main income from 
self-employment five years before retirement. Someone is defined as retired when 
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their employees and at the same time for themselves. Of businesses 
without a collective agreement, 40 percent have a pension plan. Among 
those not covered by a collective agreement pension, approximately 
60 percent have signed up for a separate personal pension (Svärdman 
2011).
The foreign born are a third group at risk for low pensions. This 
is a group with large income differences and includes many low- 
income earners. Flood and Mitrut (2010) have written a report for the 
Social Council on immigrants coming from non-OECD countries and 
their pensions. The pensions of this group of foreign born are predicted 
to be low. Between 1992 and 2007, the foreign-born men’s earnings 
were about 75 percent, and foreign-born women’s earnings were about 
60 percent of native-born men’s earnings. This can be compared with 
the native-born women’s earnings, which were about 70 percent of the 
earnings of native-born men.
The growth of earnings has important implications for future pen-
sions. Between 1992 and 2007, this was slower for the foreign born 
from non-OECD countries than for natives. As an example we take the 
cohort born in 1960–1964. The income growth (among those who had 
earned income) was 62 percent for native men, 72 percent for native 
women, 47 percent for foreign-born men, and 49 percent for foreign-
born women.
Labor force participation among the foreign born is lower than 
among natives even after taking into account differences in education, 
age, gender, etc. This leads to lower pensions for the foreign born than 
for natives. It should be emphasized that there are significant differences 
depending on country of origin. Low wages, low labor force partici-
pation, high unemployment, and fewer years in Sweden lead to lower 
pensions. Probably only a few foreign born from non-OECD countries 
have pension rights from their country of origin that can be transferred.
Forecasts of future social security pensions show that foreign-born 
people from non-OECD countries will have much lower pensions than 
natives. Foreign-born men born between 1946 and 1970 will receive 
about 60–65 percent of the native men’s social security pension. The 
corresponding figure for foreign-born women is about 55 percent of the 
native men’s social security pension.
The foreign born from non-OECD countries have significantly 
lower incomes and wealth than natives. Native-born men had in 2007 
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three to four times higher real assets than foreign-born men. The same 
relationship applies to the wealth of native- and foreign-born women.
Also, assets in personal pension savings are much smaller for the 
foreign born from non-OECD countries than for natives. For the cohort 
born 1945–1949, this amounted to one-third for both men and women 
compared to native men in the same cohort. For younger cohorts, the 
difference was even greater. For example, for the cohort born 1960–
1964, the foreign-born personal pension wealth was 18 percent of that 
of native men in the same cohort, and for the cohort born 1970–1974 it 
was only 11 percent.
CONCLUSION
In this section, we summarize our results and mention some areas 
where we lack essential knowledge. 
One important result is that some groups aged 65 and older have 
low pensions and other low incomes compared to others the same age. 
Women 65 and older on average have lower incomes and pensions than 
men the same age. The main reason for this is that working-age women 
have had a greater responsibility for unpaid housework than men. This 
does not mean that all of them live in households with low incomes as 
they get older. Many are married to men who have high pensions or 
other forms of income, but older women are often single. Women live 
longer than men, and women are on average younger than the men they 
marry. This means that women are more likely to be widowed than men. 
In addition, divorce is common, and pension wealth is not distributed in 
full upon divorce. Many women thus become single with a low pension. 
The long-run solution is a more equal division of labor between men 
and women both in the household and in the market. However, it can 
take a long time before such a change takes effect. Pensions are based 
on earnings over a lifetime or for many years (some of the occupational 
pensions). There are good reasons for reviewing the rules on pension 
plans.
The foreign born are another group that on average has low pen-
sions. This is because many have a weak labor market attachment and 
many have lived for less than the 40 years in Sweden required at 65 
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for a full guarantee pension. The long-term solution is a stronger labor 
market attachment, but there are good reasons to review the rules for 
pension plans, particularly the rule about the number of years of resi-
dence required for a full guarantee pension.
The self-employed is a third group that often has low pensions. One 
explanation is that they have not paid for a pension corresponding to the 
occupational pensions for employees; another is that many of the self-
employed have low incomes. A solution may be that more information 
could be given about the pension plans for self-employed, but there 
may be other ways of bringing this about.
A fourth group, which largely coincides with the three previously 
mentioned, consists of those who for various reasons have had a weak 
attachment to the labor market over a number of years. Also, after age 
65 they usually have a weak attachment to the labor market, and they 
receive a low social security income–based pension and a price-indexed 
guarantee pension.
It is important to investigate different ways to improve the situation 
for those four mentioned groups who often have low incomes and pen-
sions after age 65, that is, to improve the conditions for women, foreign 
born, self-employed, and those who for prolonged periods have had a 
weak attachment to the labor market. Different types of solutions may 
be required for the various groups.
Notes
We thank participants at the TrefF seminar in Oslo on May 31, 2012; the Swedish Fiscal 
Policy Council conference in Stockholm on June 18, 2012; and the ENRSP Conference 
in Poznan on September 13–14, 2012. We also thank Christer Gerdes for helpful com-
ments on an earlier version.
1. See Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö (2011) for a more detailed presentation.
2. There is a gradual change from one system to another. For those who are born in 
1938, 4 parts of 20 are calculated according to the new system (and 16 parts of 20 
according to the old system). In 1944, 10 parts of 20 are calculated according to 
the new system (and 10 parts of 20 according to the old system).
3. For a discussion of different measures of income inequality among pensioners, see 
Johnson and Stears (1999).
4. van Vliet et al. (2011) use P80/P20 to measure the income distribution among 
older people in 15 European countries. They find that the ratio is lowest in the 
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four Nordic countries included in their study—Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden.
5. See also Sjöström and Örnhall Ljung (2011) and Klevmarken (2010) for an analy-
sis of who is working after 65.
6. Retirement is defined here as the first-year pension income from social security 
and occupational pension exceed labor income.
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The Reform of Social  




This chapter provides a critical perspective on the policy direc-
tion followed in Portugal after the reform of social security pensions 
in 2007. First, it examines and assesses the main legislative changes 
introduced in that year by the former socialist government. The reform 
has been presented to the public as unavoidable, intended to improve 
financial sustainability while preserving the overall logic of the system. 
The chapter argues that it did not have a limited impact in the structure 
of the pension system, as it has introduced a fundamental change of 
perspective regarding the objectives and principles of pension policy. 
It also tries to show how the Portuguese process of reform has been 
influenced by political decisions from the EU, by focusing on restric-
tive rules that guide economic policy and the EU strategy for pensions. 
Economic policies inspired by the New Classical Economics paradigm 
and an agenda for pensions aligned with supply-side oriented economic 
policies have been important features in national pension policy. A 
particular emphasis is attributed to the critical influence of economic 
performance on pension systems’ budgetary equilibrium, arguing that 
economic failures explain, to a great extent, much of the problems iden-
tified in Portugal.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes the 
main measures introduced by the reform program of the social secu-
rity pension system introduced in 2007. The second section develops a 
critical analysis of that reform. It examines its adverse effects regard-
ing pensioners’ well-being and its methodological incoherence. Next, it 
describes the path change introduced in the objectives and principles of 
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policy, concluding that although pay-as-you-go financing has not been 
replaced by funding, its overall logic has changed. The next section ex-
amines the influence of the EU on the Portuguese reform process. The 
supply side–oriented economic policy paradigm, dominant at the EU, 
helped create an economic environment since the early 1990s that has 
favored the introduction of pension reforms. However, the social policy 
agenda set at the EU aligned with that paradigm has also been an impor-
tant element in the reform process. Finally, the last section emphasizes 
the critical relevance of economic performance on social security bud-
getary equilibrium, arguing that the budgetary difficulties identified in 
the present are mainly the result of restrictive macroeconomic policies 
unfavorable to employment and growth. A paradigmatic change in eco-
nomic policy is a necessary condition to allow a different orientation 
for pension policy.
MAIN LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In Portugal, social security is financed by a total contribution rate 
of 34.25 percent of earnings paid by the employee and employer. Out 
of this total, employees pay 11 percent and employers pay 23.25 per-
cent. These contributions finance old-age benefits (20.21 percent, since 
2010), survivors’ benefits (2.44 percent), unemployment benefits (5.14 
percent), and disability benefits (4.29 percent). The contributions also 
finance sickness, parenthood, and occupational disease. The legal age 
of retirement is 65, but benefits can be received at age 55 for work-
ers with 30 years of contributions (with penalties for early retirement), 
though the award of early retirement benefits has been temporarily sus-
pended from 2012 through 2014, except for the long-term unemployed.
The social security pension plan in Portugal was reformed in 2007.1 
This plan is mandatory for the employees and self-employed workers 
in the private sector. Civil servants are covered by a separate plan.2 
Other plans also exist but cover a limited percentage of the total active 
population.
This reform introduced three important changes in regard to retire-
ment benefits. First, a “sustainability coefficient” was introduced in the 
formula for calculating pensions. This coefficient is a demographic ad-
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justment factor, which reduces pensions by a certain percentage as life 
expectancy increases. It is equal to the ratio between life expectancy 
in 2006 and life expectancy in the year preceding retirement. The level 
of statutory pension is multiplied by the coefficient and is thus reduced 
as life expectancy increases. The decrease in pensions may be partially 
offset if workers decide to postpone retirement or if they increase their 
voluntary contributions to a new complementary public plan of indi-
vidual accounts.
Second, the formula for calculating pensions was changed. After 
2007, pension levels are calculated taking into consideration the earn-
ings of the entire working life. Since 1994, pension levels were calcu-
lated on the basis of the average earnings of the 10 best years of the 
final 15.3 A 2002 law stated that the earnings of the entire career would 
be taken into account for calculating the pension.4 However, it also de-
fined a transitional period, 2002–2016, during which the most favorable 
method of calculation—the former, the latter, or a weighted average 
of both—could be applied in order to guarantee beneficiaries the most 
favorable rule to determine the pension level. For that reason, the full 
impact of the measure was not felt. During the transitional period, only 
approximately 17.5 percent of pensions were calculated based on the 
earnings of the entire career, the method that could guarantee the most 
favorable pension amount (European Commission 2005, p. 2). The re-
form of 2007 accelerated the transition to the new method of calcula-
tion. The pension is determined by a weighted average of two terms: 
one is based on the best 10 years of earnings of the final 15, the other 
is based on the earnings of the whole career. The weight of each term 
depends on the moment of retirement and the length of the contribu-
tory career up to a specified moment of reference. For those who retire 
before 2016, the moment of reference is 2006; for those who retire after 
2016, the moment of reference is 2001. 
Third, new rules for indexing the benefits were approved, which 
came into effect in 2007.5 The new method does not guarantee the 
maintenance of the real value of all benefits. Higher benefits will be 
indexed to prices only for higher rates of economic growth. In addi-
tion, the minimum wage is no longer used as reference for determin-
ing minimum pension levels. The process of gradual convergence of 
the minimum level of pension with the national minimum wage started 
almost 10 years before and was completed in 2005.6 In 2006, pension-
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ers with a career longer than 30 years were entitled to a pension equal 
to the minimum wage (net of employee contributions), and those with 
shorter careers were entitled to a certain percentage of the net minimum 
wage. However, immediately after, there was a reversal of this policy. 
A law published in the end of 2006 stated that thereafter the adjust-
ment of the minimum levels of pensions should be dissociated from the 
minimum wage.7 A new term of reference for calculating and adjusting 
the benefits is used, the Indexante	de	Apoios	Sociais (IAS), which is 
defined every year by the government. As a consequence, the minimum 
pension level started to diverge from the net minimum wage, as Table 
5.1 shows.
The reform also introduced new rules to encourage older workers 
to stay in the labor market such as higher penalties for early retirement 
and incentives to extend working life. 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PORTUGUESE 
REFORM PROCESS
A Reform Focused on Cutting Spending 
The reform was presented to the public as necessary to contain 
pressures on the social security budget and guarantee its fiscal sustain-
ability (Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity [MTSS] 2006a,b). The 
policy solution chosen was based exclusively on the reduction of ben-
efit levels.
The option of cutting pensions is particularly adverse in the Portu-
guese case because, at the time the reform was introduced, the retired 
population had on average lower incomes and higher incidence of pov-
erty than the rest of the population (Murteira 2008). This is explained 
by the late development of the Portuguese public pension system and 
by work histories characterized by low earnings and short contributory 
periods. Table 5.2 shows that more than 80 percent of old-age pension-
ers were entitled to an amount of pension lower than the national mini-
mum wage. Thus, the strategy followed has placed the burden of the 
adjustment exclusively on pensioners, particularly on pensioners with 
the lowest incomes.
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However, some analysts argue that the decrease in the benefit lev-
els should not be a reason for concern because, up to 2007, the system 
could guarantee high replacement rates. Thus, the system could be con-
sidered “generous.” This argument, although frequently mentioned, is 
not strong. It is important to understand why replacement rates were 
high while the majority of old-age pensioners received very low bene-
fits. Analysis from previous research (Murteira 2008) helps to clarify 
this question. The average gross replacement rates were broken down 
by income quintile for several cohorts of men and women who retired 














2006 385.90 343.45 343.45 100.00
2007 403.00 358.67 354.10 98.70
2008 426.00 379.14 363.81 96.00
2009 450.00 400.50 374.36 93.50
2010 475.00 422.75 379.04 89.70
2011 485.00 431.65 379.04 78.20
2012 485.00 431.65 379.04 78.20
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 5.2  Distribution of Old-Age Pensioners in 2005, by Pension Levels









frm 2997.6–3747.0 2,555 0.19
Total 1,371,529 100.00
SOURCE: Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (2006a).
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before the rule change. The disaggregate data on replacement rates 
helps to explain the paradox. High replacement rates did not reflect the 
generosity of the social security pension system. The highest replace-
ment rates were those of pensioners, especially women, with very low 
wage levels who were entitled to a minimum pension level. A high per-
centage of women had low incomes and short working careers. These 
women were entitled to a minimum pension level that was higher (in 
many cases much higher) than their previous wages. Thus, the fact that 
replacement rates were high does not mean that the system provided 
generous benefits. High replacement rates and low pension levels were 
two faces of the same coin.
Moreover, the reform may also be criticized from a methodological 
standpoint because it has focused on the means of policy (spending on 
pensions) and neglected its ends (the social objectives). The objectives 
to attain, in regard to income security, are not reported either in the text 
of the law or in the document that reveals the strategic lines of the re-
form (MTSS 2006b). The State Budget Report (Ministry of Finance and 
Public Administration [MFAP] 2006) presented the estimated effects 
of the new rules regarding the future reduction of public spending on 
pensions and the future decrease of real growth of average pension, as 
Figure 5.1 shows. This outcome was considered positive. 
This conclusion results from a biased perspective that consists of 
assessing policy only by its budgetary consequences, ignoring the es-
sential purpose of pension provision. The obsession with the means of 
pension policy has led to the neglect of the ends. An appropriate assess-
ment of pension policy should focus on its ends, looking at the means 
in view of the ends. As the purpose of pension plans is to provide re-
tirement income security, a consistent policy design requires a clear 
specification of this aim. Spending on pensions should be seen as the 
“constraint” to face, rather than the “objective,” as Barr and Diamond 
(2008, p. 33) have observed. 
The view that motivated the reform undertaken in the field of social 
security pensions in Portugal, based on cutting benefits in order to alle-
viate fiscal problems, represents a way of approaching the welfare state 
that has been deeply criticized by Atkinson. In particular, the author 
underlined the tendency to look exclusively at costs without consider-
ing the benefits of the welfare state: “The whole purpose of welfare 
state provision is missing from the theoretical model” (Atkinson 1999, 
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p. 8). In the Portuguese debate the purpose of pensions was completely 
absent. As a consequence, the level of benefits has been taken as the 
adjustment variable in a policy aimed at containing spending.
The Structural Nature of the 2007 Reform
The reform was presented to the public as merely parametric, 
aimed at improving financial sustainability while preserving the overall 
logic of the system. However, there are sound reasons to argue that this 
reform had an important impact in the structure of the social security 
pension system. Thus, it might be better defined as structural. 
The first reason is that it has produced a significant decline in the 
level of benefits, for both present and future pensioners but mainly for 
the latter. The three main measures introduced reduce the benefit levels 
because they affect both the replacement rate and the earnings path in 
the retirement period. 
The replacement rate will decrease significantly over time because 
of the introduction of the “sustainability factor.” According to the 
OECD (2007, p. 68), future benefits are expected to decrease around 


















SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (2006).
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20 percent as a result of the link to life expectancy. The replacement 
rate also decreases due to the new way of determining the benefits that 
are now based on the earnings of the entire career rather than the final 
earnings. Since working careers generally present rising earnings in 
later years, when pensions relate to the earnings of the entire career, the 
replacement rate is lower. Historical experience has shown that when 
pensions could be calculated according to the most favorable rule, be-
tween 2002 and 2004, only 17.5 percent of the new pensions were de-
fined according to the new rule (European Commission 2005, p. 2). As 
a consequence, with the new formula, the large majority of pensions 
became more distant from the workers’ final earnings and from the level 
of average earnings current in society at the time of retirement, meaning 
that replacement rates were reduced. 
Moreover, pensioners’ benefit levels over the retirement period will 
continue to diverge from the overall earnings path in society due to the 
unfavorable method of adjusting the benefits over time. 
Thus far, the adverse effect of the reform on pensioners’ economic 
well being has not been entirely felt: there is a transitional period for 
the application of the new calculation rule; the influence of the sustain-
ability coefficient will be felt more acutely over time; and the negative 
effect of the new indexation rules is cumulative. The reduction of future 
pensions will be significant. OECD (2007) has estimated that future 
benefits will be more than 30 percent below the level pensioners would 
have been entitled to before the reforms. However, the reduction of fu-
ture pensions might be higher than expected because of the effect of the 
new indexation rules, which is unpredictable.
The second reason for arguing that this reform was structural is 
that, although not explicitly, a new perspective regarding pension pol-
icy objectives has been adopted. The objective is no longer to enable 
people to maintain the previous living standards, but to provide a mod-
est income protection. 
A growing divergence between pension levels and wage levels was 
implicitly accepted. First, the new calculation rule expresses a different 
choice of objectives for pensions. When the objective is to safeguard 
the previous living standards, the benefits should be related to the final 
earnings. When pensions relate to the earnings of the entire career, they 
will diverge from workers’ final earnings and from the average earn-
ings current in society at the time of retirement. Second, the change in 
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the way of adjusting pensions over time allows a growing divergence 
between pensioners’ earnings path and the overall earnings path in the 
society. Both the reduction of the replacement rates for the majority of 
the retired population and the new rules of adjusting benefits over time 
show that the objective of enabling people to maintain the previous liv-
ing standards in retirement has been abandoned. The new objective is to 
provide a modest income protection in retirement. A conception of so-
cial assistance, rather than what Myles has described as “contemporary 
notions of social security” (Myles 2002, p. 158), inspired this move.
The strategy of lowering pensions occurred at the same time the 
government declared the prevention of poverty among the elderly as 
a political priority. However, instead of reinforcing minimum income 
protection, the government has decided to dissociate the minimum pen-
sion levels from the minimum wage. At the same time, it has introduced 
a new means-tested benefit intended to alleviate old-age poverty (com-
plemento	solidário	para	idosos).8 In the text of the law that introduced 
this benefit it is stated that the previous policy of general increase in the 
minimum levels of benefits was not sustainable and that it should be 
replaced by the strategy of concentrating the benefits of those in need.
Thus, the right to a minimum pension of the earnings-related plan 
has been questioned as a work-related right and started to be replaced 
by national solidarity mechanisms justified in case of need.
Furthermore, another profound change has occurred: the nature of 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG). The idea that it is possible to maintain in re-
tirement the living standards achieved in the working period, which 
inspired the previous policy, was questioned. 
The initial PAYG plans organized a mechanism of solidarity through 
work. Retirement pensions, like other social benefits, were guaranteed 
by the collectivization of a share of the total wages. In such a plan, the 
amount of contributions is immediately redistributed in the form of so-
cial benefits (pensions, unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, etc). 
In the original conception, a PAYG plan is contributory—benefits are 
defined on a commutative basis; since they are related to the employ-
ment status, their purpose is to replace earnings and require previous 
contributions—but it may involve a certain degree of redistribution in 
order to realize a set of social objectives. Therefore, benefits do not need 
to be strictly linked to contributions. A PAYG plan may include redis-
tributive mechanisms such as the rules that establish minimum pension 
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levels, the rules that guarantee higher replacement rates for the lowest 
incomes, or a calculation formula that takes into account the earnings 
of the final working years instead of the earnings of the whole career.
When the purpose is to safeguard in retirement the living standards 
achieved in the working period, pension levels should be close to the 
final wages. In this case, the pension may be seen as a “continued sal-
ary” (Castel 2009a,b; Friot 2010). This logic requires high replacement 
rates and indexation rules that guarantee a similar growth of pensions 
and wages over time. 
Recently, PAYG plans in some countries have abandoned the previ-
ous logic, which based the right to resources on work and made pension 
levels dependent on the previous wage levels. In some cases, these plans 
have moved to a savings logic. Accordingly, each individual should be 
entitled to a sum of benefits closely related to what he has paid during 
his working period. Thus, the link between lifetime contributions and 
expected benefits should strengthen at the individual level. In this view, 
pensions are justified by the existence of “previous savings” (the con-
tributions) and seen as an individual deferred income (Castel 2009a,b; 
Friot 2010).
In Portugal, the transition to a savings logic has already started. The 
logic of work-related rights is vanishing as the link between pensions 
and wages weakens. The reduction of the replacement rates, caused by 
the new pension formula and the introduction of the sustainability coef-
ficient, increases the gap between the first pension and the final wages. 
These new rules contribute to strengthen the contributory nature of the 
plan and, thus, to the gradual transition to the model of pensions as in-
dividual deferred income. Also the new rules for indexing the benefits 
contribute to increase the gap between pensions and wages over the 
retirement period. Moreover, the link between pensions and wages also 
weakens due to the divergence of the minimum pension levels from the 
minimum wage. The plan is still PAYG but has a changing nature: the 
wage reference is disappearing, while the system moves from a work-
based logic to a savings-based logic. 
Thus, although the rule changes are parametric, the overall effect of 
the reform is structural: the level of future benefits will decrease signifi-
cantly, social objectives have changed from safeguarding the preretire-
ment living standards to the guarantee of a modest income protection, 
and a new logic is ruling PAYG.
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THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
RETRENCHMENT IN PORTUGAL
The Portuguese social security pension system has been experienc-
ing increasing political pressures. In recent years, we have identified a 
two-stage strategy for social rights retrenchment. Each stage presents a 
specific configuration. 
In the first stage, marked by the 2007 reform conducted by a center- 
left government, the pressures were intended to contain spending. How-
ever, as observed ealier, this reform introduced significant changes in 
the structure of the social security pension system.
In the second stage, when a new right-wing government came into 
power in June 2011, the strategy for social rights retrenchment assumed 
a new configuration. The revenue side of social security budget has 
come under growing pressure. The new government has introduced 
several measures that reduce, directly or indirectly, the receipts from 
contributions. All the variables that influence the receipts from contri-
butions came under pressure: the wage, the level of employment, and 
the contribution rate. In regard to the public sector, the government, in 
agreement with the troika (the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), has decided to 
reduce wages and employment. The private sector is recommended to 
follow the same route of wage reduction. In any case, wage reduction 
in the private sector is expected to occur as a consequence of massive 
unemployment. The third variable, the rate of contribution (taxa	 so-
cial	única), has also been under downward pressure. The government 
has planned to reduce the employer contribution, arguing that it would 
reduce labor costs and thus improve the level of employment and ex-
ternal competitiveness of the economy. But, in regard to the reduction 
of the employer contribution, the government had to step back because 
of strong political opposition. These measures were planned when the 
social security budget was already extremely destabilized by the serious 
recession and massive unemployment that followed Portugal’s bailout 
in May 2011. Massive unemployment has caused a significant decrease 
in receipts from contributions, an increase in spending on unemploy-
ment benefits, downward pressure on wages, and the growth of early 
retirement.
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At the same time, a new political discourse has emerged. Invoking 
the excessive economic burden of social security, the government has 
introduced a new political speech on this subject intended to justify ad-
ditional regressive reforms. The prime minister has announced that the 
reform of 2007 is not enough to guarantee the financial sustainability 
of the social security pension plan and that it is necessary to shift to-
ward more funding and more private voluntary provision. Meanwhile, 
in April 2012, the government suspended the access to early retirement 
during the financial assistance period.9 The financial assistance pro-
vided to Portugal after May 2011 by the European Central Bank, the 
European Commission, and the IMF was given on the basis of a policy 
program that required economic policy conditions. Following the de-
mands of austerity established in the Memorandum of Understanding 
with the the troika, the new government has imposed deep cuts in ex-
penditure, mainly in the wages of public servants and pensions, but also 
in a set of other social benefits, health care, and education. In 2013, 
after the periodical reviews of the troika for assessing the progression 
made with respect to the policy criteria specified in the memorandum, 
the government has accepted to impose additional cuts in expenditure. 
The focus will be on major budjet items, particularly the government 
wage bill and pension spending. A new reform of social security may 
be announced at any time.
The	Influence	of	the	EU	on	the	Portuguese	Reform	Process
To understand the Portuguese reform process, we should not ana-
lyze it in isolation because it was significantly influenced by European 
prescriptions. The management of economic policy, imposing restric-
tive rules for the conduct of fiscal policy, and the social policy agenda 
set at the EU were important elements in that process.
The 2007 reform pensions, as well as the agenda of the current gov-
ernment, can only be understood by taking into consideration the social 
policy agenda set by the EU. The standpoint that has been adopted by 
both the previous and the current government is in line with the social 
policy paradigm dominant in the EU. This one is aligned with the para-
digm that has guided economic policy, especially since the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992. In order to clarify this subject and understand how the 
EU has influenced pension reforms in the member states, it is worth 
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mentioning the pressures imposed by restrictive macroeconomic policy 
and the influence of the European strategy for pensions.
The Economic Policy Paradigm Dominant in the EU 
Especially since the Maastricht Treaty and the policy orientation 
adopted for the introduction of the single currency, the macroeconomic 
policy in the EU was defined in accordance to the prescriptions of the 
New Classical Economics (NCE). The same occurred with labor market 
and social protection policies.
The NCE defends monetary and fiscal policies based on rules rather 
than discretionary decisions of governments (Creel 2011). As the latter 
are considered to be moved by electoral purposes, rules are the only 
way to assign credibility to economic policies, a fundamental condition 
for guaranteeing its effectiveness. Therefore, economic policies should 
be ruled by restrictions imposed on the objectives or on the means. 
Monetary policy should be conducted by an independent central 
bank and be committed to the objective of price stability. This com-
mitment is fundamental in order to stabilize economic agents’ anticipa-
tions and keep labor costs under control. In regard to fiscal policy, it 
should also be guided by strict rules. Two arguments justify it (Creel 
2011). The first is the “Ricardian equivalence,” stated by Barro (1974), 
according to which an expansionary fiscal policy has no effect on the 
level of economic activity. The argument may be summarized as fol-
lows: If a government tries to stimulate demand by increasing spending, 
the reduction of public savings will be offset by an increase of private 
savings. As people make perfect predictions of the effects of economic 
policy—assuming the rational expectations hypothesis—they will save 
more in the present in order to afford the future tax increases that will be 
necessary to pay off the increased debt. As a consequence, total spend-
ing will remain unchanged. Thus, demand-management intervention 
by governments is ineffective. The second argument states that the in-
crease of the public debt may lead the central bank to increase money 
supply. According to the monetarist view, this will cause an increase in 
the price level. Both the inefficiency of fiscal policy and the importance 
of keeping price stability are arguments that justify the imposition of 
strict limits to budgetary policy.
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Since Maastricht, EU countries have been submitted to a “culture of 
discipline” in the rules that guide macroeconomic policy (Fitoussi and 
Laurent 2009). According to the view that prevails in the EU, fiscal and 
monetary policy should have a limited role in stabilizing economies. 
The European Central Bank is responsible for guaranteeing the exclu-
sive objective of monetary policy that is price stability. National fiscal 
policies have also been severely restricted by the Stability and Growth 
Pact and have been focused on the objective of balancing the budget. 
According to the dominant view, the role of the state in economic ac-
tivity should be reduced to improve the performance of the economy. 
Therefore, it is essential to limit the growth of public expenditure. For 
this reason, a clause that prevents the governments from appealing to 
the European Central Bank to finance its deficits has been introduced. 
As a consequence, the governments have become dependent on deregu-
lated and globalized financial markets. 
Policies for the Labor Market and Social Protection
According to the paradigm that inspires European economic policy, 
growth and employment should not come through expansionary mac-
roeconomic policies. These are replaced by the so-called structural re-
forms, such as the deregulation of the labor market or welfare retrench-
ment. Structural reforms in these two domains are recommended as a 
way to avoid distortions in the functioning of the labor market, promot-
ing efficiency, and preventing high levels of public deficits and debts. 
Policies for the labor market and social protection have been con-
ceived in articulation with the supply-side orientation of economic poli-
cies. In regard to the functioning of the labor market, in this perspective 
unemployment is supposed to be caused by the malfunctioning of the 
labor market. It is considered largely voluntary, occurring when wages 
are above the level needed to clear the labor market. The source of mas-
sive unemployment is considered to be excessive regulation and high 
labor costs. Thus, the recommended solution is to make labor markets 
more flexible. Less regulation and the reduction of labor costs (wages 
and social contributions) are advocated in order to promote employ-
ment and the external competitiveness of economies. 
Social spending, in turn, is considered unfavorable to economic 
growth. Social protection mechanisms are regarded as something that 
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disturbs the market process. Welfare state programs, and social security 
pension plans in particular, are accused of contributing to the increase 
in the size of the government, causing inefficiency and originating huge 
public deficits and debts. It is assumed that the provision of welfare 
should not rely exclusively on public intervention. Instead, it should al-
low an increased role for the market, that is, private plans and voluntary 
provision. Additionally, pension plans should contribute to improve la-
bor market efficiency by promoting employment and competitiveness. 
Thus, they should focus on containing labor costs and providing ben-
efits that do not create disincentives.
Pressures Imposed by EU Macroeconomic Policy
The pressures for reforming social security pensions imposed by 
economic policies in the EU have been underestimated in most of the 
literature on the subject. In particular, the significant influence on pen-
sions of the rules that guide fiscal and monetary policies in the EU 
should be underlined. 
Since the Stability and Growth Pact, governments have been di-
rectly pressured to tighten fiscal policies (Fitoussi 2002, 2004). The im-
perative of balancing the budget has led the governments to cut public 
spending in general, and spending on pensions and other social transfer 
programs in particular. This fact has led to an attentive supervision of 
spending on pensions by the EU institutions charged with economic 
and financial affairs. 
The imposition of the Maastricht “culture of discipline” in macro-
economic management materialized into restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies (Fitoussi 2002, 2004). These policies have imposed indirect 
pressures on social security budgets. As restrictive macroeconomic pol-
icies have depressed growth and employment, they have undermined 
social security budgetary equilibrium. Under these circumstances, the 
pressure to impose reforms in social security pension systems increases.
The European Strategy for Social Security Pensions
At the same time, EU institutions have built a common political 
view about social security pensions, which is aligned with the main-
stream in the international debate on pensions, inspired by the recom-
mendations of the World Bank (1994) and the OECD (1996). 
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In the EU, social security pension system reform has been included 
in the political agenda after 1999. The effects of aging on pensions’ 
spending have been under attentive supervision by the EU institutions 
charged with economic and financial affairs as a consequence of the 
budgetary discipline imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
member states were asked to adopt measures in order to guarantee the 
financial “sustainability” of PAYG plans by containing future spending 
and by encouraging the development of funded plans and voluntary 
provision. During the 1990s, and following these recommendations, 
many European countries have introduced reforms in social security 
pension plans with the implicit or explicit aim of containing spending. 
Since 2001, the strategy designed for the field of pensions was pur-
sued through the open method of coordination (OMC), which aimed to 
promote an increasing coordination of national reforms by building a 
consensual perspective regarding pension policy. It has contributed to 
define common principles and objectives, establish a common set of 
indicators to assess national pension arrangements, and offer periodic 
monitoring of progress made toward the common objectives. Although 
it has not imposed the same orientation to all member states, the OMC 
has been influential for decisions on national pension policy: it has con-
tributed to build a shared view that has been translated into orientations 
for pension reforms. Palier (2006) has described the OMC as “a new 
form of intervention which is less aimed at institutional harmonisation 
or legislation than at harmonising ideas, knowledge and norms of ac-
tion, in order to have common policy goals converging towards ‘a com-
mon political vision’ . . . The aim here is to achieve a Europeanization 
of social policy paradigm” (p. 8).
As mentioned earlier, the EU pension policy agenda is focused on 
reducing spending and organizing the plans in order to strengthen the 
“competitiveness” of national economies. First, it is assumed that the 
provision of welfare should not rely exclusively on public intervention; 
an increased role for the market should be allowed. Second, pension 
policy orientations are configured to meet the requirements of eco-
nomic policies supply-side oriented. This view emphasizes that both 
contributions and benefits affect the functioning of labor markets. Pen-
sions and other social benefits are analyzed in terms of their effects on 
labor costs and the incentives they embed. First, as the contributions 
required for financing pensions are a component of the labor costs, the 
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contribution rate should be contained in order to avoid reducing labor 
demand. Therefore, cuts in social contributions are advocated to im-
prove the performance of the labor market by favoring employment and 
the external competitiveness of economies. Second, generous pensions 
disincentivize the labor supply of older workers. Thus, in order to im-
prove the functioning of the labor market to promote employment and 
competitiveness, pension policy should focus on containing the contri-
bution rate to avoid the increase in labor costs, on providing benefits 
that do not create disincentives, and on “activating” older workers (Eu-
ropean Commission 2006, p. 18).
This shared view inspired the reform programs developed in many 
member states, after 2003, like the one introduced in Portugal in 2007. 
The analysis of the progress in reforming pension systems in these 
countries, after the second round of the OMC (European Commission 
2006), has identified common lines of reform. The conclusion was that, 
since 2003, when the first comprehensive analysis of national strate-
gies in the area of pensions was reported (European Commission 2003), 
a general move has been observed in many member states regarding 
some features that may be summarized as follows. First, many coun-
tries have introduced rule changes such as incentives to extend working 
lives or disincentives to early retirement, the strengthening of the link 
between contributions and benefits, and the inclusion of life expectancy 
in pension formulas. Second, in many cases, the level of guaranteed 
minimum pensions has been increased to prevent the risk of poverty. 
Third, private provision has been promoted. It was recognized that, in 
general, the reforms caused the decrease in social security pensions, but 
it was admitted that it could be “compensated by longer working lives 
as well as by higher personal savings” (European Commission 2006, 
p. 3). Obviously, in Portugal these common lines of reform have been 
replicated in 2007. 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND PENSION POLICY: PENSION 
POLICIES IN A CONTEXT OF INCREASING LONGEVITY 
The increased pressures on public finances caused by an aging 
population has prompted many authors and policymakers who criticize 
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state intervention in this sphere to recommend that the governments 
promote ambitious reforms of pension systems by means of rolling 
back spending. The “unsustainability/roll back argument” (Barr 2000b, 
p. 740) has been spread and consolidated as common sense. 
Despite the recurrent use of this simple argument, it may be mis-
leading because it neglects the decisive influence that economic per-
formance has on the social security budget. The present difficulties in 
pension system financing are, to a great extent, the consequence of the 
economic dysfunctioning. Therefore, the analysis of pension policy 
should not be dissociated from the debate on macroeconomic policies. 
Economic Growth, a Fundamental Issue
The economics of pensions has shown the relevance of promot-
ing economic growth in order to face population aging.10 Thompson 
(1998) has shown that, from an aggregate and real perspective, the eco-
nomic cost of retirement equals the consumption of goods and services 
of the retired in relation to the total production of goods and services. 






where CR represents the consumption of retirees and Y represents total 
income. The analysis of this simple expression allows us to take two 
fundamental conclusions. First, retirement costs do not depend only on 
the consumption of retirees, but also on the level of total income. Thus, 
output is a central variable, as Barr (2001, 2004) and Barr and Diamond 
(2008) have emphasized. Second, pensions represent a claim on the 
output (Barr 2004). 
Thus, the problem with pensions is essentially a distributive issue: 
it is the question of defining the rule that specifies pensioners’ share in 
total income. Pensioners’ income share depends on the distribution of 
income between capital and labor and on the division of the labor in-
come between workers and pensioners. Thus, the social bargaining that 
leads to income distribution and so defines capital and labor shares and 
the political decision regarding the way the latter is divided between 
workers and pensioners are critical issues. 
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To sum up, in society’s perspective, pensions represent a claim on 
the output. If life expectancy increases, other things equal, pensioners’ 
share in spending will grow. At a given level of output, the adjustment 
may be realized by increasing contributions (of the employer or the 
employee), by reducing the benefits, or by increasing the legal age of 
retirement in line with rising life expectancy to avert the growth of the 
dependency ratio. However, in order to face rising life expectancy there 
is also a fourth solution: to increase the supply of goods and services. 
So, policies that promote economic growth are central. If the output 
grows, the distributive problem will become easier. There are two basic 
strategies for rising output: to increase labor productivity or to increase 
the number of workers (by reducing unemployment, by increasing 
women’s participation in the labor market, by rising the legal age of 
retirement, or by immigration). 
The public debate on the future of pensions has focused on two of 
the possible options: reducing pensions or increasing the age of retire-
ment. In both cases, the burden of the adjustment is placed on the el-
derly. The relevance of policies that promote economic growth and full 
employment as a means to deal with future problems posed by demo-
graphic aging has been underestimated. However, a serious debate on 
pension policy cannot be dissociated from the debate on the model of 
macroeconomic regulation, income distribution in society, and the way 
labor income is divided between workers and pensioners. 
The problem posed by the change in the age structure of the popula-
tion—an increasing share in spending—has to be faced independently 
of the method of financing pensions. A shift toward funding would not 
avoid it. As Barr (2004) has shown, PAYG and funded plans represent 
two sorts of claims on future production, that is, two different ways of 
claiming the share of pensioners in national output. In the first case, 
the question is decided in the political process. In the second case, the 
question is decided in the market sphere. If the role of private plans and 
of voluntary provision increases, the pressures on public finances will 
reduce—because the retirement costs will not burden the public bud-
get—but the economic cost of retirement will rest unchanged, unless 
it could be proved that a shift toward funding would lead to a higher 
increase in output. It is often argued that funding increases savings and 
hence will lead to higher productive investment and economic growth. 
Although there is a vast economic literature on this subject, there is a 
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great controversy regarding both the causal link between funding and 
saving and the effect of saving on productive investment.11 
Economic Policy and Pension Reforms in Portugal
The EU has declared concern for the future of pensions. However, 
European macroeconomic policies followed in the last two decades, 
inspired by the prescriptions of the New Classical Economics, have not 
been conceived in order to promote growth and full employment. In-
stead, the restrictive rules that have guided macroeconomic policies, fo-
cused on restrictive fiscal policy, price stability, and a strong euro, have 
depressed growth and employment, especially in peripheral countries 
like Portugal. Economic policies have contributed to deepen the social 
security budgetary problems and thus helped to present the reforms as 
unavoidable. Moreover, in Portugal, as in many developed countries, 
labor income share has decreased significantly in the last decades.
In Portugal, population aging has provided the argument to the for-
mer center-left government to restructure the system by reducing spend-
ing on pensions. In the years preceding the 2007 reform, social security 
has been characterized by a significant financial destabilization. The 
budgetary difficulties identified were, to a great extent, the outcome of 
economic policies—restrictive fiscal policy, monetary policy focused 
on price stability, and a strong euro in a context of external trade liber-
alization—that have depressed growth and employment. Since the in-
troduction of the single currency, Portugal has experienced a decade of 
low growth and increasing unemployment, as Table 5.3 shows.
A low rate of economic growth and unemployment are big threats to 
the financial balance of social security. The official diagnosis mentions 
it: “As a consequence of a set of negative factors, like the slowdown of 
economic growth, a parallel increase in unemployment, the maturation 
of the system and the consolidation of schemes of anticipation/flexible 
age of reform, we have assisted, in the last five years, to an increased 
deterioration of the financial balance of the social security system . . . ” 
(MTSS 2006a, p. 14).
Unemployment leads to the decrease in contributions and to a 
downward pressure on wages, which translates into lower contribu-
tions. Moreover, it causes an increase in spending on unemployment 
benefits and favors early retirement. In this context, retirement may 
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Table 5.3  Real Growth Rate of GDP and Unemployment Rate
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP real growth rate (%) 3.40 1.70 0.80 −0.80 1.30 0.50 1.40 2.40 0.00 −2.90 1.40 −1.60
Unemployment rate (%) 3.90 4.00 5.00 6.30 6.70 7.60 7.70 8.00 7.60 9.50 10.80 12.70
SOURCE: Banco de Portugal.
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be the appropriate alternative for older workers facing the risk of un-
employment. Early retirement becomes more frequent and creates ad-
ditional financial pressures on pension systems. The budgetary prob-
lems identified were also conditioned by the increased maturity of the 
system, mentioned in the same report. Furthermore, these difficulties 
were aggravated by several measures of reduction or exoneration of 
contributions, expanded after 1999 with the purpose of stimulating em-
ployment, based on the idea that high labor costs are the main cause of 
unemployment. Population aging has also imposed financial pressures, 
but at a slow and gradual rate.
Thus, economic policies have contributed to deepen the budgetary 
problem and, as a result, to present the reform as unavoidable. At the 
same time, the social security plan came under growing political pres-
sure. In particular, the recommendations from the EU level, regarding 
benefit retrenchment and the design of the plans, have been influential 
for decisions on national pension policy. 
THE PRESENT CRISIS
The present crisis has revealed the adverse effects of economic 
policies oriented by the New Classical Economics in stabilizing econo-
mies with regard to growth, employment, and the external equilibrium 
of several member states, particularly the peripheral nations. After the 
global recession in 2008, some EU countries had to face problems of 
public debt financing. However, in order to manage the crisis, the lead-
ers of the EU have imposed budget austerity to these countries, thereby 
contributing to deepen the recession and worsen the public finance cri-
sis. The governments were asked to cut their deficits even when they 
had to face serious recession. 
According to the understanding of European leaders, the present 
crisis is the consequence of the lack of rigor and effectiveness in the 
governance of the euro zone. Thus, discretionary decisions of national 
governments and parliaments with regard to fiscal policy should be 
subject to additional constraints in order to enforce budget consolida-
tion. The commitment to this view has been embodied in the fiscal pact 
signed in March 2012 by European leaders. Expansionary fiscal policy 
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is considered ineffective with regard to growth and responsible for in-
creasing deficits and debts. The proposed solution to promote growth 
is to deepen structural reforms, which should improve competitive-
ness at the national level. Inspired by this view, European leaders have 
called for additional regressive reforms of the labor market and welfare 
systems. Thus, a “race to the bottom” for wages and social benefits is 
emerging.
As a consequence, welfare systems have been under growing 
pressure. Restrictive rules on monetary and fiscal policies result in a 
growth path that puts social protection systems under increasing stress 
in times of recession, since the receipts from contributions decrease 
while social expenditures are increasing. However, structural reforms 
promoting labor market flexibility and welfare state downsizing have 
not reduced massive unemployment in European countries, as predicted 
by the New Classical Economics. Instead of acting in favor of growth 
and employment, the decline in wages and social benefits has caused a 
decrease in effective aggregate demand and thus contributed to deepen 
the recession. 
CONCLUSION
The 2007 reform of the social security pension system in Portugal 
was presented to the public as fundamental to contain pressures on the 
social security budget and guarantee its financial sustainability. The re-
form has been described as merely parametric, aimed at reducing the 
level of benefits for improving financial sustainability while preserving 
the overall logic of the system. However, it did not have a limited im-
pact in the structure of the social security pension system. It might be 
better described as structural.
This chapter has argued that the Portuguese process of pension re-
form was deeply influenced by European guidelines and policies. The 
economic policy paradigm dominant in the EU helped to create an eco-
nomic environment since the early 1990s that has favored the introduc-
tion of pension reforms. Since Maastricht, the imposition of restrictive 
rules in macroeconomic management has contributed to impose pres-
sures for reforming pensions. As the governments were recommended 
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to cut spending on pensions and other social transfer programs, there 
were direct pressures to lower public deficits and debts. There were also 
indirect pressures, since restrictive rules on fiscal policy have caused the 
slowdown of growth and the increase of unemployment, destabilizing 
social security budgetary equilibrium. However, a European strategy 
for the field of pensions, compatible with economic policies supply-
side oriented, was designed in parallel. An open method of coordina-
tion was followed, which has been an important factor in the process of 
reforming pensions in many member states. It has contributed to build 
a common view on this subject and to define guidelines for policy that 
have been translated into common trends in reforms. The Portuguese 
reform in 2007 and the new political discourse that calls for an addi-
tional reform have been aligned with the EU orientation for pensions. 
The chapter has also emphasized that the present difficulties in pen-
sion system financing are, to a great extent, the consequence of eco-
nomic dysfunctioning. This fact, however, has been underestimated 
in the public debate, which has been dominated by the argument that 
spending on pensions will be unsustainably high because of popula-
tion aging. The use of this simple argument may be misleading as it 
underestimates the decisive influence that economic performance has 
on pension systems budgetary equilibrium.
 Economic growth is crucial, as the problem posed by the change 
in the age structure of the population is one of an increasing share in 
spending. If output grows, the distributive problem becomes easier. 
However, economic policies inspired by the New Classical Economics 
have had extremely adverse effects in stabilizing economies with regard 
to growth, employment, and the external equilibrium of several Mem-
ber States, particularly the peripheral nations. A paradigmatic change 
in economic policy is fundamental to allow the appropriate policies for 
growth.
Furthermore, the discussion on the future of social security pen-
sions should not be dissociated from the debate on income distribution 
in society. In a system financed on a PAYG basis, pensioners’ income 
share depends on the distribution of income between capital and labor 
and on the division of the labor share between workers and pensioners. 
Ultimately, pension policy is about political choices.
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Notes
1. Law n.º 4/2007, January 16, and Decree-Law n.º 187/2007, May 9.
2. Significant measures intended to harmonize the public scheme with the scheme 
that covers civil servants were introduced. See Law n.º 60/2005, December 29. 
Notice that Decree-Law n.º 187/2007 also applies to the calculation of pensions 
for civil servants whose working career started after September 1, 1993, in accor-
dance with Decree-Law n.º 286/93.
3. Decree-Law n.º 329/93, September 25.
4. Decree-Law n.º 35/2002, February 19. See also DecreeLaw n.º 17/2000, August 
8, art.º 57º3.
5. Law n.º 53-B/2006, December 29.
6. Ordinance n.º 1316/2005, December 22.
7. Ordinance n.º 1357/2006, November 30.
8. Decree-Law n.º 232/2005, December 29. 
9. The official speech of the present government includes two policy orientations: 
increasing the labor market participation of older workers and promoting comple-
mentary private retirement savings. These orientations seem to have been inspired 
by the proposals of the EU social policy agenda defined in the Green Paper (Eu-
ropean Commission 2010) and the White Paper (European Commission 2012).
10. See, for example, Barr (2001, 2004); Barr and Diamond (2008); and Thompson 
(1998). 
11. First, funding might not increase savings, since an increase in mandatory savings 
can be offset by a reduction in voluntary savings. Second, increasing savings might 
not increase productive investment. Savings do not convert automatically into pro-
ductive investment. However, if there is a low rate of economic growth, increasing 
savings may have a depressive effect on the level of economic activity, and thus 
reduce productive investment. Third, an increase in productive investment might 
not have a significant effect on growth. This is the reason why Barr (2004, p. 207) 
argues that funding, as a mechanism intended to promote economic growth, is both 
indirect and debatable. On the effects of pensions on saving and investment, see 
Barr (2004), Barr and Diamond (2008), and Thompson (1998). The “myths” on 
the advantages of funding have been examined by Barr (2000a, 2001, 2004); Barr 
and Diamond (2008); Orszag and Stiglitz (2001); and Thompson (1998).
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The Norwegian Government  




Because of population aging, many countries have established re-
serve funds to mitigate the effects of future deficits in their social se-
curity programs (Jarrett 2011). According to the OECD, in 2009, 17 of 
34 member states had social security reserve funds. They have accumu-
lated a total of $4.554 trillion, of which about $2.540 trillion belonged 
to the U.S. Social Security Trust Fund (OECD 2011). 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a special reserve fund, 
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund. Its uniqueness is reflected 
in both its organizational structure and its principles of accumulation 
and investment of resources. This fund consists of two parts: Pension 
Fund-Global and Pension Fund–Norway. In view of a clearly defined 
commitment to the social security program of the latter, and a general 
commitment of the former, only the latter is recognized as a reserve 
fund in the OECD statistics. This chapter, however, mainly focuses on 
the Global Fund, which is one of the largest investors in the global fi-
nancial market.
This chapter addresses issues related to the development and the 
operation of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), 
which the Norwegian government uses to invest funds derived from 
the extraction of oil. After 15 years of regular fuel revenue receipts 
and through active investment policy, GPFG became the second-largest 
pension fund in the world (after Japan) and the first in Europe, with as-
sets of NOK 3.496 trillion ($626 billion, based on $1.00 = 5.58 kroner), 
This chapter first provides an overview of Social Security programs 
in Norway. It then discusses the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, 
focusing on the Norwegian Pension Fund Global.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
IN NORWAY
The involvement of the Norwegian government in the organization 
of social protection of the population began in the late nineteenth cen-
tury with the establishment of accident insurance for factory workers 
in 1885. The start of the development of the social security program 
took place in 1957, and 10 years later an additional mandatory retire-
ment plan depending on the amount of remuneration of labor was im-
plemented. In 1967, social benefits introduced for different groups prior 
to the Second World War were integrated in a single National Security 
program (Ambasada Norwegii w Polsce 2010). The current social secu-
rity program consists of three components (Lovdata 1966, 1998, 2002; 
Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organisation [NAV] 2012):
1) The National Insurance Scheme, under an act of February 28, 
1997;
2) The Family Allowance Scheme, regulated by an act of March 
8, 2002;
3) The Scheme for Cash Benefits for Families with Small Chil-
dren, established by an act of June 26, 1998.
In 2006, the social security reform process began. One of the most 
important changes was the establishment of a new institution, NAV. 
This office started its operations on July 1, 2006, and replaced the two 
previous institutions, Norwegian National Insurance (Trygdeetaten) 
and the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service (Aetat). NAV’s primary 
objective is to create opportunities for employment, while at the same 
time protecting the rights to social security benefits (NAV 2007–2009). 
The organizational structure includes 457 local NAV offices. The first 
offices were established in the autumn of 2006, while the target number 
was reached in March 2011.
The social security program is financed by contributions from em-
ployees, the self-employed, and employers, and also from government 
subsidies. The amount of the contribution is determined annually by the 
Parliament (NAV 2012). In 2012, four rates applied:
1) 7.8 percent of income from employment, paid by workers;
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund   131
2) 11.0 percent of the income from the self-employed;
3) 14.1 percent of the gross payroll for employers (with no ceiling 
on earnings);
4) 3.0 percent of other income (e.g. pensions).
The benefits of social security include old-age, survivor’s and dis-
ability pensions, temporary assistance grants for the chronically ill and 
those recovering from accidents, care allowances for persons with dis-
abilities, rehabilitation benefits, compensation for accidents at work, 
benefits for single parents, unemployment, sickness and maternity ben-
efits, medical sickness and maternity allowances, and funeral benefits 
(NAV 2012).
The right to individual benefits usually depends on the length of 
membership in the social security program. Most of the benefits, how-
ever, are calculated on the base rate, the G value (from grunnbeløp), 
determined annually by the Parliament in May. Since May 1, 2011, this 
rate amounts to NOK 79,216 (NAV 2011c) ($14,196).
THE PRINCIPLES OF FUNCTIONING AND THE REFORMS 
OF THE NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
Norwegian authorities reformed the social security program, taking 
effect starting January 1, 2011. The program is currently undergoing a 
period of transition in which old and new rules operate simultaneously. 
The most important aspects of the current system and the changes are 
indicated below.
The Norwegian retirement system consists of three components re-
ferred to as pillars. The first pillar is the basic pension received from 
the social security program (Folketrygden). The amount of the benefit 
depends on the amount of income, the duration of membership in the 
program and the contribution period, marital status, and whether the 
spouse receives benefits from Folketrygden. The retirement pension 
from this part of the system consists of the basic pension (grunnpens-
jon), the supplementary pension (tillegspensjon) and/or the extra allow-
ance (særtillegg) and the care allowance for pensioners with dependent 
children and/or a spouse (NAV 2012).
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The basic pension is granted to persons with at least three years of 
membership in the program between the ages of 16 and 66. The amount 
of the basic pension benefit is determined by the length of the insur-
ance period and is independent of both the amount of income earned 
during the activity period and the contributions paid into the system 
during the activity period. A full basic pension is received by members 
of Folketrygden after a minimum of 40 years. If the membership period 
is shorter, the amount of benefits is reduced accordingly (NAV 2011a). 
A full basic old-age pension is 100 percent of the base G rate (NOK 
79,216 since May 1, 2011) (NAV 2011c).
The supplementary pension (tilleggspensjon) was introduced in 
1967 with the purpose of maintaining a standard of living after retire-
ment close to the level of the work period (NAV 2012). The amount of 
the benefit is strictly dependent on income, measured by the average 
number of pension points, and the qualifying years of contributions. 
In order to obtain supplementary pension rights, the insured needs to 
exceed the G rate of the pensionable salary for a period of at least three 
years, with the G rate being the income threshold above which the pen-
sion points are counted. The part of income that exceeds the G rate is 
divided by this rate. Thus, workers earning twice the G rate receive 
one pension point. This rule applies to pension points calculated on the 
basis of pensionable salary not exceeding 6G. For income between 6G 
and 12G, only one-third is taken into account to calculate the number 
of pension points. Income exceeding 12G is not taken into account. The 
average final pension points for determining the supplementary pension 
is calculated as the average of the 20 best years in terms of pension 
points (NAV 2012).
The extra allowance (særtillegg) is granted to pensioners not en-
titled to a supplementary pension or if the supplementary pension is less 
than the særtillegg. The right to the basic pension is necessary to obtain 
the extra allowance. The amount of the allowance is decided by Parlia-
ment as a percentage of the basic G in two rates, normal, amounting to 
94 percent of G and reduced, which is 74 percent of G (NAV 2010).
The age for receipt of social security benefits in Norway is 67 for 
both men and women. Workers are allowed to continue work after ben-
efit receipt until age 68 with full pension entitlement. At age 68, how-
ever, until age 70, if the annual income of the retired person exceeds 
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twice the rate of G, the pension amount above this level is reduced by 
40 percent (NAV 2011a).
The pension reform implemented on January 1, 2011, introduces 
changes in the retirement age, the principles of calculation and payment 
of benefits and the possibility of combining an old-age pension with 
further work. The new, flexible, retirement program is primarily aimed 
at providing the insured with the following (NAV 2012):
• The ability to receive a retirement pension after age 62, if the 
insured has acquired adequate pension rights. Everyone is still 
entitled to receive benefits at age 67.
• The selection of the “retirement standard”—the insured worker 
decides whether to receive the full old age benefit from their 
pension account, or a partial benefit: 20 percent, 40 percent, 50 
percent, 60 percent, or 80 percent.
• The right to change the “level of retirement” once a year.
• The possibility of combining the entitlements and labor income 
without reducing the received pension benefit.
In addition, those born after 1962 acquire pension rights according 
to the following new rules (NAV 2012):
• The amount of the old-age pension depends on all the years in 
which the income accounting for pension points was obtained, 
until age 75. Based on the new rules, the contributions of the 
insured create a pension fund, and the amount of the benefit 
depends on the accumulated capital value. According to the ex-
isting rules, the amount of pension was calculated on the basis 
of the 20 best years of work and allowed full pension after 40 
years of participation in the program.
• The funds accumulated in the pension fund (a notional account, 
rather than an invested account) are indexed annually by the 
wages growth indicator for those before retirement, and by 
that indicator decreased by 0.75 percent for persons receiving 
a benefit;
• The pension fund grows by 18.1 percent of the insured income 
in excess of the equivalent of 7.1 G.
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Persons born between 1943 and 1953 acquire pension rights and 
receive benefits in accordance with the existing terms and conditions. 
Persons born between 1954 and 1962 acquire the rights based in part on 
new and old rules.
The changes introduced in the Norwegian social security program 
guarantee a greater freedom as to when, and to what extent, the insured 
person starts drawing a pension. The changes also allow a person to 
work and receive an unreduced pension, which helps to increase future 
benefits by raising retirement savings. Despite the right to receive a 
pension at age 62, the new rules for calculating entitlements encourage 
prolonged years of work. The flexibility of pension savings withdrawal 
also applies to persons born between 1943 and 1953, to whom the regu-
lations from before the reform apply.
The effects of the implemented reforms were evident right when the 
new regulations were enforced. In January 2011, 13,600 persons under 
age 67 took the advantage of the possible pension savings withdrawal. 
In total, in the first quarter of 2011, 17,834 people aged 62–66 opted to 
receive benefits, of whom 83.5 percent were male (NAV 2011b). About 
60 percent of this group remained in the labor market using the possibil-
ity of joining work with drawing pension benefits (NAV 2011e). In the 
first quarter of 2011, NAV paid pensions to 685,226 people, an increase 
of about 32,000 compared to the first quarter of 2010. In total, the par-
ticipation of pensioners in the Norwegian community at that time was 
13.88 percent (NAV 2011d).
In addition to the social security program, the second pillar, consist-
ing of employee pension plans (Obligatorisk	Tjenestepensjon [OTP]), 
was introduced in 2006 as a part of the retirement system reform. The 
Norwegian OTP is mandatory for both employees and employers. The 
third pillar covers all additional, optional forms of benefits offered by 
private pension funds and other financial institutions. The scope of its 
organizational system, however, is not specified by the legislature.
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THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORWEGIAN 
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund has been operating in 
its present form since January 1, 2006. Its origins, however, date back 
to the 1960s. It consists of two separate funds: the Government Pen-
sion Fund Global (GPFG), which is the successor of the Government 
Petroleum Fund, and the Government Pension Fund Norway (GPFN), 
derived from the Social Insurance Fund. The Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund is owned by the Norwegian Government and the Ministry 
of Finance. 
The current administration of GPFG and GPFN has been entrusted 
to two institutions, a special unit operating in the National Bank of Nor-
way called Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) and Folk-
etrygdfondet (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2012). Each of these 
funds was created at a different time and, although together forming the 
Norwegian Pension Fund, are independent of each other, governed by 
separate legislation and adopting different strategies.
The GPFN was established in 1967 under the Social Security Act 
as the Social Insurance Fund (Lovdata 1966). As mentioned above, in 
2006 it was converted into GPFN, managed by Folketrygdfondet, an 
independent entity, under an act of June 29, 2007, fully owned by the 
state (Lovdata 2007). The aim of GPFN is to accumulate and grow sav-
ings in the social security program for the purpose of payment of future 
pension benefits. The initial capital of the GPFN derived from the sur-
plus generated in the social security program since its establishment in 
1967 until the late 1970s. Currently, the proceeds to the fund are profits 
from its investment activities. The total net gains (net of management 
costs) increase the GPFN assets and no transfers to the state budget 
or payments of current benefits occur (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
2012). The value of assets held in the fund at the end of 2011 stood at 
NOK 129.4 billion ($23.19 billion), of which NOK 78.3 billion ($14.0 
billion) is in equity securities, and NOK 51.1 billion ($9.2 billion) is in 
financial assets with fixed income (SSB 2012b). The investment port-
folio of the fund shares included 48 Norwegian companies (with a total 
value of NOK 60.4 billion) and 90 companies in other Nordic countries 
(with a value of NOK 17.9 billion). Among the debt securities, almost 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
136   Mosionek-Schweda
70 percent were corporate bonds of Norwegian companies (worth NOK 
35.5 billion); the fund also held government bonds worth NOK 6 bil-
lion and foreign debt securities worth NOK 9.6 billion (SSB 2012c). 
In contrast to the GPFG, the GPFN investment activity is limited to 
the Norwegian market and the regulated markets of Nordic countries 
(Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, with the exception of Iceland). GPFG, 
founded more than 30 years later than the GPFN, is the focus of the 
remainder of the chapter. 
The basis for its establishment was an act in June 1990 that cre-
ated the Government Petroleum Fund (the Oil Fund) (Lovdata 1990). 
Through this fund, the Norwegian government accumulated and in-
vested the excess funds from the extraction of crude oil discovered at 
the end of 1969. Until the establishment of the Oil Fund, the revenues 
from extractive industries were used for about 20 years for current pub-
lic expenditure and national debt redemption. In the 1970s, however, 
it was evident that the revenues from the petroleum sector are indefi-
nite as they relate to nonrenewable resources. To avoid overheating the 
Norwegian economy and in view of the long-term use of oil wealth, 
the Norwegian authorities decided to direct one-third of the net income 
of the state generated by the oil production to a special fund. The first 
transfer of funds, however, took place only in 1996; the fund received 
approximately NOK 2 billion in 1996 (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
2012).
After 15 years of regular fuel revenue receipts and through an ac-
tive investment policy, GPFG became the second-largest pension fund 
in the world (after Japan) and the largest in Europe. The fund is also 
the largest shareholder in the European capital market with about 1.8 
percent of shares listed on stock exchanges in Europe and one of the 
largest investors in the world, with approximately 1 percent share in the 
global capital market (Towers Watson 2011). The value of assets held 
in GPFG at the end of the first quarter of 2012 amounted to NOK 3,496 
trillion ($627 billion). Figure 6.1 shows the market value of the fund on 
a quarterly basis from 1998 to 2012.
As mentioned above, the predecessor of today’s GPFG was the Oil 
Fund, transformed into GPFG in 2006. From that time, its purpose is 
not only to support the government in the long-term, sustainable use of 
revenues from the petroleum sector, but also to multiply these means in 
order to finance future pension payments in the public social security 
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system (OECD 2011). The fund, however, is an instrument for general 
saving with undefined future liabilities to the social security program or 
any other social or economic area. It is not an instrument of Norwegian 
foreign policy, and is not used for the purpose of achieving political or 
strategic objectives. The functioning of the GPFG (Statens	pensjons-
fond	–	Utland) is based on three basic principles (Ambasada Norwegii 
w Polsce 2012):
1) Annual revenues of the fund are derived from the Norwegian 
state oil production, financial operations associated with the ex-
traction and profits generated by the fund.
2) The transfer of funds to the budget may not exceed an amount 
equal to the expected rate of return on investment, set at 4 per-
cent per year. With this principle, the government can only 
SOURCE: NBIM, Government Pension Fund Global first quarter 2012, Oslo 
(2012b, p. 2).
Figure 6.1  Government Pension Fund Global Market Value, 2002–2012 
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Market value of real estate investments
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withdraw the profits earned by GPFG without diminishing its 
capital. In addition, short-term fluctuations in oil and gas prices 
do not impact the fiscal policy.
3) The fund’s assets are invested exclusively outside Norway. 
This is to ensure the diversification of investments and the re-
duction of the adverse impact of fluctuations in oil prices on the 
domestic economy.
Due to the lack of clearly defined social security pension liabilities 
of the pension fund, as well as the lack of the connections between the 
fund and the social security program (GPFG revenues are independent 
of the contributions of the insured), it is not a typical social security 
reserve fund established in some countries, such as the United States, 
with the aim of securing future pension payments. As emphasized by 
the Norwegian authorities, the idea of the GPFG is a long-term, rational 
management of resources from the oil deposits to benefit both today’s 
and future generations of the residents of Norway (Norwegian Ministry 
of Finance 2012). According to the forecasts of the Ministry of Finance, 
in 2020 the market value of the fund will amount to NOK 6.285 tril-
lion ($1.126 trillion) (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2011). Assuming 
that at that time Norway will be inhabited by about 5.5 million peo-
ple (SSB 2012a), the amount per person will exceed NOK 1.1 million 
($197,000). At the end of 2011, the fund’s value per capita amounted to 
about NOK 670,000 ($120,000).
THE INVESTMENT STRATEGY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
PENSION FUND GLOBAL
GPFG is a unique investor considering not only its large asset 
value, but also its lack of necessity of achieving short-term investment 
objectives. Its investment policies are designed to take into account the 
specific characteristics of the fund and the specificity of the markets in 
which the assets are invested. For this reason, the Ministry of Finance 
and the National Bank of Norway carry out a continuous review of the 
fund’s investment strategy to develop it in the best direction to increase 
funds accumulated in the fund and to achieve the desired rate of return 
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at a moderate level of risk. It is the basic principle to be respected by 
NBIM, the entity responsible for managing the assets of GPFG (Norwe-
gian Ministry of Finance 2010). The real average annual rate of return 
of the fund for the period 1997–2011 was 2.7 percent and therefore 
below the 4 percent estimated by the Ministry of Finance. The annual 
performance of the GPFG is characterized by extremes, from a loss of 
−23.3 percent to profits of 25.6 percent (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
2012). The Norwegian Government points out, however, that GPFG 
is based on a long-term investment objective, and the loss-making as-
sets in the investment portfolio have a great potential for growth in the 
future.
GPFG investment policy has evolved with the growth of its as-
sets (Table 6.1). The first transfers from the state budget to the fund 
(then Statens	petroleumsfond) were invested exclusively in government 
bonds, in accordance with the investment policy of the Norwegian Cen-
tral Bank. In 1998, NBIM was established—the body responsible for 
the management of the investment policy of the fund in accordance 
with the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance. In that year, it was de-
cided to include stocks in the investment portfolio on the condition that 
they not exceed 40 percent of the fund (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
2012). Nine years later, this limit was raised to 60 percent, and in the 
subsequent year the Ministry decided to permit real estate investments 
limited to 5 percent of the portfolio (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
2010).
The diversification of the GPFG portfolio pertains to different cat-
egories of investments, as well as geographical dispersion. For the pur-
pose of the investment policy of the fund, the following three regions 
were determined: Europe, America/Africa, and Asia/Oceania, with the 
investment limits within each of these regions defined separately for 
investments in equity and debt securities. So far, they were established, 
respectively, as 50 percent, 35 percent, and 15 percent for equities, 
and 60 percent, 35 percent, and 5 percent for investments in fixed in-
come securities (NBIM 2012a). This indicates that more than half of 
the GPFG assets were located in securities and real estate in Europe. 
The current financial crisis not only shook the capital markets, but also 
revealed a number of anomalies and problems in the public finances of 
certain European countries. The changes observed in global finance in 
2008–2010 contributed to the GPFG management decision to change 
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Table 6.1  Stages of Development of the Government Pension Fund 
Global Investment Policy 
Year Events
1969 The discovery of oil in the North Sea—extraction since 1971.
1990 The decision of the Norwegian Parliament to set up the Government 
Petroleum Fund for long-term management of revenues from oil 
sales. 
1996 The first transfer of funds to the Fund in the amount of 
approximately NOK 2 billion.
1997 The decision of the Ministry of Finance to start investing in equity 
funds—the fund previously invested only in government bonds.
1998 January 1—the NBIM commencement—NBIM manages the fund 
on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. The change in the structure 
of the investment portfolio of the fund—40 percent of the portfolio 
conversed from debt to equity instruments.
2000 Five emerging markets added to benchmark index. 
2002 Corporate bonds included in debt instruments benchmark index.
2004 The establishment of ethical guidelines for the fund’s investment 
plan.
2006 Name changed to: Government Pension Fund Global.
2007 The decision of the Ministry of Finance to increase the limit 
of investment in equities from 40 percent to 60 percent and the 
inclusion of small and medium-sized enterprises to the portfolio. 
2008 The decision to start investing in real estate to a maximum of 5 
percent of the fund’s assets. The inclusion of all emerging markets 
in benchmark index.
2009 Evaluation of ethical guidelines. The share of stocks in the portfolio 
of the fund has reached the limit of 60 percent in June. The fund 
reached a record rate of return, 25.6 percent.
2010 Rules for investing in real estate adopted.
2011 The first investments in real estate (located in London and Paris).
2012 A new benchmark for investments in debt instruments. New rules of 
geographic diversification of investments in equity.
SOURCE: Author’s study based on Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2012, pp. 13–39).
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the geographical spread of the fund investments by reducing the share 
of European investment in the fund and increasing its commitment 
to emerging markets. The category of emerging markets includes 23 
countries, among others: Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Russia, and Hungary (NBIM 2012a). The new rules of 
geographical diversification were introduced progressively since 2012, 
and this process is expected to take about six years.
In addition to the investment guidelines of the Ministry of Finance, 
the fund management is obliged to comply with the rules developed by 
the Council of Ethics. The council, operating since 2004, is preparing 
recommendations for the Ministry of Finance on exclusion from GPFG 
portfolio of companies operating in the production of weapons, de-
stroying the environment, disrespecting ethical standards, and violating 
human rights. By the end of 2011, based on council recommendations, 
a total of 55 companies were excluded, among others: British American 
Tobacco Plc., Philip Morris International Inc., and Japan Tobacco Inc. 
(the tobacco industry); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (human rights violations); 
Alliant Techsystems Inc., General Dynamics Corp., and Hanwha Corp. 
(cluster weapons); and Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd. (land-
mines) (Council on Ethics 2012).
THE INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO OF THE GOVERNMENT 
PENSION FUND GLOBAL IN 2011
In 2011, GPFG assets increased by approximately NOK 234 bil-
lion, and at the end of this period, their value amounted to NOK 3.312 
trillion. As a result of persisting high oil prices on the world markets, 
the government receipts transferred to the fund were the highest since 
2008 and amounted to NOK 271 billion (SSB 2012b). Table 6.2 pre-
sents the basic information on the investment portfolio and the financial 
performance of GPFG between 2006 and 2011 (since the transforma-
tion of the Oil Fund into the Pension Fund).
In 2011, the value of the fund’s assets was almost two times higher 
than in 2006. This value is dependent on transfers from the state bud-
get, rates of return on investments, and changes due to fluctuations in 
the Norwegian krone (all GPFG investments are made outside Nor-
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way). In the analysed period, the worst result from investing activities 
was achieved in 2008—the rate of return was −23.3 percent (in inter-
national currency) and it was the weakest result since the establishment 
of the fund.1 The loss of NOK 633 billion, however, was compensated 
by record transfers from the state budget (NOK 384 billion) and the 
weakening of the Norwegian krone against the currencies in which the 
fund invests (NBIM 2009). At the end of 2011 the loss amounted to 
NOK 86 billion. With funds from the state budget and the depreciation 
of NOK the assets increased eventually by NOK 234 billion, but this 
was the lowest figure since 2005.2 A negative rate of return in 2011 
(−2.5 percent in international currency) was the consequence of nega-
tive results from investments in equity; the declines in stock markets in 
Asia, the United States and Europe generated the loss of −8.8 percent. 
The rising prices of debt instruments, however, resulted in a 7 percent 
return on investment in this type of GPFG securities. Comparing these 
figures with their reference indexes (the FTSE Global for shares, the 
index prepared by Barclays Capital for bonds) shows that the rate of 
return on investment in shares is 0.48 percentage points lower than its 
benchmark, while in the case of bonds, the result is 0.52 percentage 
points higher (NBIM 2012a).
Table 6.2  Government Pension Fund Global Market Value, Annual 
Results, and Cash Flows from the State Budget, 2006–2011 
(NOK billion)
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Equity instruments 1,945 1,891 1,644 1,129 958 726
Fixed-income 
instruments
1,356 1,186 996 1,146 1,061 1,058
Real estate investments 11 0 0 0 0 0
Transfer of funds from 
the budget
271 182 169 384 314 288
Generated profit/loss −86 264 613 −633 504 124
Change due to 
fluctuations in krone
49 −8 −418 506 −154 −28
Total net change 234 437 365 257 235 384
Total GPFG value 3,312 3,077 2,640 2,275 2,019 1,784
SOURCE: Author’s study based on NBIM, Government	Pension	Fund	Global	Annual	
Report	2006,	2007,	2008,	2009,	2010,	2011.
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Based on these figures, the changes to the investment policy of 
GPFG can be observed in the structure of the investment portfolio, i.e., 
a gradual increase in the share of stocks. As a result, starting from 2009, 
the shares occupy a dominant position in the structure of the invest-
ment. At the end of 2011, GPFG held shares of a market value of about 
NOK 1.945 trillion (an increase of NOK 54 billion compared to 2010), 
which accounted for 58.7 percent of total assets, slightly below the 
permissible limit of 60 percent of the investment in such instruments 
(see Figure 6.2). At the same time, 41 percent of the GPFG assets were 
invested in the fixed income securities, significantly exceeding the 35 
percent limit adopted for the strategic investment portfolio. The market 
value of debt instruments has increased over 2011 by NOK 170 billion 
to the level of NOK 1.356 billion (NBIM 2012a).
In 2011, the GPFG investment portfolio included the first real es-










Figure 6.2  Strategic and Actual Structure of the Government Pension 
Fund Global Investment Portfolio, 2011 (%)
SOURCE: Author’s study based on NBIM (2012a, p, 14). 
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the purchase of a 25 percent stake in the Crown Estate’s Regent Street 
in London, with a value of NOK 4.2 billion (approximately GBP 452 
million). Three months later, the fund acquired a 50 percent interest in 
7 properties located in Paris and the surrounding area with a total value 
of NOK 5.5 billion (EUR 702.5 million). By the end of the year, the 
involvement in real estate had increased by another 2 buildings located 
in London at the Regent Street and three in Paris. In total, GPFG held 
shares in 13 buildings (114 premises), primarily office and retail space. 
The total market value of these investments at the end of 2011 was ap-
proximately NOK 11 billion, which accounted for only 0.3 percent of 
the value of the investment portfolio with an acceptable level of 5 per-
cent. Due to the transaction costs, the return on investment in real estate 
in 2011 was negative and amounted to −0.79 percent (−4.37 percent in 
international currencies) (NBIM 2012a).
The Ministry of Finance plans to gradually increase the fund’s in-
volvement in the real estate market to reach the 5 percent threshold in 
2020. Given the projections on the value of the fund’s assets (Norwe-
gian Ministry of Finance 2011), about NOK 250–300 billion of GPFG 
assets is expected to be invested in the European real estate market in 
the target year.
At the end of 2011, GPFG held stocks, bonds, and real estate shares 
registered in 68 countries (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2011). 
Table 6.3 shows the capital structure of the GPFG investment portfolio 
in terms of geographic diversification in 2011. About 50 percent of its 
shares were listed on the European markets, 35 percent on the markets 
in the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East, and 15 percent in Asia and 
Oceania. The rates of return on investments in these regions (measured 
in international currency) were, respectively, −12.1 percent, −2.4 per-
cent, and 15.5 percent.
Analysing the fund’s commitment to national stock markets of in-
dividual countries (Table 6.3), the largest share (30.3 percent) of the 
GPFG investment portfolio was placed in the securities listed on the 
markets in the United States (2,041 investments with a total value of 
more than NOK 588.4 billion), followed by the British market (16.3 per-
cent of the GPFG portfolio, 397 investments worth NOK 317.7 billion), 
France (6.9 percent), Switzerland (6.3 percent), Germany (5.8 percent), 
and Japan (5.6 percent). The investments in securities of Japanese com-
panies accounted for 40 percent of the total value of shares purchased 
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in the Asia-Pacific (NBIM 2012c). As a result of the earthquake and 
tsunami that hit Japan in March 2011, their value has decreased by 18.7 
percent. More negative returns were received on investments made in 
the four countries considered to be the largest emerging markets, i.e., 
India (−34.4 percent), China (−21.8 percent), Russia (−19.5 percent), 
and Brazil (−10,1 percent) (NBIM 2012a).
At the end of 2011, the fund held securities issued by 8,005 com-
panies, while in the previous year this number was equal to 8,496. Ac-
cording to the investment policy of the Ministry of Finance, the fund 
is not allowed to exceed 10 percent of the shareholding of one com-
pany. In the analysed period, the highest share was recorded in the Irish 
company Smurfit Kappa Group, in which the fund held 9.6 percent of 
shares worth NOK 773 million. In total, the participation of the fund 
exceeded 5 percent in 53 companies (17 companies in 2010). The 10 
largest investments in equity securities included companies from Swit-
zerland, the UK and the United States (see Table 6.4) with an oil sector 
company, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, on the top of the ranking, as GPFG 
acquired 2.2 percent of its shares worth nearly NOK 31 billion (NBIM 
2012a).
The fund’s investments in fixed income securities include bonds, 
inflation-indexed bonds, corporate bonds, securitized debt instruments 
and bonds issued by public entities such as regional authorities or state-
owned enterprises. The GPFG debt investment portfolio in 2011 was 
dominated by government bonds (46 percent), followed by securitized 
debt instruments (18 percent) and corporate bonds (14 percent). The 
fund had a total of 5,215 series of debt securities issued by 1,404 enti-
ties, while in the previous year it was a series of 8,659 issued by 1,686 
entities. Ninety-four percent of these investments were denominated in 
Euros, U.S. dollars, British pounds, and Japanese yen (NBIM 2012a).
CONCLUSION
GPFG is one of the largest investors in the global capital market. A 
characteristic feature of its investment activity is a long-term approach 
to investment. The main idea of the fund’s management is growing the 
GPFG assets for future generations. Such an investment objective en-
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Table 6.3  GPFG Investments in Equity in the Global Capital Market, 2011
Region/country
Investment value 
(NOK million) Number Region/country
Investment value 
(NOK million) Number
Europe 966,343 1,567 Africa 9,564 89
Austria 6,119 28 Egypt 750 31
Belgium 16,505 44 Morocco 33 1
Cyprus 111.6 3 South Africa 8,781 57
Czech Republic 903 4 Asia 244,624 3,481
Denmark 18,300 36 China 27,235 1,016
Faeroe Islands 8.9 1 Hong Kong 26,030 327
Finland 15,688 44 India 10,365 120
France 136,215 162 Indonesia 4,427 15
Georgia 56,646 1 Japan 109,633 1,267
Germany 112,797 140 Kazakhstan 174 3
Greece 2,066 29 Malaysia 5,993 79
Guernsey 280 5 Philippines 1,619 26
Hungary 1,407 6 Singapore 7,243 102
Ireland 4,509 25 South Korea 28,856 92
Italy 34,941 118 Taiwan 19,554 401
Jersey 34.9 1 Thailand 3,495 33
Lithuania 1.6 1 Latin America 41,881 174
Luxembourg 431 3 Brazil 33,308 98
The Netherlands 37,745 56 Cayman Islands 10.5 1
Poland 5,844 48 Chile 3,141 33
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Portugal 6,681 23 Colombia 367.7 8
Russia 25,246 69 Mexico 4,754 30
Spain 45,077 75 Panama 10 1
Sweden 48,714 85 Peru 290.1 3
Switzerland 121,811 103 Middle East 4,005  73
Turkey 6,936 57 Bahrain 454 1
Ukraine 152.8 3 Israel 3,342 65
Great Britain 317,758 397 United Arab Emirates 209.1 7
North America 641,671 2,333 Oceania 32,646 288
Bermuda Islands 56 2 Australia 31,830 269
Canada 53,151 290 New Zealand 815.4 19
USA 588,464 2041
SOURCE: Author’s own study based on NBIM (2012c, pp. 1–46).
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ables the fund management to focus on prospective investments with 
above-average returns in the future instead of achieving short-term re-
sults. The current financial crisis and the collapse of the capital markets 
resulted in impairment of investments for many investors. At the same 
time, GPFG consistently implemented its investment objective by ac-
quiring low-priced shares with a potential for growth in a long-term 
perspective. For instance, in the second half of 2011, GPFG allocated 
NOK 150 billion to the purchase of shares in the European market.
Establishing the Government Petroleum Fund and then converting 
it into a Pension Fund is a testimony to the rational management of 
Norwegian wealth. Although GPFG has no clearly defined obligations 
to the social security program, it is stressed in any document governing 
the operation that it was founded for the benefit of future generations. It 
is undoubtedly a financial, as well as social, success.
Table 6.4  The Largest GPFG Investments in Equity Securities, 20011
Issuing entity Country
Value of shares held 
(NOK billion)
Royal Dutch Shell Plc Great Britain 30.983
Nestlé SA Switzerland 25.346
HSBC Holdings Plc Great Britain 19.583
Novartis AG Switzerland 19.281
Vodafone Group Plc Great Britain 18.858
BP Plc Great Britain 17.277
Exxon Mobil Corp United States 16.901
Roche Holding AG Switzerland 16.279
Apple Inc United States 16.027
GlaxoSmithKline Plc Great Britain 15.775
SOURCE: Author’s own study based on NBIM (2012a, p. 43).
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Notes
1. The GPFG investments in international securities are not converted into kroner 
in connection with financial reporting and are not hedged against moves in the 
krone. Changes in the krone exchange rate do not affect the fund’s international 
purchasing power. Consequently, the return is generally measured in international 
currency, a weighted combination of the currencies in the fund’s benchmark 
indices for equities and bonds. This is known as the fund’s currency basket and 
consisted of 35 currencies at the end of the first quarter of 2012 (NBIM 2012b).
2. In 2011, the Norwegian krone weakened by 1.9 percent against the British pound, 
2.7 percent against the U.S. dollar, 8.2 percent against the Japanese yen, and 
strengthened by 0.7 percent against the euro. The fund held 83 percent of the 
investments in these currencies.
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Pension Reforms in Central 




Since the end of the 1990s, a number of countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe carried out structural pension reforms, including the 
introduction of a privately managed pension system, the so-called 
second-pillar pension system. The reforms were clearly influenced by 
the book Averting	the	Old	Age	Crisis, published in 1994 by the World 
Bank. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that imple-
mented this type of pension system include Hungary (1998), Poland 
(1999), Latvia (2001), Bulgaria (2002), Croatia (2002), Estonia (2002), 
the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia (2003), Slovakia 
(2005), and Romania (2008). 
This chapter covers a wide topic: social security pension reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter surveys the main tendencies 
and discusses the reforms in the region in general terms, with a more 
detailed discussion about Poland, which was one of the forerunners of 
both the structural reforms in the late 1990s and the reforms at the time 
of crisis. The chapter concentrates on structures and types of manda-
tory general pension systems without going into details of the systems’ 
design.
The chapter starts with a brief description of the heritage of com-
munism in pension systems and the early transition. The next section 
deals with the structural pension reforms in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. The following section presents basic differences between coun-
tries, concerning solutions within pension systems and their situation. 
The next section is devoted to the impact of crisis on pension systems 
and the resulting “second wave of reforms.” Conclusions follow. 
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HERITAGE OF COMMUNISM AND EARLY TRANSITION
When the CEE countries started their transition from communism 
to democracy and from a centrally planned economy to a market econ-
omy, the heritage of communism was largely negative. However, in the 
pension area, contrary to many others, the countries inherited existing 
and functioning institutions. 
The pension systems in the CEE countries had many similar char-
acteristics in the early 1990s (Barr and Rutkowski 2005; Hirose 2011):
• Social security pension systems, financed on a PAYG basis, 
were the only source of income in old age, as occupational or 
individual pension plans did not exist.
• The systems were fragmented, with privileges for some groups, 
such as lower retirement age or more generous benefit formulas.
• Access to pensions was easy: the normal retirement age was 
low, there were many early retirement possibilities, and dis-
ability pensions were granted relatively easily.
• Even if pensions were financed by contributions (the “Bis-
marck” approach), the entire contribution was paid by the 
employer and pensions were only partly related to contribu-
tions, due to many redistributive aspects in the benefit formulas.
• There were no records of contributions at an individual level 
and no clear lines of demarcation between the state budget and 
the budgets of the social security systems.
At the same time, there were also differences between CEE coun-
tries concerning solutions in the pension system or generosity of 
pensions. CEE countries entered the transition to the market economy 
with inherited pension systems that had been adjusted to the circum-
stances of a centrally planned economy. In the early transition, some 
changes were introduced that made the pension systems compatible with 
a market economy (Barr and Rutkowski 2005), including
• indexing pensions to cope with high inflation;
• improving incentives, such as through increasing the number of 
years used to calculate a pension; and
• strengthening administration.
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Poland, like most other CEE countries, has a long tradition of social 
insurance that was still present under communism, although with some 
important elements of a state redistribution system. The Polish pension 
system was in a sense between the traditions of “Bismarck” and “Bev-
eridge” (Żukowski 1994).      
The transformation process influenced the Polish pension system: 
the number of contributors fell and the number of pensioners rose, partly 
as a result of special early retirement plans connected with unemploy-
ment. This, together with an increase in pension levels, led to a financial 
crisis. These were costs of a successful policy protecting incomes of 
retirees in the difficult time of an economic and social transformation.  
Several reform plans met with political resistance, and changes 
introduced affected only some parameters of the system, without a 
structural reform (Żukowski 1996). Unlike many other areas of the 
economy, the pension system was reformed only in the “second wave” 
of the reforms. 
There are several reasons why the pension reform was made only 
10 years after the beginning of transformation. First, Poland had inher-
ited from the communist era an old-age security system that was able 
to function under the changed circumstances, unlike many other areas 
that had to be built from the beginning, such as taxes, banks, capital 
market or—in the social policy area—labor market policy. Second, for 
exactly the above reasons, at the beginning of the transformation some 
important preconditions for functioning of pension funds, which were 
an element of almost every reform concept, were absent (capital mar-
ket, banks, insurance). Third, a political consensus necessary for such 
a deep reform was absent in Poland for a longer period. Still, however, 
with time, the understanding of the problem, especially of the system-
atic burden of the system, has been growing.
STRUCTURAL PENSION REFORMS
Many CEE countries introduced structural social security pension 
reforms in a second wave of reforms. These reforms created “multitier 
pension systems” (Żukowski 1997), with a mandatory second tier (or 
pillar) of privately managed pension funds. As these new second pil-
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lars replaced a part of the previous social security PAYG systems, the 
structural reforms were also described as (partial) privatization of old-
age security. These pension reforms in CEE countries were influenced 
by the World Bank report (1994) and followed the examples of some 
countries in Latin America (Müller 2003). 
The first two CEE countries to introduce such a reform were Hun-
gary (1998) and Poland (1999). Several other countries followed: Latvia 
(2001), Bulgaria (2002), Croatia (2002), Estonia (2002), the FYR of 
Macedonia (2003), Slovakia (2005), and Romania (2008). 
As a result of these structural pension reforms, the new EU member 
states are a majority of countries within the EU with a mandatory second 
tier (Table 7.1). The exceptions were the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and 
Lithuania, which preserved their “Bismarckian” PAYG systems with 
no mandatory pension funds. 
Apart from the common feature of replacing a portion of the PAYG 
plan with a fully funded plan, the exact reform patterns in these coun-
tries differed in many respects. In the PAYG social security systems 
(now called the first-pillar pension systems), some countries (such as 
Poland and Latvia) introduced notional defined contribution accounts, 
while the others kept the defined benefit formula, but often reformed 
through, for example, the extension of the qualifying period in terms of 
years of work needed to receive a benefit. Also, the second-pillar pen-
sion systems differed in terms of contribution rate, administration, and 
coverage. 
There are various explanations of the structural pension reforms in 
CEE countries. The role of international organizations, especially the 
World Bank, was stressed, especially in relation to the high foreign debt 
of the countries involved (Müller 1999, 2003). It was shown that the re-
forms were fostered by a transnational advocacy campaign (Orenstein 
2008). 
Economic objectives, such as accumulation of capital and eco-
nomic growth, played a crucial role. The pension reforms were treated 
as a vehicle of modernization to accelerate the development of market 
economies. The reforms were introduced in specific circumstances of 
transition: “extraordinary” conditions of a transformation of almost all 
economic, social, and political institutions. In this situation, the politi-
cal will to enact deep reforms was stronger than the political resistance 
to change. 
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In Poland, after several years of discussions on pension reform, the 
reform concept “Security through Diversity” (Office of the Government 
Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform 1997) was to a large extent 
implemented. The new system took effect on January 1, 1999. Three fac-
tors enabled such a structural change in the old-age security system: 
1) the critique of the old system, 2) the reform concept, and 3) an ap-
propriate organization of the work on the reform, including political 
consensus. 
The main objectives of the reform were both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic. The first microeconomic concern was to create a tighter 
link between contributions and pensions, thus strengthening the incentive 
to work and the disincentive to evade making contributions. The other 
microeconomic objective was to lower—in the longer term—social insur-
ance contributions paid by the employer in order to reduce labor costs and 
to increase employment. The key macroeconomic aim was to lower the 
level of public expenditures on pensions, as a proportion of gross domes-
tic product, to relieve public finance for other aims toward growth. The 
other aim was to induce people to save more voluntarily. 
The new old-age pension system covered younger insured workers 
(under age 30) in full. Those aged 30–50 were given the option until the 
Table 7.1  Types of Old-Age Security Systems in the EU-27 
General state pension system (first tier)
Supplementary pension plans  
(second and third tiers)
Pensions Based on: Voluntary Obligatory
Earnings-  
     related
Insurance/earnings (defined 
benefit)
Austria             Germany 
Luxembourg    Belgium  
Greece             Portugal 
Spain               Slovenia  
Lithuania         Cyprus  









(notional defined  
contribution)
Italy Latvia (i) 
Poland (i) 
Sweden (i)
Flat-rate Insurance (paying  
contributions)
Ireland UK (s, o, or i)
Residence Denmark (o) 
Netherlands (o)
NOTE: s = state; o = occupational; i = individual.
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end of 1999 to participate (and split pension contributions accordingly) 
in both new pillars (PAYG and funded) or to stay in the new PAYG one 
with the entire contribution. The insured who were older than age 50 
were not covered by the reform—they will retire according to the old 
rules.    
The pension reform in Poland replaced a one-pillar system with a 
multipillar one. The new system consists of two obligatory parts: the 
first is pay as you go, which is administered by Social Insurance Institu-
tion (ZUS), and the second one is fully funded and privately managed. 
Between 1999 and 2011, these plans had contribution rates of 12.22 
percent and 7.30 percent, respectively. Additional sources of income 
security, among them occupational pension plans, constitute the third, 
voluntary pillar. 
Pensions from the first pillar will be based on the principle of 
notional defined contributions, whereas the old pensions have been 
defined benefit pensions. The new pension formula includes only two 
components: the sum of indexed contributions paid, divided by average 
life expectancy at retirement age in the calendar year of retirement. For 
persons born after December 31, 1948, who had been insured in social 
insurance before January 1, 1999, a “starting capital” according to the 
old pension rules will be assessed and recorded on the individual ac-
count in ZUS.    
The same defined contribution formula (with real capital) will also 
be used in the second pillar. The newly created open-ended pension 
funds are administered by private pension fund societies, organized as 
joint stock companies. The insured may choose a fund and change the 
choice. The funds are supervised by a state agency, and there are strict 
regulations concerning functioning of the funds. A multistep procedure 
is foreseen in case of fund insolvency until another pension fund society 
overtakes a fund management. Every fund has to achieve a minimum 
rate of return, relative to the results of all funds.                  
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IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS ON PENSION SYSTEMS—
SECOND WAVE OF REFORMS 
When the global financial crisis disrupted financial markets in 
2008, the rate of return on investments from pension funds dropped 
dramatically. Moreover, the difficult state of public finances started 
to make further financing of the reform’s transitional period increas-
ingly difficult. This led to a discussion on “reforming the reform” in 
many countries. Extreme measures were taken in Hungary where the 
second pillar was renationalized in 2010. Poland, which pioneered the 
structural reforms with Hungary in the late 1990s, reacted also, but dif-
ferently, reducing the contribution rate to the second pillar (Fultz 2012). 
A similar strategy to scale back the privatized pension systems, rather 
than to eliminate them, was developed in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, and Latvia (Hirose 2011; Orenstein 2011). 
The crisis has also facilitated some pension system reforms to 
address both the current financial problems and future challenges, 
especially related to demographic developments. For example, later 
retirement has been legislated in several countries, including Poland 
(Hirose 2011).
In Poland, the pension system remained relatively stable in the 
2000s. The reform debates concerned the “completing” of the reform 
started in 1999, and some issues have remained open until now (Go-
linowska and Żukowski 2011). In 2008, the issue of early retirement 
finally was solved, giving some restricted categories of workers who 
have worked under special (difficult) conditions bridging pensions 
starting in 2009.
The financial markets crisis revealed the weaknesses of the pen-
sion reform, which started in 1999. It was the reform itself that led to 
worsening of the financial situation of the Social Insurance Fund, and 
especially of its part related to old-age pensions. The reform created a 
large funded tier out of a part of a previously entirely PAYG system, 
which created a big deficit for the expenditure on current pensions. The 
financial markets crisis, which started in 2008, led to a further deterio-
ration of old-age insurance finances: increasing subsidies to the social 
security system contributed to a growing deficit of the government 
budget. This provoked debates on introducing changes to the pension 
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system, including the withdrawal of crucial structural elements of the 
new system.
A debate started in 2010 on a reduction of the contribution rate 
to the funded second pillar, with the money going to the notional de-
fined contribution part, in order to lower the budget subsidies to the 
social security pension system and thus to lower the public debt. The 
discussions continued in 2011 with clear polarization of positions. Most 
economists criticized the proposal, claiming it was rescuing the present 
public finances at the cost of future generations (or at least govern-
ments) and dismantling the pension system and pension reform that had 
started in 1999. The government was successful in passing the law in 
Parliament. Beginning May 1, 2011, the contribution rate to the second 
pillar was reduced from 7.3 percent to 2.3 percent.
Another structural change that had not been tackled for political 
reasons was increasing the retirement age. Again, the financial mar-
kets crisis facilitated the reform. After the Parliamentary elections in 
October 2011, the new government, backed by the same Parliamen-
tary coalition and led by the same prime minister, announced plans to 
increase the statutory retirement age. Starting in 2013, the statutory re-
tirement age was raised by three months every year, reaching age 67 
for both genders, in 2020 for men and in 2040 for women. After a short 
but intensive debate, the change was legislated in May 2012 and imple-
mented in January 2013.
CONCLUSION
Most CEE countries introduced structural pension reforms as part 
of the transformation of their socioeconomic systems following the end 
of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Modernization may thus 
be seen as the main objective in the first wave of pension reforms.
The second wave of pension reforms was closely related to the 
financial crisis that revealed problems of the pension systems and fa-
cilitated changes. However, contrary to some comments, no “death of 
pension privatization” occurred (Orenstein 2011). The second wave of 
pension reforms in CEE countries may be seen as an adjustment of pen-
sion systems to the circumstances. 
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There have been differences between the countries in terms of solu-
tions and pension systems. In the first wave, most CEE countries opted 
for the introduction of the second pillar of privately managed pension 
funds. However, both the solutions in the main public PAYG systems 
differed, and the patterns of the second pillars were different. In the 
second wave, the countries again reacted differently. 
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Pension Reform and the 







 Poland belongs to a relatively small group of European countries 
that, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, introduced comprehensive, 
structural reforms, changing the whole structure of their pension sys-
tems. Earlier structural pension reforms had been introduced in Sweden 
(1998) and Hungary (1998). In Poland, this took place in 1999, and it 
was followed by Bulgaria (2000), Latvia (2001), Croatia (2002), and 
Estonia (2002). Recommendations contained in a World Bank report 
(1994) have had a significant impact on the shape of structural pen-
sion reforms. A representative of the World Bank in Poland was even 
directly involved in introducing the pension reform. The basic element 
of structural pension reform was the introduction of a capital-financed 
segment into social security systems (privately managed individual ac-
counts), which in effect meant the partial privatization of the pension 
system (Żukowski 2006). 
Despite the similarities between these structural reforms, there were 
also significant differences. One of them was the underdevelopment of 
the third-pillar, employer-provided supplementary pension systems in 
all the reformed pension systems of the postsocialist countries. In this 
respect they differ, for example, from the Swedish model. In Sweden, 
occupational pension plans play an important role in securing the fi-
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nances of future retirees, covering the majority of employees due to 
widespread collective bargaining agreements.
In 2011, Poland made a partial reversal from the original reform 
that involved the diversification of risk between the PAYG and the fully 
funded segments. Funded second-pillar pension plans are mandatory in 
Poland, following the original reform, and cover nearly the entire labor 
force. Since June 2011, the mandatory second-pillar pension funds—
the individual account pension funds, managed by private financial 
institutions—have been funded with contributions of only 2.3 percent 
of wages. Previously, the fully funded segment had received contribu-
tions of 7.3 percent. In 2013, the 2.3 percent was raised to 2.8 percent. 
The total mandatory pension contributions is 19.55 percent of pension 
of wages, which was not changed. The difference between 2.3 or 2.8 
percent and 7.3 percent is transferred to the Polish Social Security fund 
(ZUS), which provides social security benefits through a notional de-
fined contribution plan.
While the reform of the public pension system in Poland since 1999 
has been the subject of many studies in Poland and abroad (see Góra 
[2009] and Góra and Palmer [2004]), the operation of supplementary 
pension systems, and especially the still underdeveloped voluntary 
employer-provided occupational pension system, has not received such 
interest, with a few exceptions (see Szczepański [2011]). Only a few 
researchers have tried to explain why the potential hidden within the 
occupational pension plans has not been utilized in Poland. 
With these plans, benefits cannot be taken before retirement age. 
Contributions are made on an after-tax basis. The plan must be offered 
to more than 50 percent of the employees of the company. The em-
ployer is required to contribute to the plan, with a maximum employer 
contribution of 7 percent of the employee’s wages. Employees can 
voluntarily contribute. Voluntary employer-provided pensions cover 
only a small percentage of the labor force. This chapter attempts to 
explain why. It focuses on the conceptual and empirical identification 
of different types of risk involved in employer-provided individual ac-
count (defined contribution) pension plans. It examines the state of risk 
awareness on behalf of the employer-sponsors related to the investment 
of funds accumulated in occupational pension plans. It compares the 
investment performance of Employees’ Pension Funds investment with 
the results of other types of investment funds operating on the Polish 
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financial market, and uses risk as an explanation for why most of Polish 
employers have not adopted pension plans for their employees. 
RISK CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION PLANS
The economic literature defines risk, for which there are many 
types, as an event with the possibility of different results achieved 
with a certain probability. Risk is most broadly classified depending 
on the outcome of an event (Fabozzi and Modigliani 2009, pp. 23–31; 
Monkiewicz and Gąsiorkiewicz 2010, p. 35): pure risk refers to situa-
tions in which a random event occurs and results in loss or no loss, and 
speculative risk exists when the result of an event is a loss or gain in 
relation to initially assumed expected outcome.
Operation of occupational pension plans is subject to risk of 
bankruptcy, break of contract, or an event insured within Employees’ 
Pension-Insurance Fund (such as occupational disease or accident). 
Such funds operate in many countries (such as the United States and 
Germany), but not in Poland. More speculative risk factors of occupa-
tional pension plans include, for example, the risk of political and legal 
regulations, investment risk, and financial or business risk.
The classification of risk factors into systematic and specific ones 
remains important from the point of view of risk management (Fabozzi 
and Drake 2009, pp. 555–574; Monkiewicz and Gąsiorkiewicz 2010, 
p. 36). Systematic risk concerns events a company cannot alter because 
they result from the macro environment. In the case of an occupational 
pension plan, these factors include
• demographic risk, especially the longevity of employees in a 
company pension plan;
• political risk due to legal regulations and their frequent changes 
to which pension institutions have to adapt;
• interest rate risk affects investment performance;
• currency risk, which affects the results of foreign investments 
and revenues of an enterprise importing or exporting goods; 
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• risk of market valuation of asset class and the associated eco-
nomic risks; 
• risk of purchasing power due to the uncertain future rate of 
inflation;
• risk related to market liquidity of assets; and
• risk related to market conditions for reinvestment (market re-
investment risk).
Table 8.1 summarizes the systematic (macroeconomic) and specific 
(microeconomic) business risks of occupational pension plans accord-
ing to their operational and financial-investment activity.
Specific risk concerns a single occupational pension plan and is 
thus called micro risk here. The following factors of this risk have been 
distinguished:
• Business risk, including market-demand risk of business activ-
ity of an enterprise with a pension system and an entity that 
manages it.
• Management risk, which is conditioned by an improper man-
agement of an enterprise and its pension system and capital. 
This risk can be limited by public supervision of pension 
institutions.
• Breach of contract risk—the source of its origin is the failure 
to meet conditions agreed between the parties to the transaction 
and written in the contract.
• Risk of insurance event regarding participants in the occupa-
tional pension plan in the form of life insurance.
• Liquidity of assets risk results from the investment strategy, 
just as other factors.
• Risk of the investment preferences of participants regards an 
approved return rate and its term structure tailored to the age 
of the insured.
• Risk of a financial instrument valuation is a problem with 
risky investment efficiency in terms of the ratio of expected 
return and its volatility measured with, for example, standard 
deviation. 
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• Market reinvestment risk due to assets durability and time ho-
rizon of portfolio of given fund. 
• Financial risk associated with interest and repayment of bor-
rowed foreign capital and its liabilities, which in the case of 
occupational pension plans relates to pension disbursement.
• Risk of bankruptcy. It may result in a company’s bankruptcy 
caused by two previously described types of risk, the risk of 
contract breach and the financial risk. 
A SURVEY ASSESSING OCCUPATIONAL PENSION PLAN 
RISK IN POLAND
The risk of occupational pension plans is a complex concept, which 
consists of all the previously mentioned factors. Occupational pension 
plans in Poland have operated since 1999, which is a relatively short 
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than that of social security, reaches the era of industrial revolution). 
Most of the employers do not have enough experience with investments 
of pension funds and do not understand all aspects of risk connected 
with pension savings. Lack of experience and knowledge about risk 
management of pension plans has a significant impact on whether em-
ployers introduce such a plan. Of course, there are also other important 
reasons why there are very few occupational pension plans in Poland 
(for example, complicated registration procedures, not enough tax in-
centives for pension plans’ sponsors, and situation on labor market).   
 The Financial Supervision Commission is obligatorily provided 
by occupational pension plans with information on such risk factors, 
such as the rate of return. Others, such as currency risk, depend on the 
investment strategy of the fund. Yet other factors, such as business risk 
or the risk of the investment preferences of participants, can be judged 
best by business enterprises providing occupational pension plans to 
their employees. 
For this reason, an indirect risk assessment has been chosen in the 
form of a survey of company representatives providing occupational 
pension plans. In February 2011, 1,099 companies were running occu-
pational pension plans. The survey included 100 companies that were 
selected using stratified random sampling. There were three strata of 
pension plans concerning different legal forms (capital fund, capital-
insurance fund, employees financial program). The strata fraction in the 
sample was proportionate to the fraction in the population. The survey 
was done by telephone, with an answer rate of about 90 percent. 
 Responses were measured using the following scales:
• Binomial scale—yes/no in order to assess the most important 
risk factors and recommendations for regulators.
• Ordinal scale to assess the level of risk (rating scale: low, me-
dium, high, and hard to tell).
• Ordinal scale to assess communication, risk reduction tools, 
and system design (rating scale: definitely yes, probably yes, 
it’s hard to say, probably not, definitely not).
• Nominal scale to assess appropriate strategies for investors 
with different preferences toward risk (rating scale: the level of 
risk and income corresponding to the majority of participants, 
etc.).
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
Pension Reform and the Measurement of Risk   169
Fig. 8.1  Respondents’ Percentage Indicating Importance of Chosen 
Factors of Risk
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.











The most important risk factors are listed in Table 8.1. Figure 8.1 
shows the proportion of respondents that recognized the individual 
risk factors as the most important. This is a multiple-choice question 
in which one can indicate any number of factors as the most important: 
it can be one, several, or all of the risk factors. Only 17 percent of re-
spondents indicated one most important factor, which indicates high 
importance of several factors. Among other respondents, the most nu-
merous group was the one that indicated two most important factors (31 
percent), while 17 percent marked three factors. Four and five factors 
were selected by 13 percent of respondents; more factors were selected 
by the remaining 9 percent of respondents. 
Investment risk was recognized as the most important factor for 
most (63 percent of respondents). It is understood as an uncertainty 
of the rate of return. Sixty-two percent of respondents indicated the 
macroeconomic risk of the situation on the financial markets and the 
economy as a whole, while 41 percent of respondents indicated a mi-
croeconomic risk of an enterprise’s activity.
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A significant proportion of the companies surveyed (as many as 56 
percent) pointed to the importance of legal-political risk. About one-
third of all companies considered inflation and financial institutions 
settling accounts of occupational pension plans as important risk fac-
tors. Thus, they referred to external risk management. Only 12 percent 
of the surveyed companies confirmed that foreign exchange risk poses 
a threat to pension plans, and only 2 percent indicated other important 
risk factors and mentioned manipulation and the lack of knowledge.
Because the representatives of companies identified investment 
risk as the greatest source of risk, another question regarded the assess-
ment of its level in the financial market and in pension plans. Figure 8.2 
shows that the risk of financial markets is rated as average for more than 
half of the respondents and high for the remaining 40 percent. Twenty-
four percent of respondents indicated a high level of risk in financial 
markets, noting that it has been higher after the crisis, while 16 percent 
of respondents said that although this risk is high, it has not increased 
as a result of the crisis. However, the perceived level of risk of occu-
Figure 8.2  Assessment of Investment Risk Level of the Occupational 
Plans and Whole Capital Market (% of Positive Answers)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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pational pension plans is lower than the risk of the financial market. 
Eighty percent of respondents believe that it is of an average level, and 
12 percent believe that it is actually low.
The risk of the investment preferences of pension participants cov-
ers a mismatch between the level of risk aversion of the pension plan 
and its participants due to a single investment pool. In Poland, partici-
pants of occupational pension plans can choose one of the investment 
funds offered by the financial institution that manages their pension 
plan (for example, fund investing in securities or treasury bonds). They 
have the right to move their assets from one fund to another. 
With the exception of one form of pension plan (the occupational 
pension fund, which does not have to be managed by an external fi-
nancial institution), workers do not have any influence on investment 
strategy of a given pension fund. Therefore, we asked representatives of 
employers offering pension plans about how they select plan risk pref-
erences (see Figure 8.3). Most respondents chose strategies accepted 
by a company’s management in consultation with representatives (34 
percent) or strategies that were the most popular among participants. 
Both of those choices are irrational because they lack finance and in-
vestment education and experience—some people’s preferences even 
appeared to resemble gambling, which was observed during the stock 
market boom (Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 2003). That means that 
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erences. The most rational preference strategy is that recommended 
by an independent consultant (chosen by 28 percent of enterprises). 
The least frequently chosen option was the risk-return strategy recom-
mended by the financial institution managing the occupational pension 
plan (18 percent). Once again, results suggest a lack of confidence by 
employers in financial institutions as agents of the occupational pension 
plan (principal-agent conflict). Risk preferences should be matched to 
the diverse age structure of participants and its dynamics in time. 
We now evaluate the management of occupational pension plans 
regarding the information provided to participants about the risks and 
protection against them, as well as the principles of the design of occu-
pational pension plans. Figure 8.4 shows consecutive percentage stakes 
regarding the distribution of responses by the representatives of em-
ployers to the following six questions:
1) Do you believe that employees/participants of the program 
and their employers are aware of all the risks associated with 
a given pension plan? Most of the companies and their insured 
employees are informed about the risks, according to the rep-
resentatives of the employers. Only 20 percent believe that 
communication from occupational pension plans or their man-
aging institutions remains insufficient.
2) Does the current pension plan structure provide their partici-
pants with adequate protection against the risk of investment 
and other risks associated with the financial market? Most com-
panies indicate very little protection against such risks. 
3) Occupational pension plans in Poland are defined contribu-
tion plans. All the risks rest on the participants. Is this the right 
solution? 
4) Defined benefit pension plans predetermine pension amounts in 
proportion to wages. If such occupational pension plans were 
available in Poland, would you be willing to offer them to your 
employees, being aware of the additional financial obligations?
5) In mixed (hybrid) programs, part of the investment risk is as-
sumed by the employer, and the employee also bears some of 
it (i.e., a program with a defined contribution but a guaranteed 
minimum benefit). If such occupational pension plans were 
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available in Poland, would you be willing to offer them to your 
employees, being aware of the additional financial obligations?
6) Do we need to introduce a pension guarantee fund? 
Replies for questions 3–6 are shown in Figure 8.4 and indicate that 
the majority of companies involved in occupational pension plans in 
Poland consider the plans with a defined contribution as imperfect, but 
they are not willing to accept plans where the risk is carried onto them. 
They do call for the introduction of a pension guarantee fund, which 
would take over the obligations of an occupational pension plan if the 
company went bankrupt. In another question, respondents indicated 
that the guarantee fund should be financed jointly by employers and the 
state (38 percent), employers and employees (36 percent), employers 
only (13 percent), the Treasury (9 percent), or only by the workers (4 
percent).
For questions about changes in regulation of occupational pension 
plans, the majority of business representatives surveyed did not support 
any changes, including an increase in the Financial Supervision Com-
mission’s control over occupational pension plans, an implementation 
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of pension plan design choice, or an increase in the role of employ-
ers and employees in the investment strategy (see Figure 8.5). Almost 
50 percent of business representatives noted the need for regulation by 
obliging an agent managing an occupational pension plan to provide 
information more frequently. 
INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION PLANS IN POLAND
Efficiency refers to the results-to-effort ratio. Converted into per-
centage it becomes the rate of return. In the case of an investment 
activity, the rate of return itself is not an appropriate indicator of per-
formance because it does not include effort in the form of volatility risk 
valuation of a financial instrument or its stock market price. Valuation 
risk of a financial instrument is related to operational and financial risk 
of an issuer (and, in the case of the stock exchange instruments, of li-
Figure 8.5  Respondents’ Recommendations for System and Regulation 
of Pension Occupational Plans (%)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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quidity risk and the situation on the capital market). Therefore, the rate 
of return of a fund is calculated per unit of measure of risk and com-
pared to this ratio value calculated for the Polish financial market. The 
risk of actively managed portfolios is measured in one way (the classic 
measure is the standard deviation of the rate of return), and in another 
for passively managed portfolios, which eliminates the specific risk. 
There are also a few methods to conduct a comparison with market 
effectiveness. 
A number of performance measures of capital investment have 
been developed, and we will briefly describe the three most versatile 
and widely used ones. Each ratio has its own interpretation, as well as 
pros and cons. These ratios assume the calculation of efficiency un-
der conditions of multiple market valuation of financial instruments or 
other investment assets, which is usually satisfied in the case of instru-
ments listed on a stock exchange or other regulated markets.1
1) The Sharpe ratio is the average rate of return attributable to one 
percentage point of the variation of the rate of return, measured 
by standard deviation (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, 
pp. 162, 191]; Ostrowska [2007, p. 252]). An investment that 
obtains the highest value of this ratio is considered the most ef-
ficient strategy. The construction of this index assumes that the 
portfolio rate of return exceeds the risk-free rate of return. Oth-
erwise, the index loses its ability to assess the efficiency of the 
portfolio (see Brzęczek [2004, p. 7]; Węgrzyn [2006 p. 11]). 
2) The Treynor ratio determines the rate of return for taking the 
average market risk (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, pp. 
157, 191]; Ostrowska [2007, p. 249]). Portfolio bonus for the 
risk taken (excess portfolio return over the risk-free rate) is di-
vided by its market risk measure/coefficient β (see Fabozzi and 
Modigliani [2009, p. 195]). The Treynor ratio calculated for 
the evaluated portfolio is compared to the surplus market rate 
of return. As in the previous case, the higher the ratio, the more 
efficient the portfolio. This ratio takes into account only the 
market risk of the portfolio, so it is useful for the assessment of 
well-diversified portfolios. Like the Sharpe ratio, it can be used 
if the bonus for portfolio risk remains positive. 
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3) Jensen’s Index, or Jensen’s alpha, refers to the rate of portfo-
lio return relative to the market risk taken, as well as to the 
market return rate (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, p. 203]; 
Ostrowska [2007, p. 249]). The efficiency of investment is 
evaluated by comparing the index to zero. Positive values  in-
dicate that the fund is performing better than the market, and 
negative values indicate a weaker result than the market aver-
age. Generally, the higher the ratio, the better the portfolio’s 
management. 
The Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen ratios cannot be compared be-
cause the first two convert surplus return per unit of risk of different 
type, and the third compares it to the market rate of return.
Table 8.2 lists two groups of institutions. Occupational pension 
plans in the form of Employees’ Pension Funds are separate funds man-
aged by enterprises; financial institutions are only agents for them. The 
second group, mutual open pension funds, is only financed by enter-
prises, but is fully managed by investment fund corporations, including 
insurance management companies. Therefore, the evaluation of the effi-
ciency of investments was made separately in both groups. An average 
monthly rate of return from employee and mutual pension funds was 
calculated along with its standard deviation for the years 2009–2011. 
The risk-free monthly rate of return was calculated on the basis of the 
interest rates on three-year retail Treasury bonds during the analyzed 
period per month (6.35 percent / 12 = 0.53 percent). On this basis, the 
Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen ratios were determined. The results are 
presented in Table 8.3.
The monthly rate of return for employee pension plans is 0.55 per-
cent and is only slightly higher than the interest rate of Treasury bonds. 
The rate of return from the WIG index (the index of broad market of ba-
sic shares of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland) was much higher, 
and the highest rate of return was achieved by investment fund corpo-
rations. However, the analyzed period begins after the slump of 2008, 
which significantly improves the performance of risky assets funds. 
The second difference is the level of risk for strategies listed in Table 
8.3. Total risk measured with standard deviation from the rate of return 
is far smaller for occupational pension plans than for mutual pension 
funds and WIG index. Similar proportions are maintained between the 
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Table 8.2  Authorities Managing the Occupational Pension Plans 
Grouped by Form of a Plan
Management entity
Number of occupational 
pension plans managed 
Inter-Company Employee Pension Institution PZU SA 1
Employee Pension Institution NESTLE SA POLAND 6
Employee Pension Institution “New World” SA 19
Employee Pension Institution of Polish Telecom 3
Employee Pension Institution UNILEVER POLAND SA 7
Investment Fund Institution BPH 16
BZ WBK AIB SA Investment Fund Corporation 2
Aviva Investors SA Investment Fund Corporations 10
Investors SA Investment Fund Corporation 8
ING SA Investment Fund Corporation 62
KBC SA Investment Fund Corporation 3
Legg Mason SA Investment Fund Corporation 40
Pioneer Pekao SA Investment Fund Corporation 7
PKO SA Investment Fund Corporation 7
TREASURY SA Investment Fund Corporation 3
Allianz Polska SA Investment Fund Corporation 4
PZU SA Investment Fund Corporation 104
Spółdzielcze Kasy Oszczędnościowo-Kredytowe S.A. 
Investment Fund Corporation 24
Union Investment SA Investment Fund Corporations 1
Aviva SA Life Insurance Company 133
Generali Życie SA Insurance Company 36
Nordea Poland SA Life Insurance Company 3
Pierwsze Amerykańsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń 
na Życie i Reasekuracji Amplico Life S.A. 41
PZU SA Life Insurance Company 472
Sopot Life Insurance Company Ergo Hestia SA 1
Allianz SA Life Insurance Company 99
Warta SA Life Insurance Company 4
Total 1,116
SOURCE: Financial Supervisory Commission reports, accessed November 20, 2012.
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amounts of market risk measured by the beta coefficient. Calculating 
the rate of return on its percentage point variation (Sharpe ratio), em-
ployee pension funds turn out to be less efficient than the Polish capital 
market represented by the WIG index. Mutual pension funds appear to 
be much more efficient than the market.
In conclusion, employee pension funds are characterized by low 
risk but do not offer a higher rate of return than Treasury bonds. This 
suggests that the continued operation of this form makes sense only in 
the form of bond funds. An alternative is to transfer these funds to mu-
tual funds, which are much better prepared for global investing. 
CONCLUSION
Four general conclusions can be drawn from the replies of employ-












Average rate of return (%)c 0.55 1.35 1.13
Standard deviation of 
return (%)
2.15 2.95 6.96
Sharpe Ratio 0.01 0.28 0.09
Coefficient ß 0.30 0.37 1.00
Treynor ratio (%) 0.07 2.25 0.60
Jensen index (%) −0.16 0.01 0.00
a The monthly rate of return and performance indicators were calculated on the basis of 
valuation of shares of all five employee pension funds (source: Financial Supervision 
Authority and the Warsaw Stock Exchange Bulletins 2012, 2011, 2010).
b The calculations for investment funds are based on their net assets and managed capi-
tal flows (source: Statistics of IZFiA–Chamber of Fund and Asset Management). 
c Average rate of return of the analyzed group of entities, in the case of employee pen-
sion funds is not a weighted value of the assets of entities (the results would seek one 
pension fund with by far the largest assets), while in the case of investment funds, the 
weighted value of assets.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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1) Respondents point to investment performance and economic 
conditions as the most important risk factors for occupational 
pension plans. They note, however, other important political 
and business risk factors for the sponsors of employee pension 
funds.
2) The perceived risk of financial markets is high, while the in-
vestment risk of employee pension plans regarding their 
investments remains on an average level. Replies suggest the 
existence of the agent-principal problem (the so-called theory of 
agency costs). Only 20 percent of enterprises with occupational 
pension plans chose an investment strategy recommended by 
financial agents of the program. The respondents note a signifi-
cant risk of error of an agent.
3) The current design of occupational pension plans is not consid-
ered optimal by the majority of respondents. In their opinion, 
the only major change needed is the introduction of a guar-
antee fund. The vast majority of respondents are in favor of a 
guarantee fund for the payment of benefits under occupational 
pension plans, as is the case in Germany (the fund protects 
against the risk of insolvency of the employer-sponsor of the 
program). In Germany both defined benefit and defined contri-
bution plan types are found, as well as hybrid types, although 
even defined contribution plans are legally required to have 
some sort of guarantee to workers, such as return of contribu-
tions. Such a solution could be implemented in Poland, where 
all occupational pension plans are defined contribution plans. 
From the other side, the same guarantees, if they were imple-
mented, could be treated as another obligation for employers 
and stop at least some of them from creating pension plans 
in their companies. It is always easier to declare some safety 
measures than finance them. And such a guarantee fund most 
likely would be financed by employers and not the state. There 
is also a need to better inform both employers—the sponsors—
and employees (participants of pension plans) on the level of 
risk associated with the investment strategies used by financial 
institutions managing a program (i.e., selected to support the 
investment fund companies, life insurance companies, or em-
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ployee pension funds). This confirms the previously indicated 
agent-principal problems.
4) Employee pension funds are characterized by low risk but do 
not offer a higher rate of return than Treasury bonds. This sug-
gests that the continued operation of this form makes sense 
only in the form of bond funds. An alternative is to transfer 
these funds to investment funds, which are more prepared for 
global investment and as a sector have been more effective than 
the Polish capital market. This shows that there are benefits to 
large-scale investments, which are not available for employee 
pension funds.
These findings may constitute a starting point for discussion on the 
institutional framework to reduce the risk for employee pension plan 
participants, but also for the companies that offer such programs to their 
employees.
Note
1. The selected set of performance indexes was considered sufficient. For specific 
purposes other indexes are used: information, Sortino, M2, etc. (see Węgrzyn 
[2006, pp. 53–62]).
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An Equitable Solution in a Postcrisis World?
Ross Clare
Association	of	Superannuation	Funds	of	Australia 
PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR RETIREMENT IN AUSTRALIA
Australia has a classic three-pillar retirement system:
1) A mandatory contribution, generally to an individual account 
defined contribution plan, (made by employers) which is cur-
rently 9 percent of wages, increasing to 9.25 percent from July 
2013 and then currently legislated to gradually increase to 12 
percent by July 2019.
2) Voluntary contributions to pensions, primarily to defined contri-
bution plans, many of which attract tax concessions.
3) A government means-tested pension, called the Age Pension, 
commencing at age 65 for males and (currently) 64 for females 
but increasing to age 67 over the next decade. Veterans (pen-
sioners who have been in the armed services) receive identical 
benefits but receive them five years earlier than civilians. The 
Age Pension is not earnings related, It is paid at a higher rate to 
low-income persons due to the operation of a means test but is 
received by most retirees.
All elements have been subject to changes for fiscal and other 
reasons.
The voluntary contributions are from a number of sources:
• Employers (usually large companies and governments) that pay 
a higher rate than the law requires for mandatory pensions.
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• Members paying pretax contributions from their salary package. 
The limit of tax-preferenced contributions has fallen signifi-
cantly in recent years.
• Members paying after-tax contributions, which are subject to a 
contribution cap of $A150,000 a year or $A450,000 in a three-
year period. (In early 2013, U.S.$1.00 = A $0.96. Currency con-
version rates vary over time.) 
• The government cocontribution, which matches after-tax contri-
butions up to an amount which is currently A$500.00 a year for 
low-income earners.
The taxation structure for pensions is relatively complicated, but 
in broad terms most members of defined contribution funds are taxed 
concessionally (at a reduced and flat rate) in regard to contributions and 
investment earnings. Benefits, both lump sum and in income stream 
form, are tax free when received at age 60 and over. Thus, with T rep-
resenting taxed, t representing concessionally taxed, and E representing 
exempt from tax, this system can be characterized as ttE. By compari-
son, the U.S. tax arrangement for most types of pensions is EET.
Despite the regular changes that governments have made for fiscal 
or equity reasons, the broad structure is robust and is supported by vot-
ers, politicians, and industry. 
A critical element of Australia’s retirement system, including the 
government mandated private pensions, is that members generally carry 
all the investment risks themselves because their pensions generally are 
defined contribution plans. While around 10 percent of employees are 
in defined benefit plans, most of these are closed to new members. In 
the long term, almost all members will have defined contribution pen-
sions. However, there will be at least some defined benefit pensioners 
in the system for many decades to come.
Also important for the living standards of retirees are
• a high level of home ownership among retirees, and
• government funding on a means-tested basis of residential aged 
care and some other aged care.
The focus of this chapter is on mandatory and voluntary pensions 
and the means-tested Age Pension.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPERANNUATION (PENSIONS)  
IN AUSTRALIA
Occupational superannuation in Australia first emerged in midnine-
teenth century. The term superannuation was in common usage in the 
early nineteenth century to refer to the pension received after retirement 
from the former employer. In most other countries, the term “private 
pensions” tends to be used to describe what is known as superannuation 
in Australia. While it is not entirely clear why the term superannua-
tion is used in Australia, it does provide a clear distinction for private 
arrangements from the government-provided Age Pension. It also is 
more consistent with the availability of lump sum benefits from pen-
sions in Australia, which are taken by a substantial number of retirees.
From its earliest days in Australia (with the establishment of a pen-
sion fund for its staff by the Bank of Australasia in October 1842) up to 
the 1940s, pensions were only available to a select, mostly male, group 
of salaried employees in the public sector and some large companies. 
Employer-supported pensions for wage staff tended to be less generous, 
with smaller benefits and smaller employer contributions in plans that 
were noncompulsory.
By 1974, 32.2 percent of wage and salary earners were covered 
by pensions, made up of 40.8 percent of male wage and salary earners 
but only 16.5 percent of females. Most pension assets were in defined 
benefit plans. 
In 1983, the newly elected Labor Government expressed support 
for the principles of employee pensions and initiated discussions with 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) on the possibility of 
broadening access to pensions as part of the Government’s Prices and 
Incomes Accord with the trade unions. 
The process of making employee pensions a more or less universal 
entitlement began in September 1985 when, with the support of the 
government, the ACTU sought a 3 percent pensions contribution to 
be paid by employers to industry funds specified in relevant industrial 
labor agreements, which set the minimum wages and conditions for 
many but not all employees in Australia. 
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This submission was supported by arguments addressed to
• the implications arising from the trend towards an aging of the 
population including the workforce;
• the effects of the trend for earlier retirement;
• the existing dependency on Age Pensions and the projected sig-
nificant increase in the dependency of the aged on the working 
population with an explosion of Age Pension costs; and
• the fact that a large percentage of the workforce was not cov-
ered by existing pension plans and that wide disparities existed 
in coverage according to sex, industry, occupation and income 
levels. In particular, it was submitted that women, manual work-
ers and those in the lower income level were less adequately 
covered than others.
As new labor agreements were progressively negotiated according 
to the guidelines in the national wage case decision, pension coverage 
increased rapidly. In the four years after the introduction of employer 
contributions linked to labor agreements, employee coverage grew 
from around 40 percent to 79 percent. In the private sector, coverage 
grew from 32 percent in 1987 to 68 percent in 1991.
This was a major achievement for collectively bargained pensions, 
but more was needed in terms of coverage and rate of contributions. 
Accordingly, the government at the time announced in the 1991–1992 
budget that it would introduce a mandatory pension system through 
the implementation of the Superannuation Guarantee. The Superannua-
tion Guarantee pension system is based on using the taxation power 
of the Australian government to provide a very powerful incentive for 
employers to make pension contributions of the required amount. The 
guarantee part of the superannuation guarantee is about a requirement 
for contributions being made rather than a guarantee of investment 
earnings or eventual retirement income.
The Superannuation Guarantee system—the mandatory pension 
system—came into effect on July 1, 1992, starting at a minimum con-
tribution level of 3 percent. A schedule of future increases in the rate of 
the Superannuation Guarantee contributions was also set, with a con-
tribution rate for all employees of 9 percent of earnings. Employers 
already making contributions that met the requirements of the Superan-
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nuation Guarantee were not required to make additional contributions. 
Employees now generally are able to choose the fund to which they 
want to contribute, but many employees have contributions made to 
the fund that their employers have selected as the default fund or that is 
specified as a default fund in an industrial award. There are hundreds of 
corporate, retail, industry, and public sector funds and nearly 500,000 
small Self-Managed Superannuation Funds. 
While there has been growth in the number of self-managed super-
annuation funds, the numbers of the other types of funds have decreased 
over time. Self-managed superannuation funds are funds where each 
member is also a trustee of the fund. There is a general prohibition on 
membership of such funds by someone who is an employee of another 
member of the fund. The result is that a small business owner cannot 
include his or her employees in the self-managed superannuation fund 
of which the business owner is a member. They have less than five 
members each, and they differ from the various individually managed 
accounts in other countries in that they are a private trust arrangement 
that does not require a financial institution to be involved as a provider.
The coverage of the system was very broad, using wide definitions 
for employer and employee. However, there were some exceptions, 
chiefly those earning less than A$450 per calendar month, part-time 
employees aged under 18, and those over 65. As well, the Super- 
annuation Guarantee does not apply to the self-employed (other than to 
owner-managers who receive wages and technically are employees of a 
company they control). Around 30 percent of the self-employed make 
voluntary contributions, partly driven by the tax concessions avail-
able for this. Some self-employed persons will have a private pension 
because of previous periods when they have been an employee. Some 
contractors who might be regarded as self-employed by other legal pro-
visions are also covered in the compulsory system through an extended 
definition of employee.
In May 2010, the Australian Treasurer announced that compulsory 
employer pension contributions were to increase to 12 percent by July 
2019. The increase in mandatory Superannuation Guarantee contribu-
tions is a gradual process, starting with 0.25 percent in the 2013–2014 
financial year, and then a 0.25 percent increase in 2014–2015. For the 
following five years after the 2015 financial year, the Superannuation 
Guarantee rate will increase by 0.5 percent until it reaches 12 percent 
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by July 2019. A new government was elected in September 2013 and as 
part of its election policies indicated an intention to legislate a two year 
pause in the phased increase in the rate of contributions.
THE AGE PENSION NOW AND INTO THE FUTURE
The Age Pension—the means-tested pension—is funded out of 
general tax revenue by the Australian government. It does not require 
either a history of social security contributions by the person or a his-
tory of work; rather, receipt is determined by reaching the eligibility 
age, being a resident in Australia for 20 years, and qualifying under the 
applicable asset and income tests. The maximum benefit provided by 
the Age Pension as of September 1, 2012, is A$20,142 for a single per-
son and A$30,368 for a couple. The Age Pension is taxable, but due to 
a variety of rebates, those receiving the maximum benefit generally do 
not pay any income tax. People with higher income and assets in retire-
ment receive a reduced Age Pension. Many people receive a partial Age 
Pension, but persons at the top of the income distribution do not receive 
any benefit from the Age Pension.
Table 9.1 shows budget standards for a modest and comfortable 
lifestyle as indicated by the Association of Superannuation Funds of 
Australia (ASFA) retirement standard. These budget standards are 
based on a typical retiree at age 65 and are widely used in Australia as 
an indicator of adequacy of retirement income. They are updated regu-
larly on the ASFA Web site (www.superannuation.asn.au). ASFA is a 
private-sector, not-for-profit organization whose members are pension 
funds and service providers to pension funds.
While these values do not reflect the situation of every retiree, they 
allow us to gauge the average needs for different lifestyle expectations 
given cost of living in Australia as of December 2012. These are com-
pared with the maximum annual benefit of the Age Pension as of Sep-
tember 2012.
It is clear that the Age Pension is close to meeting the modest life-
style needs of retirees. As the benefit is linked to national average wages 
and the modest lifestyle is linked to prices, the Age Pension will gradu-
ally close in on the modest lifestyle for at least a period of some years. 
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The ASFA retirement standard is adjusted for changes in prices every 
quarter, but every four or five years it is adjusted more substantively for 
changes in the pattern of expenditure by retirees and for increases in the 
general living standard of the community. For a comfortable lifestyle, 
retirees need to build their own pension savings, as the Age Pension by 
itself will be inadequate.
THE FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE AGE PENSION
Australia is unusual in that the future financial impact of programs 
such as the Age Pension is required to be assessed on a regular basis in 
what is known as the Intergenerational Report (IGR) which is prepared 
by the Australian Treasury. The IGR came to life as a key requirement 
of the 1998 Charter of Budget Honesty Act. The charter requires an 
intergenerational report to assess the long-term sustainability of poli-
cies over the 40 years following the release of the report, including the 
impacts of demographic change. The IGR has played a major role in 
raising community awareness of long-term fiscal challenges and, in so 
doing, placed greater focus on government decisions with long-term 
consequences.
For instance, in the fiscal year 2009–2010 budget, the government 
announced increases to Age Pension benefits, particularly for single 
persons, following an inquiry process that indicated the desirability 
of increasing such payments. These increases were introduced along 
with a suite of budget-saving measures designed to offset their long-









single couple single couple
Yearly total ($) 22,585 32,555 41,186 56,339
Age Pension ($) 20,142 30,368 20,142 30,368
Difference from 
Age Pension ($)
2,443 2,187 21,044 25,971
NOTE: All values in Australian dollars. 
SOURCE: ASFA (2013).
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term costs. The budget-saving measures included a gradual rise in the 
qualifying age for the Age Pension (to be phased in from 2017 to 2023), 
means testing of the private health insurance rebate, as well as reforms 
to family payments and pensions. The package of changes was pro-
jected to be budget neutral by 2021–2022 and through to 2049–2050 as 
a result of the effect of the expenditure saving measures offsetting the 
increase in the costs of he Age Pension. 
Australia was relatively unusual in the international community in 
that it weathered the global financial crisis without significant impacts 
on economic activity, unemployment, or fiscal outcomes. While the 
current budgetary situation is not without challenges, with the then gov-
ernment recently formally announcing that a target of a budget surplus 
in 2012–2013 would not be met, the budgetary situation has been suf-
ficiently robust to support both the increase in the Age Pension benefits 
and the increased tax expenditures associated with higher compulsory 
contributions to pensions. In regard to the latter, there was an explicit 
linking of the introduction of a new resources rent tax associated with 
certain mining activities with the legislation increasing the Superannua-
tion Guarantee contribution rate. The legislation increasing the Super-
annuation Guarantee contribution reduced income tax receipts due to 
the reduction in net wages, which is only partially offset by the tax 
on contributions, while the resources rent tax provided an offsetting 
increase in taxes. As noted earlier, the government elected in September 
2013 proposes a two-year pause to the increase in the rate of compul-
sory contributions.
However, over a longer time period, aging of the population will 
still contribute to pressure on government spending and fiscal sustain-
ability. The Intergenerational Report (IGR) prepared by the Australian 
Treasury projects total spending to increase to 27.1 percent of GDP in 
2049–2050, around 4.75 percentage points higher than its projected low 
point in 2015–2016. In today’s terms, that is the equivalent of adding 
around $A60 billion a year to government spending.
Around two-thirds of the projected increase in spending over the 
next 40 years is related to health, reflecting pressures from aging, 
increased community expectations, and the funding of new technolo-
gies. Growth in spending on age-related pensions and aged care is also 
significant, both as a proportion of GDP and in real spending per per-
son. Currently, about a quarter of Australian government spending is 
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on health, age-related pensions, and aged care. The Intergenerational 
Report projects that Australian government spending on these functions 
will increase significantly over the next 40 years, pushing their share of 
spending to almost one-half.
As a proportion of GDP, spending on health is projected to rise from 
4.0 percent to 7.1 percent. Age-related pensions and aged care are pro-
jected to rise from 2.7 percent and 0.8 percent of GDP to 3.9 percent 
and 1.8 percent, respectively, in 2049–2050. Figure 9.1 provides further 
details by each major expenditure category.
Excluding public debt interest, the Intergenerational Report proj-
ects a fiscal gap of 2.75 percent of GDP (or around $A30 billion in 
today’s dollars) by 2049–2050.
Much of the increase in government expenditure on Age Pensions is 
due to population aging. Unlike some countries, such as Japan, the Aus-
tralian population will continue to grow, as annual rates of population 
























SOURCE: Australian Treasury (2010).
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
194   Clare
growth are projected to slow gradually, from 2.1 percent in 2008–2009 
to 0.9 percent in 2049–2050. Australia’s population is projected to grow 
from around 22 million people to 35.9 million people in 2050.
As well, average Australian mortality rates have fallen significantly, 
with life expectancies rising for both men and women. These changes 
have added to population growth and the proportion of older people in 
the Australian population. As a result, the number of Australians aged 
65 and over is projected to grow from around 3 million in 2010 to 8.1 
million by 2050, from 2.1 percent of the population to 5.1 percent. As a 
result, the number of people of eligible age for the Age Pension is pro-
jected to increase by around 150 percent by 2049–2050.
There are other factors that affect the projections of age-related pen-
sion spending:
• A decline in the proportion of pensioners receiving a full Age 
Pension, because of the increased value of individuals’ manda-
tory pension and other private assets and income.
• The proportion of people with a partial Age Pension is projected 
to increase significantly while the proportion of the eligible age 
group not receiving any Age Pension is projected to rise slightly.
• As noted earlier, the increase in the level of the Age Pension 
benefits has been largely offset by other policy measures, such 
as raising the eligibility age.
When the next Intergenerational Report is prepared in or before 
2015, it can be expected to take into account the phased increase in 
compulsory pension contributions from 9 percent to 12 percent. This 
will further moderate the increase in age-related pension spending, par-
ticularly toward the end of the projection period. 
Of course, there are consequences flowing from compulsory pen-
sion contributions for the public sector’s contribution to private (and 
therefore national) saving as a result of the compulsory pension system. 
This public sector contribution arises from the tax-preferred status of 
compulsory pension contributions and the assumption by the Austra-
lian Treasury that other expenditures are cut back to allow for this tax 
expenditure. The public sector’s contribution is estimated to be about 
0.4 percent of GDP currently, rising gradually to nearly 0.7 percent of 
GDP by the end of the decade, and then staying around that level to the 
middle of the century.
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The estimated net fiscal cost to the government budget is smaller 
than the public sector’s contribution to private saving, because bud-
get savings arising from the compulsory pension system reduce the 
net fiscal cost of compulsory pensions. This is because growth in net 
wages is less than it would otherwise be because of the increase in pen-
sion contributions, leading to increases in expenditure on Age Pension 
and other government payments indexed to movements in average net 
wages being less than they would otherwise be.
Equity clearly is a key issue in the debate about pension and retire-
ment income reform. There is strong government and community con-
cern that the assistance provided to retirement income should be spread 
fairly according to need. There also is a strong tradition in Australia of 
support for what we colloquially call a “fair go.” In the context of pen-
sions, this means that no groups should face barriers to participation in 
the retirement income system. 
One statistic that gained some currency in public debate in Aus-
tralia was that 5 percent of individuals account for 37 percent of tax-
preferenced pension contributions. However, that is no longer the case 
and is now something of an urban myth—that figure, calculated by the 
Treasury, related to 2005–2006, when pension policy settings were sig-
nificantly different than they are now. For instance, in 2005–2006, a 
maximum deductible contribution limit of $A100,587 applied for each 
employee aged 50 and over and for the self-employed aged 50 and over. 
For those aged 35–49 the figure was $A40,560 a year.
By fiscal year 2009–2010, a new set of tax-preferenced contri-
bution caps was in force (after a number of variants along the way). 
These caps permitted annual contributions of no more than $A25,000 
a year for those under age 50 and $A50,000 a year for those aged 50 
and over. However, the $A50,000 a year cap was a transitional one and 
expired on June 30, 2012. The government has announced its intention 
to replace these caps with a general cap of $A25,000 a year except for 
those aged 50 and over with less than $A500,000 in pension savings, 
where a $A50,000 a year cap would apply. However, the introduction 
of this higher cap for those aged 50 and over has been delayed due to 
budgetary reasons.
Tax-preferenced contributions include employer contributions 
(including contributions made under a salary sacrifice arrangement 
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where wages are traded for extra contributions), and personal contribu-
tions claimed as a tax deduction by a self-employed person. 
Tax Assistance for Pensions after the New Tax-Preferenced 
Contribution Caps
Clear empirical evidence indicates that the contribution caps have 
reduced the tax-preferenced pension contributions made by upper-
income earners. This is reflected in Table 9.2, which sets out estimates of 
the proportion of tax-preferenced pension contributions made on behalf 
of wage earners in the various marginal income tax bands applying 
in 2009–2010. These estimates are based on data especially extracted 
for ASFA from a large scale survey of Australian households, namely 
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey.
These estimates of employer contributions are consistent in broad 
terms and produce overall results consistent with aggregate pension 
contributions as reported by the Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (APRA), which is one of the government regulators of the 
financial services industry (including pensions), and Australian Taxa-
tion Office statistical publications.
As is clear from the table, pension contributions are not spread 
entirely evenly across all taxpayers or income ranges. This is because 
one of the basic characteristics of pensions is that contributions are 
linked to employment, particularly full-time employment. Those tax-
payers on very low incomes are not receiving pension contributions 
made by their employers or are receiving the benefit of only relatively 
small contribution amounts. 
Individuals on a low income in any given year will not necessar-
ily be on a low taxable income for all of their lives. Many individu-
als who have low taxable incomes from employment are undertaking 
part-time employment when they are studying or when they also have 
family responsibilities that prevent them from undertaking full-time 
work. However, over their lifetime they will have many years, usually 
decades, of full-time work. As well, wages often increase in real terms 
over the course of a career. The distribution of taxable incomes and tax 
concessions for pension contributions in any given year is not a good 
indicator of assistance delivered over a lifetime. 
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However, even in regard to a single year, as indicated by Table 9.2, 
around 90 percent of employer contributions relate to individuals on 
less than the top marginal tax rate, with over 50 percent of contributions 
relating to individuals on a marginal income tax rate of 30 percent or 
less. 
The top 5 percent of employees (in terms of income) accounted for 
less than 20 percent of the total pension contributions in 2009–2010.
While upper-income earners typically have more pension contribu-
tions than lower-income earners, the amount related to upper income 
earners is now much lower than it was previously. While a higher figure 
may have applied back in 2005–2006, the impact of the contribution 
caps has been considerable. The various changes that have been made 
to the pension tax rules also may have affected confidence in contribut-
ing to pensions also leading to lower discretionary contributions.
Table 9.3 provides estimates of the amount of tax concession by 
personal income tax rate. It also factors in the receipt of the cocontri-
bution (government matching contribution), which is only available to 
low-income earners making personal contributions.
Table 9.3 indicates that in recent times less than 15 percent of the 
government assistance for pension contributions flows to those on the 
top marginal rate. This compares to the around 30 percent of aggregate 
personal income tax collections that is paid by that group of taxpay-
ers. While upper-income earners do receive assistance for their pension 
contributions, the overall personal tax system imposes a substantially 
higher tax burden on upper-income earners compared to those earning 















0–6,000 0 5.4 54 0.1
6,001–37,000 15 31.5 4,255 7.9
37,001–80,000 30 42.7 23,120 43.0
80,001–180,000 38 18.0 20,280 37.7
180,001+ 47 2.4 6,050 11.3
a Based on data extracted for ASFA from Wave 10 of the HILDA survey. 
SOURCE: Clare (2012a).
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Value of tax 
concessiona
$A, millions








% of total tax 
concession and 
cocontributionb
0–6,000 0 −8 −0.1 192 1.5
6,001–37,000 15 68 0.6 1,068 8.3
37,001–80,000 30 4,462 39.2 4,662 36.4
80,001–180,000 38 4,968 43.6 4,968 38.8
180,001+ 47 1,906 16.7 1,905 14.9
All employees 11,396 100.0 12,795 100.0
a Takes into account the Medicare levy, the phasing out of the Low Income Tax Offset, and the phasing in of the Medicare liability.
b Column does not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012a).
In order to view























Australian Pensions   199
lower incomes. It could be argued that the general tax and transfer sys-
tem in Australia should and does do most of the “heavy lifting” in terms 
of improving vertical equity.
Table 9.3 also indicates that the bulk of government assistance for 
pensions flows to those on either the 30 percent or 38 percent tax rates. 
Such taxpayers make up a very large part of the full-time workforce 
in Australia. Providing the bulk of tax assistance to this group makes 
sense from a public policy point of view. In contrast to very low-income 
earners and those who never have significant wage incomes during their 
lives, they have the potential to finance through savings significant 
income in retirement. 
For those on the top marginal tax rate, achievement of significant 
savings in the form of pension savings has the potential to make them 
totally self-funded in retirement, with no reliance on the government-
provided Age Pension. 
The Australian government has also legislated to provide a new 
matching contribution of up to $A500 annually for eligible low-income 
earners from the 2012–2013 income year. The payment will be 15 per-
cent of the eligible tax-preferenced contributions (including employer 
contributions) made by or for individuals with adjusted taxable incomes 
of up to $A37,000. Individuals will also need to meet a test where at 
least 10 percent of their incomes must be from employment or business 
sources and they are a resident of Australia or New Zealand. Individuals 
also can benefit from the cocontribution in regard to personal contribu-
tions that are not tax-preferenced. 
By its very nature, new matching contributions will only provide 
assistance to low-income earners on either the 0 or 15 percent tax rate. 
However, the government elected in September 2013 has indicated 
its intention to abolish this government contribution for low income 
earners.
As well, the phased increase in the rate of compulsory contributions 
to 12 percent will have its greatest impact on low- and middle-income 
earners, given that those earning higher incomes commonly already 
receive the benefit of contributions in excess of 9 percent of wages 
and/or will adjust voluntary salary sacrifice contributions if there is an 
increase in compulsory contributions.
Table 9.4 compares the distribution of government tax relief and 
contribution assistance for pensions in 2009–2010 for employees on 
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Current value of 
tax concession and 
cocontributiona 
($A, millions)
% of current total 
tax concession and 
cocontributionb
Value of proposed 




% of proposed 
total tax concession 
and government 
contributions
0—6,000 0 192 1.5 210 1.4
6,001–37,000 15 1,068 8.3 1,640 11.0
37,001–80,000 30 4,662 36.4 5,732 38.3
80,001–180,000 38 4,968 38.8 5,465 36.6
180,001+ 47 1,905 14.9 1,905 12.7
All employees 12,795 100.0 14,952 100.0
aTakes into account the Medicare levy, the phasing out of the Low Income Tax Offset, and the phasing in of the Medicare liability. Based 
on 2009–2010 tax rates.
b Column does not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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the basis of current policy settings and what it would have been if a 12 
percent mandatory contribution rate, the low income matching contri-
bution payment and the current rate of cocontribution had all applied in 
that year. While it will be some years before all the measures are fully in 
place this approach illustrates what the eventual impact on the distribu-
tion of government assistance by income level will be.
The combined effect of the government proposed measures would 
have, if they had applied in 2009–2010, increased the total assistance 
for retirement saving for employees earning less than $A80,000 a year 
from $A5,920 million to around $A7,580 million. Expressed as a per-
centage of total government assistance, the share of those earning less 
than $A80,000 a year would have increased from 46.2 percent to 50.2 
percent. Clearly, the measures strongly favor those on lower incomes.
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR BOTH MANDATORY 
PENSIONS AND THE AGE PENSION
There is also a direct link between the level of retirement savings 
and the subsequent reduction in the government Age Pension. In con-
sidering the equity of government assistance for retirement income, it 
also is necessary to take into account the amount of the Age Pension 
that will eventually be provided on average to persons on various levels 
of earnings and pension contributions during their working life.
This was done in research conducted in 2009 by George Rothman 
of the Australian Treasury Retirement & Intergenerational Modelling 
& Analysis Unit. This research places emphasis on a “whole of life” 
or life cycle perspective where Age Pension benefits in the retirement 
phase are included. The cost to government of its retirement income 
policies as a whole is modelled using the Treasury’s comprehensive 
RIMGROUP model.
The base case for this analysis is the retirement income framework 
following the 2009 government budget. Significant changes in that bud-
get included
• a significant increase in Age Pension payments of $A32.49 a 
week for single pensioners and $A10.14 a week combined for 
couple pensioners, together with changes to the income test, 
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whereby the pension taper rate for new pensioners, which re-
duces the Age Pension for persons receiving higher levels of in-
come, is 50 percent rather than 40 percent;
• a gradual increase in the age for eligibility for an Age Pension 
beginning in 2017 so that this age reaches 67 in 2023; and
• a reduction in the annual cap on tax-preferenced pension contri-
butions from $A50,000 to $A25,000 for those younger than 50 
and the transitional cap for those in their 50s from $A100,000 to 
$A50,000. This limit applies to the combined compulsory and 
salary sacrifice contributions. Individuals generally will not ex-
ceed this limit as the result of compulsory contributions alone 
given there is a cap on compulsory contributions per job that is 
below the tax-preferenced cap.
The analysis in the Treasury paper indicates that these measures 
have added considerably to the equity of Australia’s retirement income 
system, both by gender and income. The tax-preferenced contribution 
caps budget measure also was found to add even more vertical equity 
to the system with the saving to government revenue impacting mostly 
on the top two deciles of the income distribution for both men and 
women.
Decile NPV1-women NPV1-men NPV1-both
1 1,750 1,600 3,350
2 1,700 1,600 3,350
3 1,650 1,600 3,300
4 1,650 1,600 3,300
5 1,650 1,600 3,200
6 1,650 1,750 3,400
7 1,900 1,800 3,700
8 1,850 1,950 3,800
9 1,850 2,050 3,950
10 1,800 2,450 4,250
All 17,500 18,050 35,550
Table 9.5  Net Present Value of Cost to Government of Retirement 
Income System by Income Level ($A, millions)
NOTE: Columns do not precisely add up to the totals because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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The research also indicates that the total amount of government 
support does not vary much across the income deciles or by gender. 
Table 9.5 sets out the Treasury forecasts of government assistance for 
those born in 1960 and retiring in 2027. The proportion of assistance 
provided in the form of tax expenditures on pensions increases with 
higher income with a more or less equivalent decrease in the value of 
Age Pension expenditures. 
Overall government support for the Age Pension was found to 
account for 82 percent of the government assistance to women for their 
retirement and 68 percent of the assistance provided to men.
One group that receives above average assistance is men in the top 
income decile. For the other income deciles, the withdrawal of the Age 
Pension largely matches the assistance given to higher pension contri-
butions. However, this became irrelevant for those who are not entitled 
to even a partial Age Pension. Limiting the tax-preferenced contribu-
tion cap to $A25,000 a year for those aged 50 and over with more than 
$A500,000 in pension is a policy response to this distributional finding.
THE REAL EQUITY CHALLENGE
The real issue in regard to equity is that too many Australians have 
too little in retirement savings rather than too much. While much public 
debate has focused on the top 1 percent or 5 percent of income earners, 
there has been little or no debate on how to advance outcomes for the 
other 99 percent or 95 percent. 
If excessive government assistance is a problem, it is restricted to a 
very small number of individuals. This is particularly the case since the 
introduction of progressively tighter caps on both tax-preferenced and 
non-tax-preferenced contributions. When properly measured, the total 
government assistance for retirement income in the form of both the 
Age Pension and tax concessions for pensions is broadly even across 
the entire income distribution. 
After the recent contribution cap and rebate changes to private pen-
sions, 87.3 percent of the tax concessions for pensions will flow to indi-
viduals on less than the top marginal tax rate, up from the around 85 
percent, which applied before the changes. The share of total conces-
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sions flowing to individuals on the top marginal tax rate was around 
50 percent in 2007–2008, with the reduction in the share since then 
due to the introduction of contribution caps and higher rates of tax on 
the contributions of certain upper-income earners, together with the top 
marginal rate applying to a smaller proportion of taxpayers.
ASSISTING THOSE WHO REALLY NEED ASSISTANCE
Evidence from surveys of pension account balances held by indi-
viduals indicates that compulsory pensions have been very effective in 
lifting coverage rates and average pension account balances (Table 9.6). 
The increase in the mandatory Superannuation Guarantee contribu-
tion rate to 12 percent will further improve pension balances at retire-
ment, but it will be 40 or 50 years before the system is fully mature, 
meaning that all workers will be under that regime for their full careers.
However, voluntary contributions have remained flat in recent years 
in response to both tax changes and investment return developments. In 
particular, contribution caps and other changes to pensions are limit-
ing the amount of voluntary salary sacrifice contributions, including by 
individuals seeking to catch up on contributions late in their careers. 
Salary sacrifice contributions are made when an individual trades part 
of his salary for additional employer contributions.
Longitudinal data indicate that a significant proportion of the popu-
lation have higher incomes (with associated capacity to make higher 
contributions) for a relatively limited portion of their working careers. 
A higher contribution cap generally, or at least for those aged 50 and 
over, would assist those who need to catch up and have a capacity to 
do so.
While the pension cocontribution (matching contribution) made by 
the government has been effective in lifting personal contributions of 
low-income individuals, the design parameters of the cocontribution 
and recent cutbacks to them have made the cocontribution less effective 
than it could be. There is a case for both a higher maximum cocontribu-
tion and a lower matching rate in order to encourage greater additional 
contributions.
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Table 9.6  Pension Coverage and Pension Holdings of Men And Women Who Were Not Yet Retired, by Annual 
Salary Income, 2006 and 2010




Pension balance of  
those with super ($)
% with pension
Pension balance of  
those with super ($)
Mean Median Mean Median
Men
< 28,000 75.1 37,312 5,700 79.9 43,553 5,000
28,000 – < 58,000 96.7 70,698 30,000 96.8 62,853 25,000
58,000 – < 80,000 98.1 134,981 65,000 98.7 108,092 50,000
80,000+ 97.8 207,801 110,000 98.6 212,025 110,000
Total 91.4 99,506 35,000 93.9 109,609 40,000
Women
< 28,000 80.7 32,807 9,000 80.9 37,622 8,500
28,000 – < 58,000 96.8 56,253 25,000 96.6 52,885 29,000
58,000 – < 80,000 98.6 102,844 55,000 98.2 98,071 50,000
80,000+ 97.7 158,652 88,000 98.9 142,855 75,000
Total 89.4 55,433 21,000 90.9 63,412 26,000
NOTE: Population weighted results. 
SOURCE: HILDA data.
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The $A450 a Month Threshold for the Superannuation Guarantee 
Mandatory Contributions
While there may have been a rationale for the income threshold 
below which contributions are not required when the mandatory Super-
annuation Guarantee pension system was first introduced, it would make 
sense to remove it now given that nearly all employees have a pension 
account, and processes for making contributions are now more effi-
cient. Around 250,000 individuals, the majority of whom are women, 
would benefit from removal of the threshold through higher eventual 
retirement savings. The cost to both employers and to the Australian 
budget from removing the threshold would be very modest.
The Self-Employed
Nearly 10 percent of the labor force are self-employed. While tax 
concessions have led to some self-employed persons saving for retire-
ment through pensions, average balances and coverage have remained 
relatively low. Around 29 percent of the self-employed have no pension 
savings (this is more common for males than females). There is a strong 
case to extend compulsory pensions to include the self-employed. 
Individuals on Paid Parental Leave
Paid parental leave is considered by the government to be equiva-
lent to wages in terms of income tax and other treatment of individuals. 
Consistent with this, it would be appropriate for the Superannuation 
Guarantee mandatory pension contributions to apply to such payments, 
which it does not currently do.
One of the reasons that the average pension balance of women is 
lower than that of men is time out of the paid workforce for parental 
reasons. Paying Superannuation Guarantee mandatory contributions on 
parental leave payments would help reduce this difference in entitle-
ments. The effects of compound interest also would be very favorable 
in regard to pension contributions made on behalf of women who take 
parental leave, mostly in their 20s and 30s. The cost to the Australian 
government budget would be just over $A20 million a year.
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Indigenous Australians
Indigenous Australians have lower coverage and lower balances on 
average than the general population, again largely related to differences 
in paid labor force experience. Pension coverage for indigenous Austra-
lians is about 70 percent for men and 60 percent for women, compared 
to rates of 85 percent for men and 80 percent for women for the popula-
tion more generally. Average (mean) balances are also lower than for 
the equivalent Australian population as a whole (Table 9.7). 
Increases in the pension coverage and average pension balances of 
indigenous Australians will clearly be associated with improvements in 
involvement in paid work and in wages. Labor market measures rather 
than pension policies drive labor market outcomes.
However, current pension arrangements and administrative require-
ments do not always mesh well with the circumstances and needs of 
indigenous Australians, particularly those in remote areas who may 
have difficulty communicating with their pension fund administrators 
and in claiming benefits or identifying lost accounts. 
There is scope for the pension industry and the regulators to work 
toward a regulatory framework and administrative arrangements that 
can better cope with the special needs of indigenous Australians. Such 
arrangements also would be likely to benefit many other Australians.
Table 9.7  Pension Coverage And Pension Holdings of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Men and Women Who Were Not Yet 




Pension balance of 
those with super ($A) % with 
pension
Pension balance of 
those with super ($A)
Mean Median Mean Median
Men 68.3 49,589 9,000 70.7 55,743 14,000
Women 52.1 42,109 10,000 60.6 39,909 15,000
Persons 59.5 46,069 10,000 65.3 47,863 15,000
NOTE: Population weighted results. Not enough cases to break down by age. 
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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Recently Divorced Men and Women
Survey data indicate that the distribution of pensions is now much 
more even for those who have recently divorced compared to when 
amendments were made in 2002 to the Family Law Act to allow the 
splitting of pension account balances. The extent of disparities in par-
ticular decreased between 2006 and 2010. While a number of factors 
would have contributed to this, the growing maturity of the compulsory 
pension system leading to higher average account balances for both 
men and women would have played a role, along with more women 
having pensions in their own right. The figures also are consistent with 
the parties in a marriage making more use of the splitting arrangements. 
Exposure to Investment Risk
Currently in Australia, around 90 percent of individuals in the pre-
retirement phase who have a pension, and around 75 percent of those 
recently retired with a pension, are exposed to investment risk. The pro-
portion is higher in the preretirement phase given that the newer and 
younger fund members have been predominantly enrolled in defined 
contribution arrangements.
As shown in Table 9.8, investment returns in Australia, as in many 
other countries, have not been favorable in recent years. The global 
financial crisis had a significant impact, particularly given the 65–70 
percent exposure on average of most funds to equities.
Investment returns in 2012–2013 were relatively high, with prelim-
inary estimates indicating an average rate of return for default members 
of funds of over 15 percent.
The rationale for relatively high levels of exposure to equities in 
defined contribution plans (accumulation funds) is that this will gener-
ally lead to higher retirement benefits for members. Most individuals 
will be a member of a pension fund for a period of 40 years or more. 
Subject of course to individual decisions regarding exposure to invest-
ment risk and volatility, there is an argument that such exposure should 
be sustained throughout a member’s career.
However, market volatility means that at least some members will 
wish to shift assets into cash over the five years before retirement. This 
will allow them to cater for any required lump sum benefit and their 
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initial pension drawdowns. Life cycle investment options can provide 
such an investment strategy. However, while they are suitable for some 
individuals, they may not be suitable for others. 
Historical analysis also indicates that a typical life cycle fund would 
have delivered poorer outcomes for most members over most periods in 
Australia, such as 1900–1970, 1970–1999, and 1900–1999. Now is also 
not a good time to switch allocations from equities to bonds as returns 
to bonds are at historical lows and recent returns from equities, espe-
cially Australian equities, have been relatively strong, with double-digit 
returns in calendar 2012, particularly the second half of 2012.
While consumer satisfaction with pensions tends to follow with a 
lag in developments in investment returns, there has been little pressure 
in Australia for the government to cover any investment losses faced 
by fund members due to general developments in investment markets. 
The only policy response to the global financial crisis was to reduce 
the minimum drawdown factor for individuals who have an individ-
ual account–based (defined contribution) income stream in retirement. 
There are compensation arrangements that can be called upon in the 
case of members suffering loss due to fraud or theft in a regulated fund, 
but fortunately fraud or theft are relatively rare in the regulated pension 
funds. Compensation in these cases is effectively funded by members 
of other regulated pension funds through special levies struck by the 
government in such cases.
Table 9.8  Average Annual Fund Investment Returns to June 30, 2012 











SOURCE: Annual survey published by ASFA.
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INCOME STREAMS IN RETIREMENT
In an ideal world, the objective of pensions should be focused on the 
provision of income during the whole of retirement. However, there are 
a number of reasons why it is difficult to structure the Australian system 
around regular reliable pension payments. These include the following:
• When pension contributions began to be included in labor agree-
ments in 1986 as deferred pay (in lieu of a possible productivity 
wage rise), it was promoted to members as an addition to the Age 
Pension. The Superannuation Guarantee pension has increased 
the value of contributions, but the message has not changed—
members consider that the private pension account balance is 
their own money and they expect flexibility of payments.
• The government allows all members above age 60 to retire and 
draw a tax-free lump sum or pension. Most older Australians 
also are subject to low or nil rates of personal income tax given 
low average incomes and various tax rebates. As a result, there 
is only a limited incentive for individuals to leave money in the 
system during retirement. 
• There are no longer maximum withdrawal factors on account-
based defined contribution pensions, so nobody is forced to draw 
their benefits over time.
• Members can buy lifetime annuities from the private sector 
(albeit from a small number of suppliers), but current sales are 
well under 100 a year in total. Consumer research indicates that 
most Australians are unrealistic about the pricing of an indexed 
lifetime annuity and expect much more than fair value. With-
out compulsion or incentives, most members will not buy these 
products.
• Many members retire with small benefits, and they appear com-
fortable with leaving the money in an interest-bearing bank ac-
count rather than in a pension. This may be influenced by their 
perception of safety in the bank or by a short time horizon where 
they do not value higher (but uncertain) returns. They may also 
value instant access to their funds.
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• Many people today retire with some debt (including mortgages) 
or the need to carry out home repairs or consumer durable pur-
chases, and it is a rational decision to take a pension lump sum to 
clear all such expenses or debts before retiring.
• Around a third of total pension savings and around half of post-
retirement pension balances are held in Self-Managed Superan-
nuation Funds, which have less than five members and where 
each member is also a trustee of the fund. Such fund members 
generally value control highly and are wary of purchasing an in-
come stream from a third party such as a life insurance company 
or managed fund.
The above situation has made the provision of income streams, 
particularly those that protect members from their longevity risk, dif-
ficult. In addition, transitional arrangements, especially if compulsion is 
involved, can be problematic due to the plans made by those approach-
ing retirement.
That said, the evidence available indicates that many Australians do 
take an income stream from their pension in retirement, albeit one that 
is account based, where the individual can access the entire account 
balance should they choose to do so. This is particularly the case when 
larger amounts are involved.
As shown in Table 9.9, around 70 percent of males aged 60–64 who 
have recently retired have a pension with an average balance of around 
$A380,000. This is a drop in coverage of around 20 percentage points 
compared to those who are in the same age group who have not retired. 
The average balance is also higher than for those not retired, which 
suggests that those with lower balances are more likely to cash out and 
invest (or spend) elsewhere.
For women, the drop in coverage is greater, at around 30 percentage 
points. Again, the average balances for those retaining retirement sav-
ings in a pension, at around $A255,000, is higher than for those in the 
same age group who have not retired.
These figures strongly suggest that the great bulk of recent retirees 
keep their retirement savings primarily in a pension account and draw 
down an income stream. Those retirees who take their retirement sav-
ings out of the pension system are a minority. However, even for this 
minority there is no evidence that the pension savings are used pri-
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marily for immediate consumption purposes, such as an overseas trip. 
While some commentators claim that that frequently happens, such 
assertions are more in the line of urban myths than being supported 
by any objective research. However, in the past it is likely that the rate 
of taking lump sums was higher, in part due to account balances of 
those in defined contribution pension schemes being relatively low. For 
lower account balances, the tax benefits of remaining within the private 
pension system are not large. Elderly Australians, particularly elderly 
women, commonly have low or no private pension account balance 
because they either never had pension contributions in the first place or 
they have exhausted their pension account balances.
However, clearly there is scope for more retirement benefits to be 
taken in income stream form. 
Table 9.9  Pension Coverage and Pension Holdings of Men and Women 






Pension balance of 
those with super ($A) % with 
pension
Pension balance of 
those with super ($A)
Mean Median Mean Median
Men
<60 70.2 283,430 200,000 89.8 528,105 386,000
60–64 76.7 573,228 500,000 68.8 381,703 250,000
65–69 48.1 421,618 200,000 65.7 299,161 164,000
70+ 41.6 283,938a 162,000a 32.3 273,218a 90,000a
Total 60.7 419,841 280,000 60.8 367,336 245,000
Women
<60 62.1 322,945 100,000 63.7 135,501 53,000
60–64 53.1 273,135 195,000 58.6 255,485 120,000
65–69 46.4 129,491 90,000 41.7 205,855 70,000
70+ 41.6a 48,358a 15,000a 7.1a 184,000a 184,000a
Total 54.5 254,647 100,000 53.0 191,474 102,000
aEstimate not reliable.
NOTE: Population weighted results. “Recently retired” if “currently retired and observed 
not retired (i.e., employed) at some stage in the last three years.”
SOURCE: HILDA data.
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Designing better postretirement arrangements
The primary purpose of pensions is to provide financial security in 
retirement. This purpose is not currently being achieved as much as it 
could be in Australia, as there are many potential leakages that are at 
a cost to the system’s integrity and the taxation concessions provided. 
These potential leakages include 
• using pension benefits too fast, which manifests in several ways, 
such as having insufficient longevity protection and excessively 
running down retirement savings to either fund excessive con-
sumption and/or debts that were built up in the lead up to retire-
ment in the knowledge that a lump sum would be available; and 
• using pension benefits too slowly (i.e., poor lifestyle in retire-
ment) and leaving these benefits for others in the estate.
While the evidence available indicates that most retirees make 
sensible decisions regarding the investment of their retirement sav-
ings, there is scope to strengthen arrangements in advice, defaults, and 
compulsion.
The ASFA currently has a major project under way with the aim 
of facilitating or requiring the better provision of retirement income 
streams. This work is well under way but is not yet complete.
The following 11 guiding principles have influenced ASFA’s 
thinking:
 1) The main focus of pensions should be on income streams in 
retirement, as opposed to lump sums or estate planning. Pen-
sions in the postretirement phase should be designed to ensure 
that pension income streams, in conjunction with full or partial 
Age Pension payments, provide income and dignity in retire-
ment until death. 
 2) The retirement income system (including both tax concessions 
and Age Pension payments) must be perceived to be fair, when 
assessed across all components of the system and across the 
lifetime of individuals, including both the pre- and postretire-
ment phases.
 3) Changes should not undermine confidence in the system; that 
is, in terms of both the changes made and the need for long 
lead times. 
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 4) The system must be comprehensive, covering people in differ-
ent types of employment structures, such as employees, con-
tractors, and the self-employed.
 5) The retirement income system needs to be flexible, recogniz-
ing the need to take into account the varying patterns of work 
and lifetime income that exist. Phased retirement should also 
be encouraged as a means of helping people stay in the work-
force longer, not as a tax evasion mechanism.
 6) The retirement income system should be robust and able to 
withstand a range of reasonable economic conditions with-
out significantly reducing the expectations of the individuals 
involved. 
 7) The means test for the Age Pension has an important role to 
play in determining the amount of government assistance that 
retirees receive. In particular, those individuals or family units 
who earn below average wages, or who spend time out of the 
workforce (e.g., to raise a family or because they cannot get a 
job) should receive substantial support from the government 
to achieve a basic income in retirement. On the other hand, 
individuals and couples who continue in paid employment past 
customary retirement age and/or who have substantial pension 
and other assets that support a lifestyle in retirement more sub-
stantial than that described in the ASFA Retirement Standard at 
the comfortable level should receive little or no Age Pension.
 8) The mandatory pension system needs to have a relatively high 
degree of guidance and constraints (including good default 
systems) in order to protect people from unwise or excessively 
short-term actions. For example, it needs to 
• require long-term savings with restricted access prior to 
retirement,
• provide income in retirement, and
• reduce risks during both the accumulation and retirement 
phases.
 9) There needs to be access to deferred annuities, the purchase 
of which could start in either the accumulation or drawdown 
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stage. This will necessitate the removal of prudential supervi-
sion and tax regulatory roadblocks in order to allow the offer-
ing of deferred annuities in either the accumulation or draw-
down phase. 
 10) Incentives and default settings should be the initial approach 
to obtaining the desired outcomes. However, if such arrange-
ments are not effective in producing desired outcomes, then 
consideration may need to be given to introducing a degree 
of compulsion with respect to the taking of income streams in 
retirement. For instance, this could be achieved through the 
application of tax penalties with respect to taking benefits in 
any one of the following:
• as a lump sum, 
• in the form of a noncomplying income stream, or
•  if there is noncompliance with either the minimum or 
maximum drawdown factor of a complying account based 
income stream.
 11) The requirements should apply to all pension structures, 
including self-managed superannuation funds, which are small 
plans, where provisions are relevant.
CONCLUSION
The Australian pensions system is not without its shortcomings. 
Among other things it is too complex, particularly in regard to the taxa-
tion of contributions and fund earnings, it is not yet mature enough to 
deliver for most a comfortable standard of living in retirement, and it 
does not deal well with the financial consequences of longevity for the 
large majority of members who are in defined contribution schemes.
However, compared to systems in most other countries, the Aus-
tralian pensions system is sustainable, in that the respective burdens on 
governments, employers and individuals are manageable both now and 
in the future. It is comprehensive, in that all Australians benefit from 
an Age Pension from the government, which keeps individuals from 
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poverty in retirement with near universal coverage of private pensions 
of employees and substantial coverage of the self employed. It is equi-
table, in that when all the elements of the system are looked at together, 
the amount of government assistance is broadly comparable across the 
income distribution. Finally, the Australian pension system helps to 
strengthen the financial system, in that assets in the pension system are 
invested in the real economy rather in notional securities issued by a 
central government.
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China has one-fifth of the world’s population aged 60 and older 
(United Nations 2007). Thus, social security old-age benefits programs 
in China play an important role in the worldwide context of providing 
benefits for older persons.1 Also adding to the importance of under-
standing China’s retirement income system, China is undergoing a 
period of important changes in its provision of old-age benefits. At the 
start of 2009, less than 30 percent of its adult population was covered 
by a social security old-age benefits program, but in 2012 that had in-
creased to 55 percent (Economist 2012). Chinese government data for 
the end of 2011 indicated that 241.1 million people were contributing to 
the new rural social security pension system, with 85.3 million people 
receiving benefits (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
2012). Another important development due to the one-child policy, and 
reflecting changes in the age distribution of workers compared to re-
tired persons in China, is that in 2012 for the first time the Chinese labor 
force decreased, with decreases expected to continue for a number of 
years (Thai News Service 2013).
As in many countries around the world, until recently rural work-
ers in China generally did not participate in a social security program 
providing old-age benefits. Traditionally, older persons worked as long 
as they were able. After that, they lived with their children or received 
financial support from their children, with the support in China tradi-
tionally coming primarily from their sons. 
In countries such as China, however, where birth rates have fallen 
rapidly and where many adult children in rural areas are moving to 
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urban areas to work, the traditional support system for older persons is 
weakening. As evidence of this, one study finds that families in rural 
China with fewer children and with fewer sons tend to save more for 
their retirement (Ebenstein and Leung 2010). These changes increase 
the need for extending social security coverage to workers in rural areas. 
Because most workers in middle- and lower-income countries gen-
erally do not participate in social security, extending social security or 
pension coverage to rural and informal sector workers is arguably the 
most important problem facing social security programs around the 
world (Gillion et al. 2000). Worldwide, only 26 percent of the work-
ing population is effectively covered by social security old-age benefits 
programs (ILO 2010). Extending coverage to rural areas and the infor-
mal sector is difficult, however, because generally these workers have 
low and variable cash incomes. For these reasons, they cannot make 
regular contributions and are limited in the amount they can contribute. 
At the same time, the transaction costs for contributors, and the transac-
tion and administrative costs for the government, may be sufficiently 
high to make small contributions economically infeasible.
SOCIAL SECURITY OLD-AGE BENEFITS PROGRAMS 
IN CHINA
In China, all persons are registered as either urban or rural resi-
dents. This classification system (called the hukuo system), which is 
unique to China, is important in the provision of social security old-age 
benefits. When rural residents move to cities, they retain their regis-
tration as rural residents, which affects their access to social security 
programs in urban areas. 
China has three major social security old-age benefits programs, 
covering three different groups of people: urban areas have two old-age 
benefits programs, and there is a separate program for rural workers. 
The central government is considering rules permitting transfer of con-
tributions for workers between the three programs, so that workers who 
have contributed to more than one program can combine their contribu-
tions into one program and receive benefits solely from that program 
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(China	Daily 2012). The current pension arrangements make it difficult 
for workers to move to different areas in China.
Urban Employees’ Pension Program
The Urban Employees’ Pension Program, established in 1997, is for 
employed workers in urban areas. It is a two-pillar mandatory program 
and the only one of the three major programs that is mandatory. 
Coverage. In 2010, 36 percent of China’s total workforce (urban 
and rural), or about 264 million workers, was participating in a social 
security pension plan. One of the reasons for the low coverage rate may 
be that workers in urban areas cannot afford the required contribution. 
Complicated procedures for enrolling and lack of trust in the systems 
may be other explanations (Zheng 2012). Another factor contributing 
to low coverage rates in urban areas is that rural workers are typically 
excluded (Oksanen 2012).
Contribution rate. The contribution rate for the Urban Employees’ 
Pension Program is 28 percent, of which the employee contributes 8 
percent to an individual account and the employer contributes 20 per-
cent to the social account for the basic pension or social pension, which 
is a traditional pay-as-you-go defined benefit program. 
By 2006, individual accounts programs were established in 10 
provinces, but the extension to other provinces stagnated (Zheng 2012). 
However, government policy of the Ministry of Labor and Social Secu-
rity at the end of 2005 mandated the extension of the program, with the 
8 percent contribution rate, to all provinces, which now has occurred.
The government has not segregated the money in the individual 
accounts from other social security funds, and has spent much of that 
money, now in essence converting those accounts to notional accounts 
to which interest is credited to notional account balances (Economist 
2012). 
Benefits.	The Urban Employees’ Pension Program provides two 
benefits: one comes from the individual account, which depends on the 
contribution level of the individual and the rate of return received on 
the contribution; and the second comes from the social account, which 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
220   Chen and Turner
is a pay-as-you-go defined benefit. All participants must contribute to 
this program for at least 15 years and arrive at the retirement age before 
they can apply for the old-age benefit from this program. The average 
benefit level of this program is 1,721 yuan per month by the end of the 
year 2012, which is adjusted according to the inflation rate.
Regional variation. The contribution rates of 8 percent plus 20 
percent are set by the central government as guidelines, but the exact 
contribution rate for the social pension can be decided by local govern-
ment, and can be higher or lower. The contribution rate of Guangzhou 
City is 12 percent for the social account. Guangzhou has a considerably 
lower contribution rate for the social account because many younger 
migrants live in the city, so population aging is not a serious problem. 
The contribution rate for the social account is 20 percent in Beijing 
and 22 percent in Shanghai. Shanghai faces serious population aging. 
The 8 percent contribution rate that workers make for the individual 
account does not vary across provinces because the account is linked 
to the individual participant and is not affected by the age structure in 
the province.
China has 33 provincial-level governments. Beijing, Shanghai, 
Chongqing, and Tianjin are four municipalities that are treated as 
provinces. Besides, two Special Administrative Regions—Hong 
Kong and Macao—are treated as provincial governments. Also, the 
contribution responsibility is divided among provincial, municipal, and 
county governments, and the exact proportion shared by different levels 
of local governments varies in different provinces.
The management of social security funds is fragmented, even within 
provinces. Only four provinces, two of which are Beijing and Shanghai, 
have pooled the social security funds. There are more than 2,000 social 
security funds managed by different government entities (Zheng 2012). 
The fragmentation of the system has historic origins. In 1949, soon af-
ter the founding of the People’s Republic of China, a national pension 
system was established, but trade unions at the local level were given 
responsibility for administering it. In 1969, during the Cultural Revo-
lution, trade unions were abolished, and state-owned enterprises were 
given responsibility for managing the pension system (Oksanen 2012).
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Urban Residents’ Pension Program
Coverage. The Urban Residents’ Pension Program, started in 2011, 
is a voluntary program for urban residents who do not have jobs, are 
self-employed, work for small businesses, or are migrants from rural 
areas. It is similar to the National Rural Pension Plan, described later. 
Contribution rate. Participants can choose the level of contribu-
tions they wish to make within a set range. The central government 
suggests a contribution range of 100–1,000 yuan per year, which 
is divided into 10 levels, in 100 yuan increments. But as the Urban 
Residents’ Pension Program is managed by the county or municipal 
government, the range of contribution levels differs among areas. 
Local governments subsidize the contributions of those urban 
residents who participate in the program through a matching contribu-
tion, which varies across provinces. The lowest matching contribution, 
set by the central government, is 30 yuan per participant per year. Thus, 
on the minimum contribution of 100 yuan a year, this provides a 30 
percent match rate, which, of course, is lower for higher contributions. 
Local governments, however, can raise the match rate according to the 
financial ability of the government. 
Benefits.	 The Urban Residents’ Pension Program provides two 
benefits. One comes from the individual account, which depends on the 
contribution level of the individual, the government matching contribu-
tion, and the rate of return received on those contributions. The second 
benefit is entirely financed by the local governments and is not based on 
the contributions of participants, other than that they must contribute a 
minimum of 15 years in order to qualify for it. That benefit is 55 yuan 
per month, but local governments in high-income provinces can raise 
this benefit level according to the financial ability of the government. 
The governments pay the cost of the noncontributory basic benefit. 
In the wealthier and eastern provinces of China, the central government 
subsidizes 50 percent, and the local governments pay the remaining 50 
percent of the noncontributory benefit. In the poor middle and western 
provinces, the central government pays 100 percent of the benefit, and 
the local governments do not pay for the noncontributory benefit.
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National Rural Pension Plan
Out of a population aged 60 and older of 150 million in China, 100 
million live in rural areas (China	News 2009). Thus, 14 percent of the 
world’s population aged 60 and older is covered by China’s National 
Rural Pension Plan. 
Coverage
In 2008, only 12 percent of China’s rural population was participat-
ing in a social security pension system (Oksanen 2012). The voluntary 
social security pension for rural residents that preceded the new Na-
tional Rural Pension Plan had contribution and benefit levels that were 
low, and the program was not subsidized by the government.
Because most rural workers in China were not participating in a 
social security old-age benefits program, beginning in late 2009, China 
established the National Rural Pension Plan. It started by extending the 
program to more than 300 counties on a pilot basis and reached 23 
percent of counties by the end of 2010 (Mu 2010). By the end of 2011 
it was extended to 60 percent of counties, and it is expected to be in 
all counties by the end of 2012 (Yang 2012). The launch of the new 
program was preceded by a period during which different pension ar-
rangements were tried on a pilot basis in different parts of the country 
to see which arrangement would work best (Cai et al. 2012). 
All rural residents aged 16 and older who are not students and who 
are not enrolled in another pension plan can voluntarily participate in 
the rural plan. They can participate whether they work in a rural or 
urban area, whether they are employed or self-employed, and whether 
they work for pay or do not work for pay. The program is not earnings-
related in that anyone meeting the age requirements can contribute to it 
regardless of earnings, and the amount of the individual’s contributions 
is not related to his or her earnings. 
Rural migrants to the city can participate in the Urban Employees’ 
Pension Program if their employers contribute for them. If their em-
ployers do not contribute for them, they can choose to participate in the 
rural pension plan. Because of the high contribution rates, most em-
ployers are unwilling to make pension contributions for rural workers 
who migrate to urban areas. About one-third of the residents in urban 
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areas are migrants from rural workers who do not have full rights to 
participate in the urban pension systems (Oksanen 2012). 
Contributions
The central government has established minimum standards for 
contributions. The lowest minimum contribution is 100 yuan a year and 
the lowest maximum contribution is 500 yuan a year (about U.S.$80), 
with only 5 percent of participants contributing that amount (Dorfman 
et al. 2013). 
While most small counties use the government minimum stan-
dards, variation above those standards is permitted and occurs in some 
places that have a higher standard of living. Wuhan and Shanghai are 
examples of regional variation in contribution levels. In Wuhan, the 
minimum contribution is 200 yuan a year and the maximum contribu-
tion is 1,200 yuan a year, while in Shanghai the minimum is 500 yuan a 
year and the maximum is 1,300 yuan a year. In both Wuhan and Shang-
hai, contributions are permissible between the minimum and maximum 
in 200 yuan increments. In some prosperous provinces, contributions of 
up to 2,500 yuan are allowed (Cai et al. 2012). These levels of contribu-
tions will be adjusted upward over time to reflect increases in income. 
An important feature of this program is that the contribution rate is 
much lower than in the program for urban workers, where the rate is 28 
percent of pay. The contributions to this program are made by individu-
als and government, with no contribution by employers. 
Matching contributions
China provides a matching contribution to encourage rural resi-
dents to participate in the National Rural Pension Plan. Because rural 
residents do not pay income taxes, the lack of a tax incentive for rural 
residents to participate may explain in part the matching contribution. 
The subsidy, which is provided by the local government, is 30 yuan a 
year, where the minimum contribution by the participant is 100 yuan a 
year (about U.S.$16). 
The matching contribution varies in different areas. For example, 
in Xian City, the matching amount varies from 30 yuan for a contribu-
tion of 100 or 200 yuan, to 40 yuan for a contribution of 300 yuan, 
to 45 yuan for a contribution of 400 yuan, and to 50 yuan for a con-
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tribution of 500 yuan. Thus, for contributions above 300 yuan there 
is an additional government match of 5 yuan for every additional 100 
yuan contributed by the participant. In Guangzhou City, which is one 
of the most developed cities in China, the annual contribution levels 
(and its matching contribution) are divided into 120 (180) yuan; 360 
(420) yuan; 600 (600) yuan, 840 (720) yuan; 1,080 (840) yuan; 1,320 
(900) yuan; and 1,560 (960) yuan. The matching contribution is higher 
than the worker’s contribution at the two lowest contribution levels. 
The subsidy level in Guangzhou is higher than in other cities. 
Some commentators have argued that the matching contribution is 
low (Cai et al. 2012), but experience seems to indicate that it and the 
other incentives to participate may be adequate. Nearly half of partici-
pants make the minimum contribution (Dorfman et al. 2013), which 
generally provides the highest match rate. The government matching 
contribution is paid into the person’s individual account.
Administrative rules for making contributions
Chinese residents who choose to participate in the rural pension 
plan have different contribution options, depending on where they live. 
In some areas, they must make the entire contribution for the year as 
a single payment in January. In Beijing, however, they can make the 
contribution between January 1 and December 20. They register to par-
ticipate with the village government, which is at the lowest level of the 
hierarchy of government. They must contribute in cash. To be specific, 
they take cash to the government department in their village to make 
their annual contribution. 
At the end of the contribution period, the village government aggre-
gates all the contributions and sends them to the township government, 
which then sends the contributions of all the villages to the county gov-
ernment. The rural pension fund is generally managed by the county 
government, but in some cities, depending on local regulation, the mu-
nicipal government manages the fund, which is deposited into banks. 
The central government intends for the funds to eventually be managed 
by the provincial governments (Cai et al. 2012). 
Local governments pay the administrative expenses for the plan, 
which is a form of subsidy for the program. Those expenses thus are 
not taken out of the contributions, which would reduce the amount of 
benefits.
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Benefits
While the National Rural Pension Plan is structured as one plan, it 
provides benefits to two different groups under different but related ar-
rangements. The first is a contributory plan, to which participants must 
contribute in order to receive benefits when they reach age 60. The sec-
ond is a noncontributory plan for people who are 60 and older. The 
relationship between the two parts of the rural plan is explained below. 
Participants must contribute for 15 years in order to be eligible to 
receive benefits. For participants older than age 45 at the start of the 
system, to qualify for benefits they will need to contribute every year 
up to age 60 and then make a lump sum payment to cover the shortfall 
in years of contributions (Cai et al. 2012). It appears, however, that 
few workers are making lump sum contributions. Workers who are 60 
and older can qualify to apply for the noncontributory benefit, which is 
currently 55 yuan per month in most of the counties in China.
The benefits for participants who have contributed a minimum of 
15 years or who have contributed a lump sum equivalent to 15 years of 
payments have two components. The basic benefit currently is 55 yuan 
a month. This amount equals one-tenth of the average monthly wage in 
rural areas in 2011 (Wang and Qing 2012).
That benefit is payable at age 60 to both men and women in most 
of China. However, the benefit eligibility age varies to some extent, 
with, for example, women being able to receive the benefit at age 55 in 
Beijing. The benefit is not means tested, and workers are not required to 
stop working to receive it. By contrast, for the urban pension men can 
receive the benefit at age 60, while women can receive it at age 50, or 
if they are classified as cadres, meaning that they have a management 
position in their company, the age for benefit receipt is 55. These ages 
for benefit receipt also are mandatory retirement ages for most urban 
workers. A small percentage of urban workers, such as some university 
professors, are exempt from these requirements. In addition, workers in 
hazardous or dangerous occupations can qualify up to five years earlier 
than these ages. That exception for hazardous or dangerous occupations 
is not part of the rural pension system. One study finds an average re-
tirement age in urban areas of 53 (Sin 2005). The benefit eligibility age 
in the rural pension system, and presumably actual retirement ages, are 
thus considerably higher than in the urban pension system.
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Unlike most social security programs around the world, in China 
the social security benefit financing differs by region and also involves 
financing in part by local governments. The basic benefit is financed by 
the central government in the central and western parts of the country, 
but in the more prosperous eastern provinces it is financed half by the 
central government and half by the local governments (Lei, Zhang, and 
Zhao 2011). Localities can increase the benefit amount above 55 yuan a 
month if they have the financial resources to do so. The average benefit 
received by beneficiaries is 74 yuan a month (Yang 2012), which is not 
financed by the contributions of participants. This benefit represents the 
first time that the Chinese government has made a major financial com-
mitment to a rural pension system (Shen and Williamson 2010). 
In addition, a defined contribution benefit is provided based on the 
accumulation in the participant’s individual account from the partici-
pant’s contributions, government matching contributions, and accrued 
investment returns. That benefit is paid monthly and equals the individ-
ual account at age 60 divided by 139, which is the same factor used for 
calculating monthly pensions from the individual accounts in the urban 
plans. The divisor depends on the age at which the person collects ben-
efits, with it being higher at lower ages. It is 195 for a woman retiring 
at age 50 and 170 for a woman retiring at age 55 in the urban pension 
system. Generally, men cannot collect retirement benefits at those ages. 
Individuals do not need to stop working to receive this benefit from the 
rural pension plan.
The benefit payment is not limited to the amount in the individual 
account, but it is guaranteed by the government for life and thus is paid 
as an annuity. If a person dies before receiving the full amount in his 
or her personal account, the spouse receives the remaining amount, and 
if the spouse is not surviving then the children. Otherwise, the system 
does not provide a benefit to a surviving spouse.  
Noncontributory	benefit
Persons aged 60 and older who have not qualified for another pen-
sion can receive the basic benefit of 55 yuan a month if all their children 
are contributing to the rural pension, regardless of whether the children 
are working. The benefits will be adjusted for inflation, but the exact 
adjustment mechanism has not yet been determined (Cai et al. 2012). 
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This requirement on the adult children is called “family binding.” 
The incentive may work particularly well in China, which has a strong 
tradition of adult children taking care of their older parents. If the older 
persons do not have children, they automatically qualify. The central 
government requires that all the recipients’ children contribute, but the 
enforcement is done at the local level. At the local level, however, the 
incentive to receive the central government subsidy for benefits for 
people aged 60 and older works against the strict enforcement of this 
requirement, so that some local governments may qualify all persons 
aged 60 and older. 
Regional variations
China has a number of levels in the hierarchy of government. From 
lowest to highest, they are village, township, county or district, mu-
nicipal, provincial, and central. The National Rural Pension Plan is 
sponsored by the central government and run by the county or munici-
pal government, with oversight from the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security. 
The central government provides guidelines for the pension sys-
tems in China, but for the rural pension system, the details, including 
contribution rates, are determined at the level of the county or district 
government. It is called the county government in rural areas and the 
district government in urban areas. In some areas, the county or district 
government has established the system exactly according to the central 
government guidelines, while in other areas the systems vary. Thus, the 
systems may vary within provinces.
Combined Urban and Rural Programs
Some cities, such as Wuhan, did not establish the Urban Residents’ 
Pension Program. Instead in 2011, Wuhan established a unified Pension 
Plan for Rural and Urban Residents. The plan covers those who live in 
urban areas and do not have jobs and all those in the rural areas. Neither 
group can get contributions from employers, but they do receive the 
government matching contribution. This is a reform trend for counties 
and cities to establish a unified pension program for both urban and 
rural residents who do not have formal jobs in China.
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Government Employees’ Pensions
Government employees and employees in government-owned en-
terprises in China are covered by a separate pension system, paid for 
out of general revenues. That system costs 0.7 percent of GDP per year. 
About 8 percent of covered participants are in that system. In addition 
to these programs, hundreds of thousands of plans have been estab-
lished by local municipalities to meet the needs of migrant workers 
from rural areas or of particular industrial zones (Zheng 2012).
Hong Kong’s Mandatory Provident Fund
Hong Kong has a separate old-age benefits system. All workers 
are required to join the Mandatory Provident Fund, which is a system 
of defined contribution plans. Employees earning between HK$6,500 
(U.S.$839) and HK$25,000 (U.S.$3,226) monthly (in 2012) pay 5 
percent of their earnings, with employers also paying 5 percent (U.S. 
Social Security Administration 2012).2 The contributions go to a finan-
cial service provider chosen by the employer. As of November 2012, 
employees can choose the service provider for their contributions. 
Workers receive benefits as a lump sum. Because of savings accumulat-
ed through this program, Hong Kong has a high ratio of pension assets 
to GDP of 32.5 percent, which compares to a simple average for OECD 
countries of 33.9 percent (OECD 2012). 
FINANCING ISSUES 
Individual	Account	Benefits
Concerning the financing of the individual account benefit, the di-
visor of 139 for benefits received at age 60 is the key parameter in 
determining the generosity of the individual account benefit. Thus, in 
assessing the financing of those benefits, it is important to determine 
whether that divisor provides benefits that are adequately financed, or 
alternatively, whether the benefits are overly generous. When financial 
planners in the United States advise individual account holders about 
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the sustainable amount that a retiree can withdraw from an account 
without overly risking that they will run out of money, they often ad-
vise that a retiree can withdraw 4 percent of the initial account balance, 
adjusted for inflation, each year (McKenzie and Turner 2012). The 4 
percent amount is designed to provide an inflation-indexed withdrawal. 
That advice depends on the life expectancy of the individual and the 
expected rate of return received on the account. It would be a higher 
percentage for a shorter life expectancy and a higher expected rate of 
return. If the amount were used instead to purchase an annuity, which is 
a better comparison, it would be equivalent to a withdrawal of 5.7 per-
cent, based on male annuity rates, no inflation adjustment of benefits, 
and the low interest rates available in 2013. The withdrawal rate would 
be lower than 5.7 percent for a benefit that was adjusted for inflation.
The divisor of 139 for monthly benefits is equivalent to withdraw-
ing 8.6 percent of the initial account balance each year. Thus, it appears 
that the benefit divisor of 139 should be increased if the goal is to have 
a system that is financed primarily by the contributions of participants. 
That change would result in lower benefits, but it would be more con-
sistent with a sustainable, self-funding pension system. By one analysis, 
county governments will be liable for 40 percent of the payments from 
the individual account pensions (Herd, Wu, and Koen 2010).
The Overall Expense of Pensions
In 2011, 61 percent of the revenues for the rural pension system 
overall came from government subsidies (Wang and Qing 2012). The 
individual pays for none of the basic benefit for parents and for none of 
his or her own basic benefit. The cost to the central government of pro-
viding the noncontributory benefit to all the 100 million rural persons 
currently aged 60 and older would be about 2 percent of the government 
budget (Shen and Williamson 2010). The government also subsidizes a 
substantial portion of the individual account benefit. This cost is borne 
by local governments. Overall, the individuals will only pay at most 18 
percent of the cost of their pensions, with the government paying the 
rest (Herd, Wu, and Koen 2010).
The government is thus incurring what appear to be substantial 
unfunded liabilities for the social security pension systems (Reuters 
2012). Most countries have pay-as-you-go social security systems with 
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unfunded liabilities, thus unfunded liabilities are a common feature. 
China, however, differs from many countries in that it has a very high 
savings rate. Thus, there may be more justification for unfunded liabili-
ties in China than in other countries. In addition, the central government 
has large nonpension reserves that could be used in the future to help 
pay for these liabilities (Economist 2012).
In comparison to programs in other countries, the total cost of the 
rural pension program in China is relatively low at 0.22 percent of 
GDP. This compares, for example, to 0.38 percent of GDP for a means- 
tested program in Chile (Herd, Wu, and Koen 2010). Thus, the program 
combines a relative low cost, due to low benefits, and a high degree of 
government subsidy, due to the relatively small amount contributed by 
participants. 
Investment Policy Issues
In China, the rate of return on provincial urban pension funds has 
averaged 2 percent over the last 10 years, which is less than the rate 
of inflation over that period. However, in 2012 the national govern-
ment announced a pilot program that would permit the 13 provinces 
that manage pension funds for individual accounts to invest in domestic 
equities. The council that manages the National Social Security Fund, 
which is China’s public pension reserve fund, will act as the trustee and 
principal investor of each of these funds. The amount invested this way 
could be as much as 360 billion yuan (U.S.$57 billion), roughly 20 per-
cent of the funds’ combined total assets under management (U.S. Social 
Security Administration 2012).  
The National Social Security Fund (NSFF) was established in 2000 
to support China’s future social security expenditures. The NSSF re-
ceives money from government allocations from a government lottery 
and from the sale of state-owned enterprises. It is a strategic reserve 
fund designed to help pay for future social security expenditures during 
future periods of rapid aging. 
Since 2006, the NSSF has managed the investments of the individ-
ual account funds of nine provinces, municipalities, and autonomous 
regions. As of December 31, 2011, the NSSF had net assets of 838.6 
billion yuan. Included in that, the value of the individual account funds 
managed by the NSSF is 65.8 billion yuan. Domestic fixed income 
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investments accounted for 51 percent of the investments (National 
Council for Social Security Fund 2012). That percentage is relatively 
high for a fund of this type.
CONCLUSION
While social security old-age benefit programs around the world 
generally are uniform national programs, at least for the group of 
workers they cover, the three main programs in China have regional 
variations that make the program more complex, but that also relate to 
the regional differences in standard of living in the country. The financ-
ing of the programs varies across regions, with the central government 
providing all of the financing for the basic benefit in the central and 
western parts of the country, but half of the financing, with the local 
government providing the other half, in the more prosperous eastern 
provinces. The level of contributions by participants and the level of 
benefits they receive also vary across regions.
China has a program for rural workers that has features that may 
provide lessons for other countries wishing to extend pension cover-
age to the rural and informal sectors. It is a voluntary program, but by 
providing substantial government subsidies, it encourages coverage of 
workers who do not pay income taxes and thus have no tax incentive to 
participate. As a further incentive, old-age benefits are provided to the 
parents of participants who contribute when all the adult children in a 
family are participating in the program. Only a single contribution per 
year is required, and participants can choose from a range of contribu-
tion levels. 
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Notes
We have received helpful comments from Heikki Oksanen and David Rajnes. In this 
chapter, we follow the western convention of listing Chinese family names as the 
second name, with the given name the first name. The official name of China is the 
People’s Republic of China.
1. The official name of Chinese currency is renminbi (RMB). The basic unit of the 
currency is yuan, which are the units used in this chapter. Hong Kong uses a 
different currency. 
2. The dollar limits are adjusted upward over time.
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Social Security and  
Pensions in East Africa
John A. Turner
Pension	Policy	Center
Five countries in East Africa have formed the East African Com-
munity (EAC)—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. 
These countries include both Anglophone and Francophone Africa, 
though English is the official language of the EAC. They have a total 
population of more than 140 million, which is more than one-tenth of 
the population of Africa. The EAC, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, 
was formed in 2000 with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania; Rwanda and 
Burundi joined in 2007. South Sudan, Sudan, Zambia, Malawi, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo have indicated an interest in join-
ing. While the EAC is already an important regional organization, if 
these countries join, the EAC would include more than one-fifth of the 
population of Africa.
The EAC is seeking greater integration of the five countries in order 
to facilitate the development of a prosperous and peaceful East Africa. 
Integration goals include facilitating the movement of workers, capital, 
and commerce across countries, including developing a free trade zone. 
Facilitating the movement of workers raises issues of pension and so-
cial security portability across countries. It also involves harmonizing 
the social security and pension systems and laws in the five countries. 
The EAC has a committee responsible for these issues, the Capital Mar-
kets, Insurance and Pensions Committee. 
In 2010, the EAC established the Common Market Protocol as a 
step toward greater economic integration, including the free movement 
of workers. The citizens of any of the five countries can work or live in 
any of the other countries and participate in the social security program 
of the new country of residence. The academic and professional qualifi-
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cations of any country in the EAC are recognized in the other countries 
(Ministry of East African Community Affairs 2011). 
The EAC countries have the stated goal of adopting a common cur-
rency, and in 2012 they are considering a policy that would set them on 
the path to having a common currency within 10 years. They eventually 
may even form a federation as a single country in order to facilitate 
their development through greater economies of scale and a larger free-
trade area. The development of funded pensions can aid in the develop-
ment of capital markets in the region, providing a source of funds for 
investments in government debt and corporate debt and equity. 
This chapter discusses the pension and social security old-age ben-
efit systems in the EAC, including discussing areas in need of reform. It 
first discusses mandatory social security systems, and then various as-
pects of employer-provided pensions, including pension regulators, the 
tax treatment of pensions, the types of pensions provided in the private 
sector, and pensions for public sector workers. It discusses attempts to 
extend coverage to more workers.
SOCIAL SECURITY
Overview
All the mandatory social security programs in the region are called 
the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) (Table 11.1). Social security 
pensions in East Africa cover only a small percentage of the workforce, 
mainly those in government employment. Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, 
and Burundi cover less than 10 percent of their populations, while Kenya 
Table 11.1  Name of Primary Social Security Fund, 2012
Country Name of plan
Burundi National Social Security Fund
Kenya National Social Security Fund
Rwanda Social Security Fund of Rwanda
Tanzania National Social Security Fund
Uganda National Social Security Fund
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covers 15 percent (Barya 2011). Lack of coverage is due in part to con-
tribution evasion by employers and employees who are covered under 
the law but who do not contribute. Also, coverage for self-employed 
workers is generally voluntary, and workers in the informal sector gen-
erally are not covered (Table 11.2). Most people in old age depend on 
traditional arrangements through their families or clans. 
Table 11.2  Workers Not Covered by Social Security, 2012
Country Workers not covered
Burundi Self employed
Kenya Employers with less than five employees; persons earning 
less than Kshs1,000 a month
Rwanda Self-employed
Tanzania Self-employed; household workers
Uganda Employers with less than five employees; persons aged 55 
and older
Table 11.3  Type of Social Security Fund, 2012






Some programs for government employees have converted from 
noncontributory to contributory, meaning that government employees 
contribute toward their funding. Some programs have also moved from 
pay-as-you-go toward funding. The regulatory authority over the pro-
grams is in nearly all cases under the Ministry of Finance rather than 
the Ministry of Labor.
Countries in the region formerly under the influence of the Brit-
ish as colonies (Tanzania, Kenya) or protectorates (Uganda) have had 
provident funds, which are defined contribution plans that provide 
lump sum benefits (Table 11.3). As defined contribution plans, they are 
funded. Countries around the world with those systems have tended to 
move away from them and switch to social insurance pension systems, 
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which are defined benefit systems where benefits are based on a benefit 
formula. While Tanzania has converted its provident fund to a social 
insurance defined benefit pension, Kenya is planning to convert their 
provident funds to a defined contribution pension. Uganda is consider-
ing doing the same. Provident funds have the disadvantage that they 
do not provide a stream of benefits that protects the recipient against 
poverty during old age, thus providing no insurance against an unex-
pectedly long lifetime. A further problem with provident funds is that 
frequently the interest rate declared on the fund is less than the inflation 
rate, which, combined with high administrative costs, has resulted in 
low benefits (Gillion et al. 2000).
The social security systems of the region generally have retirement 
ages that are low by international standards (Table 11.4). Mandatory 
retirement at low ages in some countries is another problem. The coun-
tries need to adopt social security and pension programs that encourage 
work of skilled persons at older ages in order to make better use of their 
human resources.
Some of the social security programs in the region have high ad-
ministrative expenses. Some funded systems managed by government 
agencies have made questionable investments, resulting in financial 
losses to the funds. Perhaps relating in part to those two problems, con-
tribution evasion by employees and employers is also a major problem. 
In some countries, public employees are covered under a plan that 
is different from private sector employees. Some countries have multi-
ple programs for private sector employees (Table 11.5). Some countries 
have several different plans for different sectors of public employees, 
creating a need for reform that would harmonize the plans and provide 
equal treatment for all citizens. Preferential treatment of government 
employees is an issue in some countries. They have lower contribution 
Table	11.4		Early	Retirement	Age	for	Social	Security	Old	Age	Benefits,	
2012
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rates, a lower retirement age, and extremely generous benefits. Mem-
bers of parliament and judges generally are covered by preferential 
pensions. In some countries, the generosity of the pensions for public 
service employees is further enhanced in that they are not subject to 
taxation. 
Some countries in the region allow workers and employers to opt 
out of the mandatory social security program as long as they participate 
in an alternative program. It has been thought that having competitors 
for the national program would encourage greater efficiency and lower 
costs.
In order to encourage the mobility of workers across countries, so-
cial security systems need to provide portability so that workers can 
combine work in different countries in order to meet qualifying condi-
tions to receive benefits (Table 11.6). In some countries, workers must 
work for a minimum of 15 years to qualify for benefits. A proposed law 
in Kenya in 2012 would enable workers working temporarily in other 
countries in the EAC to continue participating in the social security 
program in Kenya. It would also encourage the development of agree-
ments with other EAC countries so that social security contributions in 
the other countries would be sent to Kenya for Kenyan workers who 
returned to Kenya when they retired (Mutegi 2012).
Table 11.5  National Social Security Fund or Multiple Funds, 2012






Table 11.6  Number of Years for Vesting in Social Security Fund, 2012
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The EAC countries are members of several other regional organiza-
tions, which have overlapping interests and goals concerning pensions, 
and which may not include all of the EAC countries. These include 
the East and Central African Social Security Association (ECASSA), 
which was formed in 2007, and which also includes Zambia (ECASSA 
2012). ECASSA, headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, attempts to help the 
countries meet common challenges they face in their social security 
systems, including low coverage. It also encourages the development 
of multicountry agreements facilitating the transfer of social security 
credits across countries in the region.1 
The remainder of this section discusses the social security and man-
datory government-provided systems in each of the countries.
Kenya
Types of plans
Kenya has a provident fund for private sector employees that was 
established in 1965. In 2011, 4.6 million people were registered, of 
whom 1.2 million were active (EAC 2011). The total value of assets in 
this program exceeds the total value of funds in mandatory programs in 
the other four countries combined (Katto 2012). As of 2012, legislation 
converts this fund to a defined contribution pension fund.
Kenya has four different types of pension programs: 1) the NSSF, 
for private sector workers; 2) the Civil Service Pension Program, for 
government workers; 3) employer-provided occupational pensions, for 
private sector workers; and 4) individual pension programs, for private 
sector workers. The employer-provided occupational pensions account 
for 61 percent of total assets, the NSSF accounts for 38 percent, and 
individual pension programs account for 1 percent. The Civil Service 
Pension Program is unfunded. The accumulated assets in the funded 
programs equal 20 percent of GDP, exceeding the level in Germany, 
Italy, and Sweden in the early twenty-first century (Odundo 2004).
Financing
All private sector employers with at least five employees must 
register and pay contributions to the NSSF for their employees. These 
employers are responsible for assuring that all their employees are reg-
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istered and that contributions are paid on their behalf. Other employers 
may voluntarily participate. Participation is voluntary for people who 
are self-employed. Data indicate that 10 percent of the population are 
paid employees (Machira 2011). 
Both the employer and the employee contribute 5 percent of earn-
ings, up to 200 shillings a month. Because of a low ceiling on earn-
ings, most people contribute the maximum. However, a bill proposed in 
2012 would raise the contribution of both employer and employee to 6 
percent and convert the fund from a provident fund to a social security 
fund (Daily	Nation 2012).
A major problem with the system has been a low ceiling on earn-
ings, which has resulted in low contributions. In 2008, the low ceiling 
resulted in the maximum contribution equaling 1.3 percent of average 
pay. The ceiling is low because it is not adjusted for inflation and the 
growth of earnings. As of 2008, it had only been adjusted twice since 
1965, in 1997 and 2001 (Raichura 2008). 
Participants making mandatory contributions can increase their sav-
ings by also making voluntary contributions. The NSSF is encouraging 
employers to make contributions electronically, including through mo-
bile phones. The NSSF, however, has had a problem correctly allocat-
ing contributions to the accounts of workers and as of 2008 had a large 
suspense account of unallocated contributions. The NSSF is respon-
sible for collecting contributions, but an alternative approach would be 
collection through the tax collecting agency, the Kenya Revenue Au-
thority (Raichura 2008).
In 2011, the NSSF transferred the management of 65 percent of its 
assets to external fund managers. Previously, the investment of all the 
funds had been managed by the government, where it had been subject 
to pressure to make investments that would benefit high government 
officials (Mchira and Ngigi 2012).
Benefits
As is typical of provident funds, the NSSF provides a single lump 
sum benefit rather than a pension benefit in the form of an annuity. 
Proposals for conversion to a social insurance system have been consid-
ered, but priority has been given to the development of the Retirement 
Benefits Authority, which regulates the activities of all private sector 
retirement benefit plans, and is discussed later in the chapter. 
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Benefits can be claimed at age 55 for persons who have stopped 
working (NSSF 2012). Workers are also eligible for a benefit at age 
50, called the withdrawal benefit, if they have left regular paid employ-
ment. The social security program also provides a disability (invalidity) 
benefit at any age for full disability preventing work, and at age 50 for 
a partial disability. An emigration grant is available for people perma-
nently emigrating from Kenya. 
Benefits are low for several reasons. The low ceiling on contribu-
tions is one cause. The ceiling in 2011 was Ksh4,000 a month, or about 
U.S.$50. The ceiling should be raised and adjusted in line with inflation 
or the growth of earnings in order to assure that benefits are more ade-
quate. In addition, the NSSF has had high administrative expenses rela-
tive to the low level of contributions it collects—they have exceeded 
50 percent of contributions. Associated with this problem, some service 
providers to the NSSF have paid kickbacks to government officials in 
order to be chosen.
A minimum rate of return of 5 percent annually is guaranteed, so 
the fund can at times have an unfunded liability, even though it is a de-
fined contribution plan (EAC 2011). Before 2009, the minimum guar-
anteed rate was 2.5 percent. That low rate provided a disincentive for 
participation in the fund (Raichura 2008). There is little connection be-
tween the crediting rate and the investment rate of return earned, with 
sometimes the crediting rate being higher, but frequently being lower, 
than the investment rate of return.
A pilot program is providing noncontributory benefits for people 
aged 65 and older because most people in that age group do not qualify 
for benefits based on their having made contributions while working.
Reform
One of the problems with implementing reforms relating to the 
NSSF is that it is under the Labour Ministry, while the Retirement Ben-
efits Authority that regulates it is under the Finance Ministry (Odundo 
2004).
As of 2012, legislation proposes converting the NSSF from a provi-
dent fund to an insurance fund. A defined contribution plan would be 
retained for the formal sector, while a defined benefit plan would be 
instituted for the informal sector. Contributions would be raised from 
10 percent to 12 percent of pay, split evenly between the employer and 
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employee. An important change is that there would be no ceiling on pay 
covered by the program, solving a problem with the current system, 
which has a low ceiling on pay. This program would also provide un-
employment benefits, disability benefits, and maternity leave. The new 
program would provide annuity benefits rather than a single lump sum, 
as is provided in the current program.
Tanzania 
Tanzania is composed of two distinct geographical and administra-
tive areas. Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar, which is a nearby archipel-
ago off the coast in the Indian Ocean, have two separate social security 
funds. Under the agreement forming the union between Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar, provision of social security benefits is not a union function 
(Barya 2011). 
Types of plans
Tanzania mainland has a social insurance system for the private 
sector. It has about 460,000 active members (Mutero 2010). In 1997, 
that fund replaced the National Provident Fund, which had been estab-
lished in 1964. The NSSF covers private sector employees, parastatal 
employees, and nonpensionable government employees. The NSSF has 
launched a campaign to encourage private sector workers to participate, 
particularly women and workers in the informal sector.
The NSSF and several other pension funds, including the Parastatal 
Pension Fund, are placed for administrative purposes under the Minis-
try of Labour and Youth Employment (Simbeye 2012). The Parastatal 
Pension Fund is for employees in government controlled enterprises, 
but it has also extended its coverage to private sector employees who 
wish to participate. It has two pension programs and about 100,000 
active members (Mutero 2010). The Traditional Pension Program, a 
defined benefit program, is for employees of government owned en-
terprises. The Deposit Administration Program, a defined contribution 
program, is for other private sector workers (International Labour Or-
ganization 2012).
The NSSF and the Parastatal Pension Fund are the two largest pub-
licly managed pension funds in Tanzania (Assad and Selemani, n.d.). 
Tanzania has six publicly managed mandatory pension funds. The other 
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four are the Public Service Pension Fund, the Government Employees 
Provident Fund, the Local Authorities Pensions Fund, and the Zanzibar 
Social Security Fund (Ngotezi 2010). With the exception of the Gov-
ernment Employees Provident Fund, all the funds are defined benefit 
plans. The Local Authorities Pension Fund was converted from a provi-
dent fund in 2005. It has about 70,000 active members (Mutero 2010).
Except for the Zanzibar Social Security Fund, all funds are under 
the supervision of the Social Security Regulatory Authority, which is 
under the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Labour and Employ-
ment provides general supervision over the NSSF (International Organ-
isation of Pension Supervisors [IOPS] 2011b).
The Government Employees Provident Fund enrolls people who 
work for the government on contracts, who then switch to the Public 
Service Pension Fund if they become permanent employees. Their con-
tributions are transferred from the Government Employees Provident 
Fund to the Public Service Pension Fund when they make that change. 
These programs cover about 5 percent of the labor force (IOPS 2011b). 
Special noncontributory (the participant does not contribute) systems 
have been established for the military and for political leaders (IOPS 
2011b). In order to encourage competition across programs, workers 
can choose to participate in any of the six government-managed pen-
sion programs. 
Financing
In Tanzania, the total (employer plus employee) contribution rate 
for social security is 20 percent, of which the employee cannot contrib-
ute more than 10 percent. This contribution rate is considerably higher 
than for the other countries in the region (Table 11.7). The employee 
and employer contribution rate varies across plans. The provident fund 
that preceded the NSSF had a contribution rate of 20 percent, but it was 
decided that a rate of 10 percent for a funded pension system would be 
adequate. Rather than reduce the contribution rate, Tanzania decided 
to retain the provident fund at a lower contribution rate and then phase 
it out as other social security benefits were introduced (Gillion et al. 
2000). 
For the NSSF, both the employer and employee contribute 10 
percent of earnings, but this contribution also funds medical benefits 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
Social Security and Pensions in East Africa   245
and other nonretirement benefits. Self-employed persons who volun-
tarily join the NSSF contribute 20 percent of their declared earnings. 
This high contribution rate discourages self-employed persons from 
participating. It also discourages the provision of employer-provided 
pensions. Employees in the Parastatal Pension Fund also contribute 
10 percent of their earnings. However, government employees receive 
preferential treatment. Participants to the Public Service Pension Fund 
and the Local Authorities Pension Fund only contribute 5 percent of 
their earnings (IOPS 2011b).The NSSF invests its money in projects 
and investments in Tanzania, primarily in interest-bearing investments, 
such as government and corporate bonds, money market investments, 
and loans (NSSF, Tanzania 2010a).
Benefits
For the NSSF, benefits can be claimed at age 55 with 180 months 
(15 years) of contributions. However, workers can collect their benefits 
before retirement age—they can claim benefits at any age as long as 
the person has not worked for six months. In 2012, the Social Security 
Regulatory Authority (SSRA) proposed ending this provision, called 
withdrawal benefits. Public opposition to ending withdrawal benefits 
forced the SSRA to withdraw its proposal. Compulsory retirement oc-
curs at age 60 (NSSF, Tanzania 2010b). 
Old-age pension benefits from the NSSF are paid in two parts. An 
initial lump sum benefit equals 24 multiplied by the monthly benefit. 
In addition, monthly benefits are paid. Benefits received between ages 
55 and 59 are reduced by 0.5 percent for every year before age 60. This 
reduction is far less than what would be actuarially fair, which would be 
more like 6 percent, providing an incentive to take benefits at earlier ages. 
Thus, the NSSF discourages work in paid employment at older ages.
Table 11.7  Social Security Contribution Rates, 2012 (%)
Country Total Employee Employer
Burundi 10  4  6
Kenya 10  5  5
Rwanda  6  3  3
Tanzania 20 10 10
Uganda  6  3  3
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Zanzibar
The Zanzibar Social Security Fund was established in 1998, which 
was the last social security system established in the region. The Zan-
zibar Social Security Fund covers both public and private sector em-
ployees. As of 2006, it covered about 35,000 workers (EAC 2011). Em-
ployees contribute 5 percent and employers contribute 10 percent of 
earnings. Thus, the contribution rate for the Zanzibar Social Security 
Fund is less than the rate for the Social Security Fund of Tanzania. 
Workers can receive retirement benefits at age 60, which is the manda-
tory retirement age, but workers leaving employment can receive ben-
efits at age 55.
Uganda
Types of plans
Uganda has a provident fund that was established in 1967. It covers 
all private sector employees working for employers with five or more 
employees. Membership is voluntary for employers with less than five 
employees. Workers between the ages of 16 and 55 participate. As of 
2011, the NSSF had about 500,000 registered members and 400,000 
active contributors, and covers about 3.5 percent of the working popu-
lation (Katto 2012). Civil servants are covered under the Public Service 
Pension Program, while members of the military are covered under the 
Uganda Post Defense Forces program.
Financing
For the NSSF, the employer contributes 10 percent of earnings and 
the employee contributes 5 percent, with no ceiling on earnings (Wafuja 
2011). Contribution evasion is widespread, with most eligible employ-
ers and employees not contributing. To deal with this problem, in 2011 
the NSSF offered defaulters a temporary amnesty period, during which 
they could pay contributions they owed without having to pay the 10 
percent interest on late payments (Wafuja 2011).
The NSSF has misused funds it is entrusted for investing. For ex-
ample, it has purchased property from a government minister at an 
inflated price (Barya 2011). In addition, it has fraudulently paid large 
amounts to “ghost” beneficiaries, with the money actually being paid to 
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high government officials. In 2012, the Ugandan government tempo-
rarily suspended payment of benefits while it attempted to resolve the 
issue. In 2012, the NSSF was considering loaning U.S.$400 million, 
or about one-third of its funds, to the government to help pay for the 
construction of roads (Reuters 2012).
Benefits
Benefits from the NSSF can be claimed at age 55 as a lump sum 
payment, whether or not the person has stopped working, or at age 50 
if the person has been out of employment for at least a year. The NSSF 
also provides a disability benefit, a survivors’ benefit, and an emigration 
benefit for persons permanently leaving the country (NSSF, Uganda 
2012).
Each year interest is credited to each worker’s account, based on 
the rate of return received on the national fund. Benefits are based on 
the amount contributed by the worker and the worker’s employer to the 
fund and the interest rate credited to the fund. In 2011, the NSSF cut the 
crediting rate from 7 percent to 6 percent, in part because of a lawsuit 
against the fund for cancellation of a building contract. In that year, the 
inflation rate was 28 percent, so the real value of the future benefits for 
workers declined by more than 20 percent (Ojambo 2011). The NSSF 
has provided a negative rate of real return (subtracting the inflation rate) 
in most years since its founding. 
A pilot program funded by the World Bank is providing non- 
contributory benefits to persons aged 70 and older in some provinces.
Reform
The NSSF is being converted from a provident fund that only pro-
vided lump sum payments to a pension plan that will either be a defined 
benefit plan or a defined contribution plan, with that decision currently 
pending. 
In order to encourage greater competition in the provision of retire-
ment benefits, plans are in the works to allow other programs to com-
pete, allowing workers to opt out of the NSSF and participate in another 
program (Kiwanuka 2012). During a phase-in period, workers will be 
required to make a reduced contribution to the NSSF. It was thought 
that this policy would reduce costs and increase efficiency.
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Rwanda
Types of plans
Rwanda’s social insurance system, founded in 1956, is called the 
Social Security Fund of Rwanda and is a funded defined benefit pro-
gram. The Rwanda Social Security Board was formed by the merger of 
the Rwanda Medical Insurance and the Social Security Fund of Rwanda. 
It covers all public and private sector employees (IOPS 2011a). 
Financing
The employer and the employee both contribute 3 percent. Con-
tributions also provide insurance coverage against occupational inju-
ries. Self-employed persons can be voluntarily covered, and they pay 
6 percent of earnings. In 2011, it had 300,000 active members (EAC 
2011), or about 5 percent of the employed workforce (National Bank 
of Rwanda 2008). 
In Rwanda, self-employed groups can contribute to the social se-
curity fund as a federation. An example is the Rwanda Federation of 
Motorcyclists’ Cooperatives, which promotes the use of motorcycles 
as taxis. Its 10,000 members send contributions to the federation each 
month, 8 percent of which goes toward social security (Kamndaya 
2011).
Benefits
Benefits can be claimed at age 55 if the person has ceased working 
and has at least 15 years of contributions. A bill in 2012 in Parliament 
proposed raising the age to 60 (Karuhanga 2012). For people who have 
worked at least 15 years, the retirement benefit is 30 percent of the aver-
age of the final 3 or 5 years of work, whichever average is higher, plus 
2 percent for every year of work beyond 15 years. Thus, for someone 
who had worked and contributed for 16 years, the benefit would be 32 
percent of the average of the final 3 or 5 years of work (Rwanda Social 
Security Board 2012).
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Burundi
Types of plans
Burundi’s social insurance system was established in 1962 under 
the Minister of Public Functions, Work and Social Security. It covers 
both private and public sector employees.
Financing
The employer contributes 6 percent of earnings and the employee 
contributes 4 percent, for a total of 10 percent, up from 6.5 percent in 
2010. The total contribution rate for military personnel is 14.6 percent, 
up from a rate of 9.5 percent in 2010. The contribution rates were raised 
because an actuarial study indicated that the previous contribution rates 
were not adequate to pay for the benefits promised (EAC 2011). Civil 
servants and judges have a special system. 
Benefits
Benefits can be claimed at age 60. Early benefits are available at 
age 55 for workers “prematurely aged,” and benefits can be claimed 
at age 45 for workers in arduous occupations. Monthly benefits equal 
30 percent of the average of the last 3 or 5 years of monthly earnings, 
whichever is higher, plus 2 percent of average monthly earnings for 
every 12-month period of coverage exceeding 180 months (15 years). 
Benefits in payment are adjusted according to changes in the cost of 
living, depending on the finances of the system (U.S. Social Security 
Administration 2011).
PENSION REGULATORS
This section considers the pension regulators in each of the five 
countries (Table 11.8). The pension regulators cover private sector pen-
sions and may cover some pensions in the public sector. Pension regu-
lators and regulations have been established to protect the interest of 
workers.
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Kenya
The pension regulator in Kenya, the Retirement Benefits Author-
ity (RBA), is under the Ministry of Finance. It is managed by a board 
of five members from the private sector appointed by the Minister of 
Finance, as well as the Commissioner of Insurance, the Chief Executive 
of the Capital Markets Authority, and a representative of the Minister 
of Finance. Thus, a majority of its board members are from the private 
sector, giving it some autonomy from government influence (Odundo 
2004). 
The RBA expenses are paid for in part by a tax on pension as-
sets. The RBA uses a risk-based approach to supervising the pension 
industry, based on the size and risk associated with each pension fund. 
It regulates the NSSF and private sector pension funds but not pension 
funds for civil servants. The NSSF is the only government-managed 
pension fund that it regulates. Before the RBA became operational in 
2000, pensions were regulated solely under trust and income tax laws. 
In 2011, Kenya developed a trustee training program for trustees of 
pension plans. Previously, trustees often had no special background that 
qualified them for that responsibility. 
The Kenyan Auditor General also plays a role in the governance of 




Country Name of regulator Year took effect Oversight ministry
Burundi National Social Protection 
Commission
2013 President of Burundi
Kenya Retirement Benefits  
Authority
2000 Ministry of Finance
Rwanda National Bank of Rwanda — Ministry of Finance
Tanzania Social Security  
Regulatory Authority
2008 Ministry of Finance
Uganda Uganda Retirement  
Benefits Authority
2013 Ministry of Finance
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Tanzania
Tanzania has a pension regulator, established in 2008, the Social 
Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA), under the Ministry of Finance, 
which became operational in 2010. It shares regulatory authority with 
the Bank of Tanzania, which, in cooperation with the Social Security 
Regulatory Authority, is responsibile for investment issues relating to 
pensions. Together they are preparing investment guidelines for the 
pension funds (Simbeye 2012).
Uganda 
Uganda is in the process of establishing a pension regulator, the 
Uganda Retirement Benefits Authority, which is under the Ministry of 
Finance. The law establishing this agency was passed in 2011, with the 
agency expected to become operational in 2013. This agency will regu-
late employer-provided pensions in both the private and public sectors. 
It will require all pension programs to register. 
Rwanda 
Rwanda has a pension regulator, the National Bank of Rwanda, 
which is under the Ministry of Finance. Its Social Security is under the 
Rwanda Social Security Board. The Rwanda Social Security Board has 
a director of pensions. 
Burundi
Burundi in 2012 passed legislation establishing a pension regulator, 
the National Institute of Social Security and Professional Risks. It is not 
yet fully operational. 
PRIVATE SECTOR PENSIONS 
Most private sector workers with pensions in East Africa are cov-
ered under defined contribution plans, and until recently, most govern-
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
252   Turner
ment workers had defined benefit plans (Mushi 2012). The only country 
in the region with a substantial number of pensions provided by private 
sector entities is Kenya (Katto 2012). Most of the pensions in the region 
for private sector workers are government-managed pensions. For this 
reason, most of the assets in pension programs in Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Rwanda are held by government-managed programs (Mutero 
2010). The same holds true for Burundi.
The pensions receive favorable tax treatment according to either 
the EET tax regime, which refers to exempt (tax deductible) contribu-
tions, exempt investment earnings and taxed benefits, or the TTE tax 
regime (Uganda), which refers to taxed contributions, exempt invest-
ment earnings, and exempt benefits (Table 11.9). However, many low-
income workers do not pay any income tax, effectively making the tax 
regime for pensions for them EEE, which stands for contributions being 
exempt from taxation, investment earnings being exempt from taxation, 
and retirement benefits being exempt from taxation.
Funded pensions tend to invest primarily in government securities, 
with all five countries having government debt markets. They also in-
vest in real estate. In the EAC, with the exception of Kenya, oppor-
tunities for investing domestically in stock are limited. Burundi does 
not have a stock exchange. The stock exchange in Rwanda listed two 
stocks at the end of 2010 (Yabara 2012). The Nairobi Stock Exchange 
is the largest in the region. The Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (Tanza-
nia) has 15 listed companies, and the Uganda Stock Exchange has 10 
listed companies. The Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda stock exchanges 
have signed a memorandum of understanding, permitting cross listing 
of stocks. The Uganda National Social Security Fund owns 80 percent 
of the Uganda stock market. Kenya permits a maximum of 15 percent 
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other countries have not permitted investments outside the country, thus 
prohibiting investment in other EAC countries (Mutero 2010), but that 
is changing as part of the move toward a common market. 
Pension funds in Kenya held 26 percent of their assets in stocks in 
the East African Community in 2011, almost all of which was in the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange (RBA 2012a). Reflecting the relative impor-
tance of pension funds in the different countries, pension funds hold 
2 percent of government bonds in Rwanda and 4 percent in Burundi, 
compared to 27 percent in Kenya, 23 percent in Tanzania, and 15 per-
cent in Uganda (Yabara 2012). Pension funds in Kenya are subject to 
regulations as to the maximum percentage of their portfolios that can be 
invested in different asset classes.
Kenya
Kenya has an EET tax regime, but that characterization is a sim-
plification of the actual tax regime. Investment earnings are not taxed 
while accruing. However, a Retirement Benefits Levy is charged on the 
assets of pension funds, varying from 0.2 percent of assets for funds 
up to Ksh500 million (Kenyan shillings) to 0.05 percent of assets for 
funds with more than 5 trillion shillings (RBA 2012b). Tax-exempt con-
tributions are capped at Ksh20,000 a month. Lump sum payments of 
Ksh600,000 are tax free. Further, benefits received at age 65 and older 
are tax free, and benefits received at younger ages are tax free up to a 
limit (IOPS 2009). Tax-exempt benefits after age 65 are designed to 
encourage workers to postpone receipt of benefits. 
Employers may establish defined benefit or defined contribution 
plans. About 90 percent of private sector pension plans are defined 
contribution plans (Raichura 2008). Employers have shifted from de-
fined benefit toward defined contribution programs over the past de-
cade (RBA 2012a). All pension programs and providers are required 
to register with the RBA. The RBA Web site in 2012 listed 1,216 reg-
istered pension programs and 22 individual pension plan providers 
(RBA 2012c). Retirement benefits vest after one year of work (Raichura 
2008). Defined benefit programs are required to have an actuarial valu-
ation every three years.
Anyone who wants to save for retirement can establish an Indi-
vidual Retirement Benefit program (IRB). Prior to 2003, IRBs in Ke-
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nya did not receive any special tax preference. Since then, workers 
can make tax-deductible contributions up to a limit, receive tax-free 
investment earnings, and receive tax-free benefits for 10 years, up to a 
limit per year. Most IRBs are provided through insurance companies. 
In 2005, Kenya established an Insurance Policy Compensation fund to 
protect members of IRBs in the case of the insolvency of insurance 
companies. The fund is financed based on a levy of 0.25 percent of pre-
miums charged both on policyholders and on the insurance companies. 
The motivation for the fund is to reduce the risk and instill confidence 
in Kenyans in saving for retirement this way (RBA 2007). As of 2009, 
Individual Retirement Benefit programs covered less than 1 percent of 
the workforce (IOPS 2009). Membership grew rapidly from 2010 to 
2011, however, increasing from 25,000 to 41,000 (RBA 2012a). 
An estimated 15 percent of Kenya’s labor force is covered under 
some form of retirement benefits program (RBA 2007). To deal with 
low coverage and issues of low financial literacy, the RBA, in conjunc-
tion with the Kenyan Institute of Education, has undertaken a public 
education campaign starting in 2009 concerning the importance of sav-
ing for retirement. It has held roadshow events and had an advertising 
campaign, and it is working on a financial education curriculum for 
schools. The RBA has taken a holistic approach to financial education, 
combining it with education on health and mental health. Initially, the 
program targeted workers aged 50 and older but has expanded to in-
clude younger workers. It is attempting to change Kenya to a savings 
culture rather than a consumption culture.
In addition, the Mbao Jua Kali Pension Plan is an innovative pro-
gram organized by the RBA that targets informal sector workers but is 
open to anyone. It is a voluntary program where workers register by 
paying Ksh100 and can pay a minimum of Ksh20 a day toward their re-
tirement. (Ksh20 equal roughly U.S.$0.25.) It was started in June 2011 
and by 2012 had 37,000 members. Mbao is Swahili slang for 20 shil-
lings, or one Kenyan pound. Jua	kali means hot sun in Swahili and is 
the term used to refer to workers in the informal sector. It refers to the 
working conditions in the informal sector, which is about 80 percent of 
the labor force (Raichura 2008). Participants can pay by M-Pesa, which 
is a mobile phone money transfer system (in Swahili, M stands for mo-
bile and pesa stands for money). 
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The main mobile money service provider, Safaricom, charges the 
individual Ksh2 and the pension plan Ksh3 for money transfers, so in 
essence there is a 2 percent fee to the worker for a transfer of Ksh100 
but a 10 percent fee for a transfer of Ksh20. Payments can also be made 
through an alternative provider, Airtel Money. Previously, without this 
technology, it was not feasible to have a pension program with such low 
contributions because of the high transactions costs, which are fixed 
costs, relative to the transactions. This system is relatively new but ap-
pears to be a promising innovation. Its success in providing meaningful 
benefits will depend in part on participants eventually being able to 
make larger contributions than the minimum required.
Starting in 2009, to encourage participation in pension plans and 
the development of a market for mortgages, the government allowed 
pension program participants to use up to 60 percent of their defined 
contribution pension accounts as security for mortgages. This amount 
can also be used to guarantee a loan for renovating a home. Mortgage 
lending in Kenya generally requires a down payment of 10 percent of 
the purchase price of the house. However, with pension-backed mort-
gages, lenders can lend up to 115 percent of the purchase price, with the 
borrower using the amount above 100 percent to pay for closing costs. 
This program provides an immediate, tangible benefit to workers for 
participating in a pension plan or social security. The house is the first 
form of guarantee of the mortgage. If an individual loses his job and 
defaults on his mortgage, but the value of his house exceeds the amount 
remaining on the mortgage, the house is sold and the individual does 
not lose any of his pension.
While the mortgage program undoubtedly will encourage the 
growth of the mortgage market, and may encourage participation in 
pensions, in part to be used for this purpose, the success of this pro-
gram as an aspect of retirement income policy will depend partially on 
how many people lose their pensions if they have to default on their 
mortgages. That in turn will depend on the qualifying conditions to re-
ceive a mortgage. If mortgages are extended to people who do not fully 
qualify, and thus have a greater risk of default, this may become more 
of a problem in the future, particularly if housing prices fall. A similar 
program in South Africa has had difficulty assuring that the loans were 
not diverted for other purposes (Mutero 2010).
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Kenya has relaxed the preservation of benefits rule so that partici-
pants can withdraw up to 50 percent of the employer contributions to 
their defined contribution pension plans, and up to 100 percent of their 
own contributions, at any age before retirement. In addition, they can 
withdraw up to 50 percent of the accrued value in a defined benefit plan 
(RBA 2011). 
Tanzania
Tanzania has an EET tax regime. The high contribution rate of 
20 percent to the mandatory social security fund may be a factor dis-
couraging the development of employer-provided pensions in the pri-
vate sector. A study in 2012 indicates that there are a small number of 
employer-provided pensions in the private sector, perhaps about a 
dozen, primarily for multinational companies (Kiwanuka 2012).
To encourage greater efficiency in fund management, government-
managed pension funds are competing with the National Social Secu-
rity Fund as substitute programs for workers. The Government Em-
ployees Provident Fund is seeking to enroll self-employed workers in 
the private sector in its Voluntary Savings Retirement Program. As of 
2011, it had enrolled about 3,000 persons. The Parastatal Pension Fund 
has also extended its coverage to encourage voluntary enrollment by 
private sector employees and the self-employed, as well as workers in 
the informal labor sector (Kamndaya 2011). The Local Authorities Pen-
sion Fund is for employees of local governments, but is also seeking 
self-employed members to voluntarily join.
Uganda
Uganda has a TTE tax regime, where both contributions and invest-
ment earnings are taxed, but benefits are not taxed. The tax exemption 
of pension benefits is written into the Ugandan Constitution, making 
it particularly difficult to change. Investment earnings are only taxed 
on investments in fixed income securities, such as government bonds. 
Investment income from other assets, such as real estate and stock, is 
not taxed. Anyone earning less than about U.S.$90 a month is exempt 
from tax. The elderly do not pay any tax because of an age exemption.
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As of 2011, the NSSF was the main provider of retirement benefits 
in the private sector (International Social Security Association 2011), 
but Uganda has some private sector pensions. These are primarily de-
fined contribution plans, but they can be defined benefit plans. One es-
timate puts the number of programs at more than 50 (Mutero 2010). 
These programs have mandatory vesting of benefits after one year of 
participation (Kiwanuka 2012). 
Rwanda
Rwanda has an EET tax regime. Employer and employee contribu-
tions and investment earnings are taxed at 30 percent, while benefits are 
tax free (IOPS 2011a). Pensions are generally managed by insurance 
companies. There are an estimated 40 private sector pension programs 
(Mutero 2010).
Individuals can voluntarily establish personal pension funds, which 
are generally managed by insurance companies. For personal pensions, 
contributions are tax free. Investment earnings are taxed, and benefits 
are tax free (IOPS 2011a). 
Burundi
Burundi has an EET tax regime and a few private sector defined 
contribution plans. As of 2012, it is considering a law to regulate em-
ployer-provided pensions.
PUBLIC SERVICE PENSIONS
As of 2012, the pensions for government employees in the EAC 
are defined benefit plans (Table 11.10). These plans generally predate 
the NSSF. Some of them provide benefits that are overly generous by 
international standards and that contain other generous features, such as 
commutation to lump sums on favorable terms. Particularly consider-
ing that government sector work is generally not physically arduous, 
the plans tend to provide early retirement benefits at young ages (Table 
11.11). Another generous feature is that they generally are calculated 
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on the single year of highest pay. Calculation using such a short period 
creates the possibility of a person receiving a pay increase in the final 
year for the purpose of raising his pension. Further, even more generous 
pensions are sometimes received by members of parliament, judges, 
and other high officials, sometimes after only limited periods of service. 
The EAC, however, does not provide a pension for EAC secretariat em-
ployees, but instead provides a lump sum payment when they end their 
service, based on their salary and years of service.
Kenya
Public sector employees as of 2012 were covered by the Public 
Service Pension Program, which is an unfunded defined benefit plan 
administered by the Pensions Department in the Ministry of Finance. 
In 2013, all defined benefit plans for which the Kenyan govern-
ment has a liability, a total of 40 programs, will be converted to defined 
contribution plans to reduce the risk to the government. Worker contri-
butions will be required. Workers aged 45 and older will remain in the 
old defined benefit programs. People younger than age 45 will be com-
pletely transferred to the new defined contribution program, with a con-
tribution made to that program by the government to compensate them 
for the benefits already accrued under the old program. The government 
will manage the investments of the defined contribution program. Indi-
vidual choice of investments will not be an option. According to the bill 
being considered at the end of 2012, the government would contribute 
15.5 percent of salary for civil servants, and employees would contrib-
ute 7.5 percent (Republic of Kenya 2012).
Starting in 2009, the normal retirement age for the Public Service 
Pension Program was raised from age 55 to 60, but early retirement 
Table 11.10  Pensions for Government Sector Employees, 2012
Country Type
Burundi Contributory defined benefit
Kenya Defined benefit, converting to defined contribution
Rwanda Contributory defined benefit
Tanzania Contributory funded defined benefit, multiple plans
Uganda Unfunded noncontributory defined benefit
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is still available at age 50 for workers with 10 years of service (Were 
2009). Women can retire on grounds of marriage at any age with 5 years 
of work. As of 2008, the program had about 406,000 active members. A 
separate program applies for the armed forces.
The Public Service Pension Program provides generous benefits, 
which are based on 2.5 percent multiplied by years of service multiplied 
by final base pay. Up to 25 percent of the benefit can be taken as a lump 
sum, which is calculated at a very generous rate (20:1). One aspect of 
the benefit calculation that is not generous is that there are not regu-
lar enhancements for benefits in payment to take into account inflation 
(Raichura 2008). By comparison, the U.S. Civil Service Retirement 
System benefit is calculated as 1.5 percent for the first 5 years, plus 1.75 
percent for the second 5 years, plus 2 percent for years beyond 10 years, 
multiplied by the high 3 years of average pay (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management 2012). The pension benefits are paid through banking ac-
counts, though for a number of retirees without banking accounts they 
are paid through the Post Office Savings Bank (Raichura 2008). 
LAPTRUST is a funded contributory defined benefit plan for em-
ployees of local government that was started in 1929. It had 25,800 
active members in 2011. Employees contribute 12 percent of pay while 
employers contribute 15 percent. Perhaps in part because of the high 
contribution rates, many of the 175 local government agencies are in 
arrears on their payments. LAPTRUST has registered a defined contri-
bution program in line with the requirement that all defined benefit pro-
grams that are a liability to the national government convert to defined 
contribution programs, so as to reduce the risk to the national govern-
ment finances (Kiwanuka 2012). The defined benefit program closed to 
new members starting August 2012.





Uganda 45 with 10 years’ service, less than 45 with 20 years
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Tanzania
The Public Service Pensions Fund, under the Ministry of Finance, 
covers central government employees, who contribute 5 percent of their 
salary. It has about 250,000 members (Mutero 2010). Starting in 1999, 
the unfunded defined benefit program was converted to a funded pro-
gram. The program was created in 1954, predating the National Provi-
dent Fund, which was started in 1964. Benefits can be claimed at age 
55, with mandatory retirement at age 60 (Public Service Pensions Fund 
2012). 
As with other government pensions in the region, the Public Ser-
vice Pensions Fund provides generous benefits. The basic benefit is cal-
culated as total months worked multiplied by final annual salary multi-
plied by 1/(540) (Public Service Pensions Fund 2012). The final factor 
is equivalent to 2.2 percent multiplied by years of service. The Political 
Service Retirement Benefits Act of 1999 established a special pension 
fund for members of parliament and other elected officials, who receive 
preferential pensions (Barya 2011). 
Local government employees are covered under the Local Authori-
ties Pensions Fund. In addition to providing generous benefits, those 
benefits are tax exempt (Public Service Retirement Benefits Act 1999).
Certain high government officials receive even more generous 
pensions. Judges, the Director General of Intelligence, the Inspector 
General of Police, and other high officials receive pensions that are 80 
percent of final pay, and these can be received after short periods of 
service. In addition, these officials are given a car and sufficient money 
to pay for a driver for four years, all of which are tax free. These gener-
ous pensions create a major conflict of interest for high public officials 
when it comes to the reform of civil service pensions.
The Chief Justice receives an even more favorable pension, that 
being equal to 80 percent of the salary not of himself but of the cur-
rent incumbent holding that office, plus a lump sum payment equal to 
50 percent of the salary he received while holding that office (Public 
Service Retirement Benefits Act 1999). By comparison, Supreme Court 
Justices in the United States receive 100 percent of their final salary, 
provided they have served at least 10 years and that the sum of their 
age and years of Supreme Court service is at least 80 (Longley 2012).
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In Zanzibar, public service employees are covered under a separate 
system, which began in 1990, predating the country’s social security 
program (Zanzibar Social Security Fund 2009).
Uganda
Preferential pensions are provided to government employees. 
Employees of the police, army, prisons, civil service, or government 
teaching service are exempt from contributing to the NSSF because 
they have their own pension systems. Members of parliament and their 
staffs are covered under the Parliamentary Pensions Act of 2007 (Barya 
2011). Judges have particularly favorable pensions and are eligible for 
a pension after one year of service (Barya 2011).
The pensions for government employees are unfunded defined 
benefit plans. The Public Service Pension Program, managed by the 
Ministry of Public Service, covers most civil servants. As of 2012, it 
has about 269,000 participants. The Armed Forces pension has about 
45,000 participants (Katto 2012). It was established in 1939, predating 
the Public Service Pension Program, which was established in 1946. An 
earlier program was established in 1939 for public service employees, 
but it excluded African employees and only covered colonial Europeans 
(Inter Ministerial Task Force 2012). 
Covered workers do not contribute to the Public Service Pension 
Program, with the funds coming from general government revenue. A 
reform proposal in 2012 would make the program contributory. The 
minimum qualifying age for benefits is 45 with continuous service of 
10 years, with compulsory retirement at age 60 (Barya 2011). Workers 
with 20 years of contributions can retire at any age. There are no penal-
ties for early retirement. Female employees are eligible for a special 
pension if they retire because of marriage (Pensions Act 1946).
As well as having generous provisions for early retirement, the 
Public Service Pension Program has a generous benefit formula, calcu-
lated as 2.4 percent of final gross pay multiplied by the number of years 
of service, with the maximum capped at 87 percent of gross pay (after 
36.25 years of work). They vest after 10 years of work. The pensions 
are indexed to wages, which is generally more generous than price in-
dexation (Nyakundi 2009). Pensions are paid either in Uganda shillings 
or U.S. dollars and are paid for a maximum of 15 years.
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Pensions are not being paid to some retirees, however, because of 
a lack of sufficient funds to provide such generous benefits, creating a 
problem of arrears. The Pensions Act has a provision that public ser-
vants cannot contest in courts (Pensions Act 1946). According to Kiwa-
nuka (2012), the unfunded liability for this program is an astounding 63 
percent of GDP.
The generosity of this system can be compared to that of the Civil 
Service Retirement System for federal government workers in the 
United States. In that system, maximum benefits of 80 percent of the 
average of the highest three years of earnings are received after 42 years 
of work, with these benefits being indexed to prices once in payment. 
The Civil Service Retirement System was closed to new entrants in 
1980, and a less generous pension system has since replaced it. The 
pensions for civil servants in Uganda are thus substantially more gener-
ous than for civil servants in the United States.
The Public Service Pension Program and other plans for civil ser-
vants and other government employees are run by the Ministry of Pub-
lic Service. The Public Service Pension Program covers about 2.8 per-
cent of the workforce, which is larger than the 2.3 percent covered by 
the private sector program, the National Social Security Fund (Barya 
2011). In addition, the military is covered under the Armed Forces Pen-
sion Program. Until 1994, local government employees had their own 
program, which was a provident fund, but since then they are covered 
under the Public Service Pension Program (Nyakundi 2009). Because 
many local governments do not have much money, the central govern-
ment pays for their pension expenses.
Rwanda
The National Social Security Fund in Rwanda covers all private sec-
tor employees and all public sector employees, including the military. 
Burundi
Civil servants and judges in Burundi are not covered by the Na-
tional Social Security Fund, but are instead covered by special pro-
grams. Pensions for civil servants are noncontributory, but as of 2012 
they are being restructured to require employee contributions.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has surveyed the social security and pension systems 
in the five countries of the East African Community. It has described 
pensions for both private and public sector workers. As well as describ-
ing the basic features of the systems, it has focused on areas of innova-
tion and also on areas in need of reform. Extending coverage to workers 
in the informal sector is a major challenge in all of these countries. 
Kenya and Rwanda have innovative programs to extend coverage to 
workers in the informal sector by facilitating the regular collection of 
contributions of small amounts. Regulating pensions to help protect the 
interests of participants is another issue, and now all of the countries 
have in place pension regulators. Some of the countries have pensions 
for government employees that are overly generous by international 
standards. 
Some of the countries discourage the provision of private sector 
pensions by high mandatory contribution rates for social security, but 
Kenya has low mandatory contribution rates and has successfully de-
veloped a pension sector with more than 1,000 pension plans. 
Notes
I have received valuable comments from David Rajnes.
1. The EAC countries are also members of the East African Trade Union Confedera-
tion (EATUC), which is an organization of labor unions, with Burundi having ob-
server status, and the East African Development Bank. In addition, the government 
officials involved in the retirement systems of these countries work with, and are 
influenced to some extent by, other international organizations, such as the World 
Bank, the International Labour Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the 
International Organisation of Pension Supervisors, the African Development Bank, 
and by private sector nongovernment organizations such as the Gates Foundation 
and the Financial Services Volunteer Corps.
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Defined contribution pension plans are widespread among the 
Americas. Pension actuaries use the pension replacement rate as a 
benchmark to measure how much a worker’s preretirement income is 
replaced by its pension. Although this measure is intended to make the 
system efficient, the postretirement challenge for workers is to be able 
to purchase at least the basic market basket. Income projections used in 
pension replacement benchmark rates do not capture this because work-
ers’ incomes are not efficiently linked to macroeconomic variables in 
Latin America. This chapter proposes the use of macroeconomic vari-
ables such as the Consumer Price Index and the basic market basket 
to develop a benchmark indicator of basic income replacement as an 
alternative to the replacement rate. This indicator is calculated along 
with the replacement rate by country and compared to illustrate the ef-
ficiency level of their current defined contribution plans.
REPLACEMENT RATES
A pension is intended to replace a worker’s income after his working 
lifetime. Because of this replacement objective, the pension serves the 
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same purpose as the worker’s preretirement salary, that is, to purchase 
goods like the basic market basket, health care, housing, entertainment, 
and other needs or goods. Upon retirement, the pension amount is often 
the only source of income for retirees; this is the main reason why the 
pension amount is compared with the salary, defined as the Traditional 






where ƒt is the amount in the fund at the end of the accumulation period, 
(t) is the worker’s individual account under the defined contribution 
plan, ӓ is the annuity factor used to convert a lump sum to an annu-
ity, and St is the projected salary for the accumulation period (t). The 
traditional replacement rate is affected by the contribution rate to the 
pension plan, the fees charged, the rate of return received, and the start-
ing salary.
In the Americas—North, Central, and South—the race between in-
flation and salary is often lost by the salary, that is, salaries are often 
adjusted by employers at a rate below the inflation increase. Therefore, 
the salary is not an item that is necessarily linked to macroeconomic 
variables. For this reason, the authors believe the current replacement 
rate approach underestimates the future effectiveness of pension in-
come due to price increases in the set of goods. 
Three aspects are affected when salary and macroeconomic vari-
ables are unlinked:
1) country-wise comparison between different geographies, econ-
omies, and currencies, 
2) determination of money purchase levels for goods upon in and 
out of work lifetime periods, and
3) notion of pension plan efficiency and retiree satisfaction levels.
The authors identified the basic market basket variable as a candi-
date to benchmark a defined contribution plan, particularly because this 
is a standard measurement performed by most if not all of the central 
banks in the Americas. The minimum satisfaction level or replacement 
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rate under this measure is when the pension amount is sufficient to pur-
chase the basic market basket. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the implementation and growth of defined contribution plans, 
many authors have tried to model and project the final amount in the 
individual accounts at retirement. Vigna and Haberman (2001) analyze 
the financial risk in defined contribution plans using dynamic program-
ming through a model that incorporates a regime of fixed and variable 
income. The main conclusion of this research is the sensitivity of the 
projected amounts in the fund to the returns during the accumulation 
period. 
Gómez-Hernández, Vidal, and Enrique (2009) compare the com-
petitiveness of the defined contribution plans in Mexico, Chile, and 
Argentina. They conclude that in Argentina and Chile, the pension ob-
tained is greater than in Mexico mainly because of high commissions 
in Mexico. Ramírez de Jurado Frías (2010) proposed a revised model 
for Vigna and Haberman (2001) and implemented it to analyze the 
Mexican regulatory framework, showing various curves for projected 
accumulated amounts of the individual accounts at retirement.
In the latest G20 report for pensions (OECD 2011), the OECD uses 
two benchmarks to measure pension entitlements: the replacement rate 
and pension wealth. It also provides comparisons of replacement rates 
between various OECD members and G20 countries.
METHODOLOGY
We calculated the working life contributions and investment returns 
until age 65 for a worker with $0 initial account balance and entry age 
of 25. The accumulative model uses the current regulatory framework 
in various countries of the Americas with defined contribution plans. 
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We selected a group of nine countries with defined contribution 
pension plans in the Americas. The selected countries may provide a 
fair representation of the current situation from the perspective of the 
benchmark indicator of basic income replacement. The nine countries 
are Canada, the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Co-
lombia, Brazil, and Chile; thus, North, Central, and South America 
are each represented by three countries. For details about the selected 
countries—population size, mortality, and annuity factors—refer to Ap-
pendix 12A.
The basic market baskets were then projected to retirement age (65) 
by country using the consumer price index. The projected income or 
final projected salary at age 65 is compared to the projected basic mar-
ket basket at age 65 for an arbitrary and fixed annual salary increase 
assumption of 2 percent real per annum. The Basic Satisfaction Level 
(BASAL) is then calculated as the ratio of the accumulated fund at re-
tirement, converted into an annual benefit by the annuity factor and 
divided by the basic market basket at age of retirement. (In medicine, 
basal commonly refers to the minimal level that is necessary for health 
or life.) These BASAL values are then used to compare by country the 
efficiency of the defined contribution systems.
MODEL





where tf  is the accumulated fund for accumulation period (t) of the 
worker’s individual account under the defined contribution plan and Pt is the projected basic market basket for the accumulation period (t). 
The accumulation period t is the difference between the entry age (x) 
and retirement age (y). 
The accumulated fund at retirement age (t) of the worker tf  is also 
defined as
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where fi is the accumulated fund value under the defined contribution 
plan during year i or period [i,i + 1], the factor c is the contribution per-
centage over the pre-retirement salary Si at year i, β is the commission 
charged on the value of the contributions (known also as commission 
on entry fee and death and disability insurance fee), the factor s is the 
real salary increase, yi is the percentage allocated to fix return instru-ments during the period [i,i + 1] and (1 − yi) the percentage allocated 
to variable return instruments during the same period [i,i + 1], µi is the 
force of interest for fix return instruments and λi the force of interest for 
variable return instruments and δi are the commissions on rates of return (or assets under management) charged.
The projected basic market basket cost at retirement age (t) of the 
worker PBt is given by
PBi + 1 = Bi(1 + j) y	−	x,
where PBi is the projected basic market basket value during year i or 
period [i,i + 1], Bi is the annualized basic market basket value at the 
year i, and is an average of the rates at which the historical values of Bi 
increased (or decreased).
DATA DESCRIPTION
Information was collected from original and secondary sources. 
Below is a brief description of the data. In order to model the accu-
mulation of contributions and returns, the authors relied on data from 
the International Association of Supervisors of Pension Funds (AIOS). 
Data were collected on rates of return, contributions, commissions, in-
vestment portfolios, and salaries. Other data for countries not included 
in the AIOS report was collected from the original country source. The 
mortality factors used to calculate the annuities came from the docu-
mentation issued by the regulators or the country legislation relative to 
their pension plans. Basic market basket or basket of goods costs came 
from the central banks or minister of statistics from the respective coun-
tries. Other inputs, parameters, or assumptions used in this chapter have 
been set by the authors and are documented in Appendix 12B. 
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RESULTS
Figure 12.1 shows the benchmark comparison for BASAL and TRR 
rates. These are compared side by side to illustrate their differences, al-
though these values are not entirely comparable as they use a different 
basis in their calculations; that is, BASAL uses the basic market basket 
and TRR uses projected salaries. The x-axis shows the country names 
segmented by regions in the Americas, whereas the y-axis shows the 
ratio between the final accumulated fund amount value converted into 
an annualized pension and the basis or item (basic market basket or 
salary).  
a The Costa Rica pension system relies on pension fund managers added to a public 
system. In this chapter only the pension fund manager system was taken into account 
to obtain the results.
b The Uruguay pension system relies on a private system administrated by the Uruguay 
Central Bank plus a public pension system. In this article only the UCB fund was 



































Traditional Replacement Rate - Salary
Figure 12.1  Benchmark Comparison for BASAL and Replacement Rate
a
b
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ANALYSIS
Comparing the BASAL levels in Figure 12.1, we conclude that 
Costa Rica holds the lowest BASAL from all the countries with 0.07, 
followed by Brazil with 0.10 and Uruguay with 0.40. The low BASAL 
in Costa Rica and Brazil indicates that workers in these countries will 
not have enough resources at retirement to buy 1.0 basic market basket 
if they rely solely on the basic pension system. In other words, an aver-
age worker in Costa Rica and Brazil can expect to buy 0.07 and 0.10 
basic market baskets, respectively, at retirement with his or her pension. 
The reason for this is because Costa Rica charges two kinds of fees: 
an entry fee and a high percentage of charge on returns. This reduces 
considerably the amount accumulated at retirement by the worker. An-
other key factor is that in Costa Rica only 3.85 percent of salary is 
contributed to the pension fund. Additionally, the high 10-year average 
basic market basket inflation for Costa Rica and Brazil (11.8 and 17.1, 
respectively) reduces the purchasing power over the accumulation pe-
riod; salary growth is assumed to be 2.00 percent real annually. 
On the other side we have Chile, which holds the highest BASAL 
followed by United States. The reason for this high level of BASAL is 
because Chile only charges one kind of fee (an entry fee with no charge 
on returns), reducing considerably the total amount charged at the end 
of the cumulative period. Another difference with respect to Costa Rica 
(the lowest BASAL) is that the contribution percentage of the salary is 
higher in Chile: 10.0 percent.
In North America there are small differences in the values obtained 
for the BASAL: Mexico, 1.69; United States, 1.86; and Canada, 1.60. 
This suggests that upon retirement age the workers from this region will 
be able to buy more than 1.50 basic market baskets with their monthly 
pensions. The annual salary increase rates in these countries are similar 
to the increase rates seen in the 10-year average basic market basket 
inflation, so these results were expected.
The results are consistent with Gómez-Hernández and Stewart 
(2008), who find that El Salvador has the lowest 40-year weighted 
charge (fee) ratio of the 21 countries analyzed, and Costa Rica one of 
the highest. The results for the TRR benchmark suggest Colombia has 
the highest TRR at 3.31 and Canada the lowest with 0.26. This low 
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value of TRR would appear to be a problem for the Canadian work-
ers. However, the Canada Pension Plan is designed to provide a 0.25 
TRR upon workers retirement, and Canadian workers rely on other 
complementary pensions to increase their retirement incomes, as well 
as receiving benefits from the old-age security program, which is a so-
cial security benefits program that is financed out of general revenues. 
For Colombians, the 3.31 TRR value, which is the result of a relatively 
high contribution rate and the highest rates of return of any country con-
sidered, seems appealing, but this value cannot tell Colombian workers 
how much purchasing power they will have with a monthly pension 
3.31 higher than their latest preretirement salary. In fact, Canada has 
higher purchasing power with a BASAL of 1.60 versus 1.17 for Colom-
bia (Table 12.1).
Comparing the results between BASAL and the TRR benchmarks, 
the difference in values is evident. Colombia has the highest value of 
TRR 3.31 but a BASAL of 1.17. Chile has the highest value of BASAL 
3.08 and TRR of 2.18. In Colombia, the TRR value is misleading, as 
it would suggest that retirees have done a good job saving for retire-
ment; they are receiving 3.31 times their salary when converting their 
individual retirement savings into a monthly pension, while in reality 
Colombian workers would be able to buy only 1.17 basic market bas-
kets. For Chile, the BASAL and TRR do not appear to be critically 
different, still TRR cannot reflect the final salary purchasing power at 
retirement.
CONCLUSION
For future research, it would be relevant to consider the use of a 
benchmark like BASAL to tie the future workers’ incomes upon re-
tirement with macroeconomic variables. A standardized methodology 
tied to the macroeconomic environment would help the contributory 
systems to benchmark, identify, quantify, and address potential issues 
concerning purchasing power at retirement age.
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Appendix 12A
The Americas are composed of 35 sovereign states. We make an arbitrary 
region segmentation into North, Central, and South America and select an ar-
bitrary assortment of nine countries that provide defined benefit contribution 
pension schemes to the working class. 
With the selected countries, we intend to show, compare, and determine 
the defined contribution systems efficiency when it comes to replacing income 
upon workers retirement. Although arbitrary, the selected countries provide 
a reasonable representation of the benchmark indicator of basic income 
replacement. 







people aged 65 




Canada 33 14.80 ICA2020 14.11
Mexico 110 6.20 EMSS 97 11.87
United States 312 13.30 2008 PY IRC 430 Static 13.70
Central
Costa Rica 3 5.60 SP-2005 13.08
El Salvador 7 5.20 SP-2005 13.08
Colombia 47 6.70 Ren ISS 80-89 11.87
South
Brazil 190 6.50 AT 83 13.92
Chile 17 9.40 MI-2006 11.95
Uruguay 3 13.50 MI-2006 11.95
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from data collected from various sources.
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Appendix 12B










bia Brazil Chile Uruguay
2001 4,418 1,183 6,612 n/a 881 1,759 n/a 3,321 3,025
2002 4,517 1,244 6,716 n/a 866 1,867 n/a 3,403 3,159
2003 4,644 1,291 6,870 n/a 866 1,965 n/a 3,499 4,008
2004 4,730 1,362 7,052 411 877 2,055 1,232 3,536 4,441
2005 4,834 1,415 7,291 474 912 2,137 687 3,644 4,683
2006 4,929 1,465 7,527 545 936 2,220 1,259 3,768 4,969
2007 5,037 1,510 7,741 608 996 2,329 1,582 3,934 5,324
2008 5,154 1,555 8,038 740 1,085 2,482 1,004 4,276 5,726
2009 5,168 1,602 8,010 909 1,195 2,653 1,578 4,340 6,276
2010 5,263 1,645 8,141 894 1,103 2,845 2,512 4,406 6,725
2011 5,416 1,727 8,398 967 1,227 3,062 4,048 4,476 7,213
2012 5,580 1,752 8,544 985 1,214 3,308 6,609 4,550 7,881
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from data collected from various sources. The au-
thors collected historical Consumer Price Index (CPI) data and determined the aver-
age increase rate over a 10-year period. Additionally collected average basic market 
basket household costs per country and applied CPI to roll back/forward the basic 
market basket. Certain underlying assumptions were made to have data consistency, 
for example Chilean ministry of social development only provides basic market bas-
ket per individual, so original cost was multiplied by five to reflect the household 
annual basket. 
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Table 12B.2  Average Monthly Salary ($, U.S.)
Year
Region/country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
North
Canada 2,560      2,633      2,745      2,822      2,940      3,031      3,110      3,215      
United States 2,299      2,295      2,330      2,375      2,349      2,275      2,247      2,207      
Mexico 451      483      545      543      578      492      548      607      
Central
Costa Rica 438      448      459      479      556      567      441      461      
El Salvador 313      298      452      459      474      518      522      560      
Colombia 245      300      334      364      458      480      486      538      
South
Brazil 665      656      666      693      715      739      762      791      
Chile 539      614      681      685      794      685      877      1,012      
Uruguay 348      379      471      511      634      632      912      987      
SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin. Data for Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and the United States come from various sources.  
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Table 12B.3  Pension Funds Composition, December 2010 (%)
Region/country Fix rate Variable rate
North
Canada 33.2 66.8
United States 38.0 62.0
Mexico 58.9 41.1
Central
Costa Rica 62.4 37.6






SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin. Data for Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and the United States 
come from various sources.  
Table 12B.4 Pension Fund Annual Returns (%)













SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin. Data for Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Canada, Brazil, 
and the United States come from various sources. Percentages shown for Colombia, 
Mexico, and Chile are the weighted average of the target or risk portfolio returns for 
each of those countries.  
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t





írez de Jurad Frías







insurances Net fees Contribution
Fee over 
contributions Total
(1)   (2)   (3) = (1) − (2) (4)   (5) = [3(4) + (3)] (6) = (1)/(4) + (1)
North
Canada — — 1.32 4.95 —  —
United States — — 0.78 8.20  — —
Mexico — — 1.81 8.50 — —
Central
Costa Ricaa — — 0.40 3.85 0.09 —
El Salvador 2.70 1.20 1.50 10.30 0.13 0.21
Colombiab 3.00 1.41 1.59 11.50 0.12 0.21
South
Brazil — — 2.00 8.00 — —
Chile 3.37 1.87 1.50 10.00 0.13 0.25
Uruguayc 2.62 1.01 1.62 14.94 0.11 0.16
NOTE: — = not applicable or not necessary input for purpose of BASAL or traditional replacement rate calculation.  
a Fee per transaction. Death and disability coverage is provided by public plan but its cost is included in the aging contribution period.  
b Additional fees apply for rollover and voluntary contributions. 
c Additionally, a custodial fee applied to balance. The average rate as of December 2007 was 0.0002%. 
SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin with original footnotes translated into English. Data for Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Canada, Brazil, and the 
United States come from different sources. 
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This chapter analyzes the formal institutions of corporate gover-
nance for pension plans. It applies this analysis to open pension funds, 
which are mandatory individual account plans, operating in Poland. 
Each pension fund has a specific institutional arrangement, which de-
termines to a large extent its effectiveness. Such an arrangement sets 
the pension fund under the influence of many stakeholders. The pri-
mary objective of regulations in the governance area of pension funds 
becomes a minimization of potential agency problems—conflicts of 
interest that may arise between the pension participants and those re-
sponsible for the fund’s management.
PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM
In agency theory, agency relationships are understood as contracts 
under which a principal engages a third party (agent) to perform cer-
tain actions on their behalf in dealing with a second party, which is the 
provider of the service. The essence of agency theory can be reduced to 
two basic assumptions. First, expectations and objectives of principal 
and agent are various and remain in conflict (difference of interests, 
different objective function). Second, it is very difficult and expensive 
for the principal to check the agent’s work. In agency theory the basic 
concept is the agency relationships (Szczepański 2010). 
In pension arrangements, the plan participant is the principal, the 
plan sponsor is the agent, and the financial institution managing the 
pension funds is the second party. This implies the need for the princi-
pal to delegate certain powers to the agent to make certain decisions. 
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Then an agency relationship arises, which can be a public contract 
(formal, explicit) or an implicit contract (informal). The purpose of the 
contract is to ensure such actions of the agent so that he/she strives to 
maximize the principal’s benefits. However, between the agent and the 
principal there is an asymmetry of information. This can lead to the 
agency problem, which usually occurs in two situations: hidden action 
of the agent, and hidden information or hidden knowledge possessed by 
the agent (Mesjasz 2002). In the first situation, the agent takes action, 
the course or outcome of which cannot be observed by the principal, 
resulting in the risk of moral hazard (the inclination of someone who is 
imperfectly checked to take part in behavior which may be dishonest or 
undesirable). In the second situation, the agent has information about 
environment variables, which the principal does not have before or after 
the conclusion of the contract. Ex ante asymmetry can lead to adverse 
selection, with the party having the superior information benefiting at 
the expense of the party with inferior information (Mesjasz 2002). 
Agency problems can be prevented by concluding a complete con-
tract, which will take into account all possible aspects and options of 
future situations. However, drawing up a complete contract is not feasi-
ble. Thus, we are dealing with incomplete contracts between principals 
and agents (Mesjasz 2002).
Agency problems can be limited in three ways:
1) reduction of information asymmetry,
2) seek harmonization between the principal’s and the agent’s ob-
jectives, and
3) building trust.
There are two options for reducing information asymmetry: 
screening (the principal keeps track of the agent in the corporation) 
and signaling (the agent gives specific signals to the principal, such 
as reports). Second, the interests of the principal and the agent can be 
harmonized by introducing incentive schemes (such as managerial op-
tions). Third, the agency problem can be reduced by agents building 
reputational capital that they want to maintain (Brink 2007).
Shaping the behavior of the agent in such a direction that his or her 
actions diverge from the principal interest as little as possible requires 
incurring certain costs, including drawing up contracts, monitoring and 
controlling the conduct of the agent by the principal, ensuring the inter-
ests of the principal, and residual loss (Aluchna 2002).
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AGENCY PROBLEMS IN PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS AND 
WAYS TO LIMIT IT
Three levels of retirement provision can be distinguished under 
pension plans. The first two are mandatory and consist of redistributive 
and saving parts. The third, however, is voluntary: individual or occu-
pational. The first level, redistributive, includes programs to ensure the 
minimum subsistence level for pensioners. The second level, savings, 
is designed to provide pensioners with a target retirement standard of 
living comparable to that when they were economically active. Within 
these levels, the programs are further classified by source (public, pri-
vate), or the way to determine the pension benefits (Samborski 2011).
The following discussion addresses the second level—more pre-
cisely, private pension plans and funds—and the third level of pension 
provision. (The discussion does not apply to pension plans financed 
using book reserves, as in Germany.)
Assuming that the pension fund, like any organization, is a nexus of 
contracts, one can identify different expectations of pension funds stake-
holders, but also areas of potential conflicts (Hess and Impavido 2004). 
Pension fund governance is, therefore, a mirror image of corporate gov-
ernance in joint stock companies, which consists of a set of relations 
between the company’s management, supervisory board, shareholders, 
and other stakeholders (OECD 2002). Pension fund governance, as well 
as corporate governance, deals with the posting of property rights by 
the principal to the agent, and consequently relies on the professional 
skills and management effectiveness of the agent (World Bank 2007). 
Private pension plans operate on the basis of the agency relationship 
between the plan members and beneficiaries, and the persons or entities 
involved in administering or funding it (such as a plan administrator or 
a plan sponsor). Governance under such plans includes all of the rela-
tionships between the entities and persons involved in the operation of 
a retirement plan, and it provides the structure through which the objec-
tives of the retirement plan are established and the means to meet those 
objectives (OECD 2002).
Pension fund governance deals with issues of pension fund control 
and seeks to answer two basic questions: 1) in whose interests should 
checks on pension funds be carried out, and 2) who should monitor 
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and control the pension funds on behalf of their members? The basic 
principles of corporate governance are applicable here: transparency, 
accountability, fairness, and responsibility (World Bank 2007). 
Nonetheless, pension fund governance is much more complex than 
corporate governance because of the larger number of parties directly 
involved in pension fund operations. Therefore, all the rules of cor-
porate governance do not apply here. Pension fund members do not 
generally exercise control through voting on fund administration, asset 
management companies, and their employees. It is difficult for fund 
members to dismiss a body managing the fund if it fulfills its duties im-
properly. In such cases the only solution for fund members is to change 
the fund or make claims for damages (World Bank 2007).
Governance in private pension plans and funds includes managerial 
control of the organization and means of regulation, including liability 
of management, and how it is monitored. The primary objective of reg-
ulation in pension funds governance is to reduce the potential agency 
problems or conflicts of interest that may arise between fund members 
and those responsible for managing the fund, which could negatively 
affect the security of retirement savings (Stewart and Yermo 2008). 
From this perspective, pension fund governance comes down to two 
issues: to protect the rights and interests of pension funds members, and 
to ensure the safety of sources of funding for future retirement benefits 
(World Bank 2007). It is worth considering, however, whether pension 
fund governance should be limited to minimizing the agency problems 
occurring between pension fund members and the entity responsible for 
managing the fund.
 The pension fund can be considered as a nexus or network of ex-
plicit and implicit contracts between all entities in the relationship with 
it. Hence, pension fund governance cannot be confined only to deal 
with agency problems; its aim should be understood broadly to ensure 
good performance of the pension fund while maintaining low costs for 
all stakeholders (Stewart and Yermo 2008). Good governance, there-
fore, should be correlated with high rates of return on investment and 
low cost of capital (World Bank 2007). 
Good governance of pension funds has a lot of benefits, which in-
clude building trust between all stakeholders, and reducing the need for 
specific regulations or facilitating supervision. It is also conducive to 
improving the efficiency of corporate governance in portfolio compa-
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nies. The better managed the pension fund, the greater the opportunity 
to multiply the value of investments through the policy of active share-
holders. Good governance in the pension fund must take into account 
the risk. The more sophisticated the investment strategies, the stricter 
and stronger the pension plan supervision must be (Stewart and Yermo 
2008). The basis of pension fund operations should be, therefore, trust 
and development of long-term relationships with all stakeholders.
In pursuing these objectives, it is worth looking at the Guidelines 
for Pension Fund Governance elaborated by the OECD. The guidelines 
contained in them may be useful in the implementation of strategies for 
building trust and developing long-term relationships with all stake-
holders. These guidelines are divided into two groups: governance 
structure and governance mechanisms. 
Governance structure should provide the appropriate division of 
operational and supervisory responsibilities, and define the responsi-
bilities and abilities of those entrusted to pension fund responsibilities 
(OECD 2002). Thus, it includes the following eight points:
1) Identification of responsibilities. There should be a clear 
identification and separation of operational and oversight re-
sponsibilities in the governance of a pension fund. 
2) Governing body. Every pension fund should have a govern-
ing body vested with the power to administer the pension fund 
and which is ultimately responsible for ensuring the adherence 
to the terms of the arrangement and the protection of the best 
interest of plan members and beneficiaries. 
3) Accountability. The governing body should be accountable to 
the pension plan members and beneficiaries, its supervisory 
board (where relevant), and the competent authorities. 
4) Suitability. Membership in the governing body should be sub-
ject to minimum suitability (or nonsuitability) standards in order 
to ensure a high level of integrity, competence, experience, and 
professionalism in the governance of the pension fund.
5) Delegation and expert advice. The governing body may rely 
on the support of subcommittees and may delegate functions to 
internal staff of the pension entity or external service providers.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
292   Samborski
6) Auditor. An auditor, independent of the pension entity, the gov-
erning body, and the plan sponsor, should be appointed by the 
appropriate body or authority to carry out a periodic audit con-
sistent with the needs of the arrangement. 
7) Actuary. An actuary should be appointed by the appropriate 
body or authority for all defined benefit plans financed via pen-
sion funds.
8) Custodian. Custody of the pension fund assets may be carried 
out by the pension entity, the financial institution that manages 
the pension fund, or by an independent custodian (OECD 2009). 
Pension funds should have appropriate control mechanisms, 
communication, and incentives to encourage good decision making, 
proper and timely implementation, and regular reviews and assessments 
(OECD 2002). The mechanisms of governance include the following:
• Risk-based internal controls. There should be adequate internal 
controls in place to ensure that all persons and entities with op-
erational and oversight responsibilities act in accordance with 
the objectives set out in the pension entity’s bylaws, statutes, 
contract, or trust instrument, or in documents associated with 
any of these, and that they comply with the law.
• Reporting. Reporting channels between all the persons and en-
tities involved in the governance of the pension fund should be 
established in order to ensure the effective and timely transmis-
sion of relevant and accurate information.
• Disclosure. The governing body should disclose relevant infor-
mation to all parties involved (notably pension plan members 
and beneficiaries, plan sponsors, supervisory authorities, and 
auditors,) in a clear, accurate, and timely fashion (OECD 2009).
ADDRESSING THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN PENSION FUNDS 
IN LIGHT OF POLISH EXPERIENCE
This analysis of governance solutions in pension funds in Poland 
is limited to open pension funds (see Figure 13.1), which are manda-
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tory individual account pension plans. Through the pension funds, part 
of the employee’s earnings (collected by the Social Insurance Institu-
tion—it also manages the public pension plan) is invested in individual 
accounts. These accounts are managed by one of several funds. Em-
ployees buy from their fund a retirement annuity, which, when they 
retire, will serve as a source of retirement income. The amount of annu-
ity depends on the amount of cash accumulated during one’s career and 
the effectiveness of their investment.





• Age determines membership of old or new scheme.
• The new system is based on notational accounts.
Private pensions: personal:
• Open pension fund (OFE).
Private pensions: occupational:
• Employee pension fund (PPE).
Private pensions: personal:
• Individual retirement account (IKE, IKZE).
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Open pension funds can be created only by a general pension soci-
ety (hereafter Society) acting as a joint stock company. The dominant 
shareholders of general pension societies are financial institutions, in-
cluding international insurance companies, Polish financial institutions, 
and various consortia of Polish and international financial institutions 
(Kerner and Reinhardt 2010). The duration of the fund is unlimited. 
The fund acquires a legal personality upon being entered in the register 
of funds, then the fund authority becomes the Society. The basic docu-
ment governing the internal affairs prevailing in the fund is the Articles 
of Association.
The objectives of the company are solely devoted to the creation 
and management of funds and their representation to third parties. The 
general society creates and manages (for a fee) only one open fund. The 
share capital of the company cannot be raised by public subscription. A 
purchase or acquisition of company’s shares requires an approval of a 
supervisory authority, which is the Financial Supervision Commission.
The governing bodies of the Society are the Management Board, the 
Supervisory Board, and the general meeting. The Management Board 
of the Society cannot have fewer than three members, and it may also 
have an audit committee. Unless the Articles of Association provide 
otherwise, the general society board members are appointed and dis-
missed by the general meeting. The member of the Management Board 
must be a person who meets the following requirements:
• has full legal capacity;
• has not been convicted of an offense against property, credibil-
ity of documents, business transactions, trading in money and 
securities, tax offense;
• has higher education;
• holds a work experience of no less than seven years; and
• gives guarantee of the due performance as the board member.
At least one-third of the board should hold a university degree in 
law, economics, or be included in the list of investment advisors. 
The Supervisory Board member of the Society must be a person 
who meets the requirements for the management board members in the 
first two points and gives guarantee of due performance as a member of 
the Supervisory Board. At least half of the Society Supervisory Board 
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members should have a degree in law or economics. Moreover, at least 
half of the members of the general pension society are appointed from 
outside of shareholders of the Society and other related entities. The So-
ciety is responsible to the members of the fund for any damage caused 
by failure to perform or improper performance of their duties in manag-
ing the fund and its representation. The membership of the open fund 
follows the conclusion of the contract with the fund (Act of 28 August 
1997).
The pension society receives from the pension fund a fee levied in 
the form of a percentage deduction from the amount of premiums (con-
tributions) paid, not more than 3.5 percent, except that the deduction is 
made before the conversion of contributions into accounting units. In 
addition, the pension society charges a fee at the rate specified in the 
Articles of Association. This rate cannot exceed the amount calculated 
according to the scale specified by law. The rates of management fees 
decrease with each increase in fund assets exceeding the successive as-
sets thresholds by the fund. Costs related to transactions of purchase or 
sale of fund assets and costs associated with the storage of assets by the 
depositary are covered by the fund assets. In addition, pension societies 
incur a fee for the contributions transfer and the costs of supervision 
and the Insurance Ombudsman. There is also the cost of the guarantee 
fund that insures the pension funds (Sołdek 2011).
The pension fund invests its assets in accordance with the law, 
seeking to achieve a maximum degree of safety and profitability of the 
investments made. The legislature defines the investment limits. 
The open fund, which has received contributions for at least 36 
months, determines each year at the end of March and September the 
rate of return for the last 36 months and reports it to the supervisory 
body. On this basis, the supervisory body calculates the weighted aver-
age rate of return of all open-end funds and releases that information to 
the public. The weighted average rate of return is the basis for calculat-
ing the minimum required rate of return that applies for all open pension 
funds. When the rate of return of an open pension fund for the period of 
36 months is smaller than the minimum required rate of return, a deficit 
arises in an open fund, which sponsors of the open fund will pay. 
The fund is obliged to choose a depositary, to whom, by an agree-
ment, it entrusts the storage of its assets. A depositary can only be a 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /356308t
296   Samborski
bank. The agreement with the depositary for the fund assets storage 
should specify in detail the duties of a depositary and the fund.
The open fund is obliged to publish a prospectus once a year in 
a national daily newspaper dedicated to the fund announcements and 
advertising. The fund’s prospectus should contain its Articles of As-
sociation, information on the fund’s investment performance, and 
approved annual financial statements of the fund. The Society and the 
fund provide periodic reports to the supervisory authority and current 
information on their activities and financial position (Act of 28 August 
1997).
CONCLUSION
The basic sources of conflicts of interest in the pension funds occur 
in the relationships between fund members and the management entity 
on the amount of fees charged by the Society.
The pension fund is a legal entity. The managing body of the fund 
is the pension society established as a joint stock company. Such a 
solution entails reducing the efficiency of the management authority 
focused on the best interests of pension plan members. Pension funds 
have been established in the majority of cases by the general pension 
societies in which dominant shareholders are financial institutions. As 
a result, financial institutions easily introduce their candidates to the 
supervisory boards of societies. It may turn out that the financial institu-
tion controls both the Supervisory Board and the Management Board. 
Therefore, it is proposed to take steps aimed at increasing the indepen-
dence of supervisory boards in general pension societies.
Furthermore, the low level of society’s economic awareness and the 
low interest in retirement issues encourage societies to undertake ex-
pensive marketing campaigns to attract as many members as possible. 
Such campaigns usually lead not to improved investment performance 
of the fund but to higher administrative costs and fees incurred by fund 
members. Hence, I propose a statutory reduction of fees that pension 
societies charge, and linking their pay to the results of open pension 
funds investment. In addition, greater emphasis should be laid on finan-
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cial education relating to the pension system operating principles in the 
Polish society. 
A wider analysis of detailed internal regulations in the area of gov-
ernance would be advisable, both in open pension funds and in general 
pension societies. The problem, however, is that such legal solutions 
have not been made public. This remark does not apply to principles 
of corporate governance in investment operations of open funds and 
their Articles of Association, which are publicly available. To explain 
the reasons for varying the rate of development of individual pension 
funds, the institutional analysis should be applied not only to formal 
institutions of corporate governance, but also informal institutions. The 
results of such analyses would allow for studying the issue of improv-
ing the efficiency of Polish pension funds investment from a different 
perspective. 
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Social security privatization with individual accounts and employer- 
provided defined contribution systems shift responsibility for invest-
ment decisions to individual workers. With social security privatization, 
workers usually have some choice as to how the money in their indi-
vidual accounts is invested. The choices workers make can have an 
important effect on their levels of retirement income. By comparison, 
in traditional social security and pension systems, fewer burdens for 
decision-making responsibility are placed on individual workers. In-
stead, decisions regarding financial management of investments are 
made by financial professionals. A further distinction is that in tradi-
tional defined benefit plans workers do not bear financial market risk, 
while in privatized defined contribution plans workers do bear this risk. 
This raises the issue of how to communicate to workers who are finan-
cially unsophisticated to the possible consequences of financial market 
risk.
Proponents of social security privatization and defined contribution 
systems argue that workers are capable of learning about financial mar-
kets and investments and making good financial decisions. Traditional 
economics, which assumes well-informed, rational decision makers, 
supports that position. Behavioral economics, however, focuses on the 
difficulties that many workers have making financial decisions. Many 
workers are not interested in, and some are not capable of, learning the 
financial information needed to adequately manage an individual ac-
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count. In addition, the market for financial services is more complex 
and less transparent than most other markets for goods and services 
(Rajnes 2003).
In part because of problems clients have encountered when they 
seek financial advice, trust in financial services is at a low level. A 
recent survey in the EU finds that many people mistrust pension and 
investment services, ranking 50th among the services surveyed and 
ranking lower in trust than the market for used cars or for gambling 
(KPMG 2011).
In this chapter, we discuss financial literacy and financial advice 
as weak links in social security privatization and employer-provided 
defined contribution systems. They cause programs to take on added 
expenses to try to reduce the effects of worker investment errors and 
bad advice. Widespread financial education has become a necessary 
part of social security privatization. 
We begin by discussing the lack of financial literacy and some of 
the types of errors that workers make in managing individual account 
pensions. We document that lack of financial literacy is widespread in 
a number of countries. We then discuss in turn financial education and 
financial advice as possible responses. Financial education is often seen 
to have limited success, in part because of a lack of interest by work-
ers. This discussion is followed by commentary on problems that have 
arisen with financial advice, including legal issues that arise when ad-
visers do not have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their 
clients. We explain how the structure and level of advisory fees may re-
sult in conflicts of interest that may affect the quality of advice provided 
to individuals. Then we explain how laws and regulations are evolving 
in different countries in response to the conflicts of interest. We offer 
conclusions in a final section.
ERRORS INVESTORS MAKE
Making investment decisions is a complex process that requires an 
understanding of risk diversification as well as knowledge about differ-
ent types of investments. A recent U.S. survey finds that 34 percent of 
investors were “overwhelmed” by the options facing them (Cornfield 
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2012). Another study finds that only 31 percent of U.S. workers are 
confident in their ability to manage their investments during retirement 
(Yakoboski 2005). A Canadian study finds that workers rated choosing 
the right investment for their individual account pension plan (RRSP 
plan in Canada) as more stressful than seeing the dentist (Canadian	
Press 2005). 
While traditional economic theory assumes that investors do not 
make systematic errors, increasingly economic theory, using insights 
from behavioral economics, suggests otherwise (Turner 2003). Pension 
participants make at least three types of investment errors: 1) insuf-
ficient diversification of their investment portfolios, 2) inappropriate 
level of risk holdings in their investment portfolios, and 3) inappropriate 
portfolio adjustments, for example, in response to a market downturn. 
With insufficient diversification, participants in some individual ac-
count systems purchase investment funds that are too narrowly focused 
on a particular segment of the investment market. For example, one 
study of U.S. defined contribution plan participants finds that most held 
either no equities (48 percent) or only equities (22 percent) in their port-
folios, rather than diversifying (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén 2003). 
Thus, with inappropriate levels of risk holdings, some investors hold 
investment portfolios that are either too conservative or too risky. With 
inappropriate portfolio adjustments, some investors tend to chase re-
turns, purchasing the mutual funds that have risen and selling those 
that have fallen in value. A further error may be lack of sensitivity to 
fees, causing pension participants to spend too much in fees (Hastings, 
Mitchell, and Chyn 2011).
Sweden has attempted to provide investment information to the 
participants of its privatized social security system. Survey results con-
cerning the mandatory individual account system in Sweden, where 
workers can choose from more than 600 mutual funds (Turner 2004), 
suggest that some participants may have been confused about their par-
ticipation in the investment process. While 18 percent actually chose 
their investments (rather than taking the default), 34 percent thought 
they had (Betson 2001). Another Swedish survey indicated that of 
those Swedes who made a choice, 73 percent could not name all the 
funds they had invested in, and 41 percent could not name any of them 
(Jarvenpaa 2001).
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A World Bank survey of the privatized social security systems in 
Latin America finds that workers and retirees encountered problems 
in making a number of decisions required of them by those systems 
(Devesa-Carpio and Vidal-Meliá 2002). These decisions extend beyond 
simply making investment decisions regarding the composition of their 
investment portfolios. They had difficulty choosing a pension fund 
management company, deciding whether to make additional contribu-
tions, whether to switch into the privatized system (when that choice 
was open to them), what form to receive benefits (phased withdrawal, 
annuity), and choosing a life insurance company to provide an annuity. 
The errors participants make can be due to their lack of information 
when making investment decisions. Lack of information can include 
lack of knowledge about investing and lack of information about stock 
markets. Pension participants may lack information for financial de-
cision making because of both the amount of information they have 
assimilated and the amount available to them. As a result of govern-
ment or employer attempts to overcome the lack of information, some 
workers may suffer from the opposite problem—information overload 
(Agnew and Szykman 2004). They may have too much information, 
which also causes difficulties for workers when attempting to make in-
vestment decisions. 
FINANCIAL LITERACY
A major reason why pension participants make investment errors 
may be a lack of financial literacy. Many do not have basic financial 
knowledge, lacking an understanding of financial terms and how finan-
cial markets work. For example, studies generally show that people do 
not know what happens to bond prices when interest rates rise (Lusardi 
2006). In another survey in the United States, only a third of respon-
dents correctly answered three questions about inflation, interest rates, 
and risk diversification (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006). Many people 
may not understand commonly used financial market jargon, such as 
“equity.” A survey of pension participants finds that 10 percent did not 
know what the word fund meant (Russell 2012).
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Causes of Financial Illiteracy
Numeracy is an aspect of financial literacy; it is the ability to ap-
ply simple mathematical concepts. One example of a lack of numeracy 
is exponential growth bias, which results in a lack of understanding 
of compound interest. Studies have shown that many people have a 
tendency to do linear (straight line) projections of growth of account 
balances, rather than exponential (upward curved) projections that are 
the result of compound interest. For this reason, they underestimate the 
benefits of saving because they underestimate its future value (Stango 
and Zinman 2009).
Literacy is a basic skill needed for financial literacy. A study in the 
United Kingdom finds that one-fifth of young persons aged 16–19 have 
low levels of literacy (17 percent) and numeracy (22 percent), making 
it difficult for them to function in the labor market (Shepherd 2010). 
These people would also have difficulty dealing with issues relating 
to investments. Data from the World Bank indicate that small minori-
ties of people are illiterate in some countries that have privatized their 
social security systems. For example, the literacy rate in El Salvador 
is 84 percent, in Peru it is 90 percent, and in Mexico it is 93 percent. 
These rates are high compared to some poor African countries, such as 
Ethiopia (World Bank 2012). In the United States, the state of Alabama 
has an adult literacy rate of 85 percent (National Center for Educational 
Statistics 2012).
Prevalence of Financial Illiteracy
In some countries with generous traditional social security systems, 
financial literacy is not a major policy issue. Countries where the re-
tirement system relies on defined contribution plans, either as part of 
privatized social security or as voluntary plans, place a greater burden 
of financial literacy on their workers. A study of financial literacy in 
28 countries finds that, according to its measure, the leading countries 
for financial literacy are Brazil, Mexico, Australia, United States, and 
Canada (Ribeiro 2012). Nearly all of these countries place heavy reli-
ance on defined contribution plans. 
Even in countries that rank relatively high in financial literacy, many 
people lack basic financial knowledge. For example, a study in Canada 
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finds that 16 percent participating in an employer-provided pension 
plan did not know whether the plan was an individual account (defined 
contribution) or traditional pension (defined benefit) plan (Schellenberg 
and Ostrovsky 2008). A study in the United States finds that fewer than 
one-third of young adults had basic knowledge about risk diversifica-
tion, interest rates, and inflation (Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto 2010). In 
the United States, studies document that many workers lack basic finan-
cial knowledge (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2006; McCarthy and Turner 
2000). For example, surveys have found that many people do not know 
that they are paying fees for the management of the investments in their 
defined contribution plans (Turner and Korczyk 2004). Studies have 
indicated that a lack of financial literacy is prevalent in many countries. 
International research demonstrates that many workers lack financial 
literacy in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Italy, New Zea-
land, and the United States (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
Gender plays a role in the lack of financial literacy—women on av-
erage are less financially literate than men (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
Reasons for this could include a division of labor in some households, 
where men take responsibility for financial decisions, or it could be that 
women are less confident in dealing with numbers. The groups who are 
the least financially literate also are those who are the most financially 
vulnerable—minorities, women, and people with low levels of educa-
tion and income (Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn 2011). Thus, those most 
in need of financial skills to deal with a privatized social security sys-
tem are the least well-equipped, making them even more vulnerable.
Chile is a leader of the social security privatization movement, hav-
ing privatized its social security system in 1981. In Chile, according 
to the 2009 Social Protection Survey, 94 percent of respondents indi-
cated that they did not know anything about the pension options that 
existed (IOPS 2011). This lack of knowledge existed even though the 
pension system had been in existence for more than 25 years. A study 
in Chile finds that workers with lower levels of financial literacy and 
lower education and income tend to rely on their employers, coworkers, 
and friends more than on cost fundamentals in choosing a pension fund 
(Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn 2011). As a result, they may make poor 
fund choices that adversely affect their retirement security. 
One problem for people with low levels of financial literacy is that 
people tend to think they know more than they do. For example, in an 
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Australian survey, 67 percent indicated that they understood compound 
interest, but only 28 percent were able to determine the correct answer 
to a problem involving that concept (OECD 2006). Before governments 
can successfully provide financial education, they need to convince 
workers that they need it.
FINANCIAL EDUCATION
Growth
The growth in financial education provided by governments and 
employers in a number of countries is a direct result of the increas-
ing importance of defined contribution plans as voluntary or mandatory 
parts of retirement income systems. Financial education can cover such 
topics as investment terminology, asset allocation, risk tolerance, and 
retirement goal setting (Olsen and Whitman 2007). The cost of finan-
cial education becomes one of the costs of social security privatization, 
though it often is not included in studies that compare the advantages of 
privatized to traditional social security programs and compute the rates 
of return in privatized systems. Using financial education to address 
the lack of financial literacy of pension participants is not a quick fix; it 
needs to be a long-term and sustained effort, which can be quite costly 
(Ashcroft and Stewart 2010).
Several international organizations, such as the OECD and the Inter-
national Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS 2011), have taken 
an interest in financial education for pension participants in individual 
account pension systems. In 2008, the OECD created the International 
Network on Financial Education. 
A survey by IOPS (2011) found that 16 out of 19 financial supervi-
sors of pension systems provided some type of financial education. The 
pension supervisors not providing financial education tend to be fairly 
young, with intentions of providing financial education in the future. In 
Chile, the pension supervisory authority has a specific budget set aside 
for financial education (Ashcroft and Stewart 2010). Chile has launched 
several initiatives to encourage financial literacy, and in Mexico, the 
pension supervisory authority has undertaken a comprehensive pro-
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gram of financial education (IOPS 2011). This program has provided 
financial education not only to workers and those nearing retirement, 
but also to school children. In the United States, 13 out of the 50 states 
require that children in secondary (high) school are required to take a 
class in personal finance (Malcolm 2012). 
In 2009, more than 20 U.S. federal government agencies had 
programs aimed at improving financial literacy (U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office 2011). One of the often overlooked aspects of these 
programs is their cost, as they are funded with general government tax 
revenues. 
Along with financial education, there has been an increased focus 
on the content of periodic statements provided to pension participants, 
which is part of an effort to improve communication. These statements 
are being used to attempt to improve the financial literacy of partici-
pants and their understanding of their pension plans. However, there is 
little consensus as to what information, beyond basic account informa-
tion, should be provided and how. In particular, there is no consensus as 
to whether projections of possible future account balances should be in-
cluded and how they should be calculated so as to indicate the possible 
effects of financial market risk. Communicating to pension participants 
about risk is a difficult and unresolved aspect of financial education 
(Antolin and Harrison 2012).
Effectiveness
In the United States, financial education often occurs at the work-
place. Evidence suggests that financial education programs have had 
some success in helping people who participate in them make better 
decisions concerning saving for retirement (Hathaway and Kahtiwada 
2008). Studies of workplace financial education programs have shown 
improved financial literacy after taking the programs (Clark, Morrill, 
and Allen 2012). These results, however, may be affected to some ex-
tent by selection bias in that positive results are found for programs for 
people who voluntarily participate because of their interest in learning 
about the subject. Some studies show limited effects of financial edu-
cation, which may be in part because the financial education provided 
was of limited duration, such as a one-time presentation. Also, some 
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people have difficulty following through on their intentions for making 
changes following financial education (Lusardi 2006).
Studies indicate that many people are not interested in financial 
education. One U.S. survey finds that 56 percent of employees did not 
review the educational material provided by their pension plans. In 
that survey, 52 percent said that they do not have the time, interest, or 
knowledge to manage their 401(k) plan adequately (Gray 2012). These 
results indicate that provision of information alone is insufficient to 
deal with problems of financial literacy.
The effectiveness of financial education may depend in part on de-
tails as to how it is presented, with behavioral economics providing 
insights as to effective methods. A study of Chilean workers (Hastings, 
Mitchell, and Chyn 2011) finds that framing investment information 
relating to investment choices as gains rather than losses had a large 
effect on the way the information was perceived, particularly by people 
with lower levels of education.
TRANSPARENCY
An alternative to dealing with problems of financial literacy is to 
make financial products more transparent in their features and costs. Of-
ten, pension participants and other investors do not understand the fees 
they are paying (Turner and Korczyk 2004). A lack of understanding 
about fees may in part be the result of a lack of transparency. In addition, 
attempts can be made to standardize financial products, simplify them, 
and limit their possible features so as to facilitate comparability across 
financial products (Inderst and Ottaviani 2012). A further approach is to 
standardize disclosure, to make it easier for clients to compare costs and 
risks across financial products. In addition, attempts have been made to 
assure that disclosures are made in “plain English,” that is, that they are 
written in language that is comprehensible by people with low levels of 
education.
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DEFAULTS
Transparency and financial education, however, rarely are suf-
ficient to deal with the problems many participants face when given 
the responsibility for managing their investments (Ashcroft and Stew-
art 2010). One way of dealing with the lack of interest in and lack of 
knowledge of about financial market issues of some participants in 
privatized social security systems is to establish defaults that provide 
reasonable outcomes for workers opting out of the decision-making 
process. Studies have shown that defaults can have a major impact on 
pension participants in some circumstances (Choi et al. 2002; Madrian 
and Shea 2001). Sweden has a default investment in its mandatory in-
dividual account system for people not choosing an investment (Turner 
2004). Australia has also established a system of investment defaults 
for its mandatory individual account system (Muir 2012). 
Defaults are a form of implicit advice, incorporating decision- 
making outcomes that experts view as desirable. With defaults, individ-
uals who lack interest or knowledge in making financial decisions rely 
on the default investments to be a reasonable option. In addition, others 
who are knowledgeable may accept the default as a form of advice.
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
The traditional policy approach to affect people’s behavior is 
through financial incentives. Individuals do have financial incentives 
to overcome financial illiteracy and make effective investment deci-
sions, because doing so would presumably improve their investment 
decisions and ultimately the amount of money they had accumulated 
at retirement. However, it seems that the incentives are not sufficient to 
have much effect on behavior. This may be due in part to the lack of a 
clear connection between achieving financial literacy and the financial 
rewards from doing so.
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BANNING SOME PRODUCTS OR PRACTICES
Another approach to protecting unsophisticated investors is to 
ban certain financial products or practices. For example, in the United 
States, financial advisers are not permitted to charge fees based on the 
performance of the clients’ portfolios, except for wealthy clients who 
are presumably sophisticated investors. Similarly, in the United States 
participants in defined contribution plans and Individual Retirement 
Accounts are prohibited from making certain investments, such as us-
ing their pension funds to purchase a home, short selling, or investing 
in collectibles, such as art work. 
FINANCIAL ADVICE
Because of a lack of interest and engagement among some workers, 
there has been limited success with financial education. Therefore, at-
tention has also focused on providing financial advice. While financial 
education provides general information about investments and finan-
cial markets, financial advice provides specific suggestions as to what 
investments to make. The use of advisers allows for specialization and 
economies of scale in the acquisition of financial skills and knowledge. 
With advisers, not everyone needs to become an expert. Financial ex-
pertise can be a specialized skill rather than one that is generally held. 
However, workers with low financial literacy may be vulnerable to ex-
ploitation through bad advice when the adviser can profit by steering 
clients to more expensive options. 
Financial advisers can assist clients in several ways. They can 
provide financial advice, financial education, decision support, and mar-
keting information, and they can manage the individual’s investments. 
Decision support is education targeted to help a client reach a decision. 
Marketing information may appear to the client to be unbiased advice 
but is designed to sell a product. Many advisers assist their clients in 
carrying out their advice. If they provide financial management, they 
make investment decisions and carry them out, generally without in-
volving the individual investor in the decision (Turner and Muir 2012).
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Problems with Financial Advice
Workers seeking financial advice concerning investment decisions 
may encounter problems relating to the advice they receive, including 
the use of jargon and confusing terminology relating to fees, lack of 
knowledge about the client’s goals and risk tolerance, lack of disclosure 
about fees, conflicts of interest of financial advisers that affect the qual-
ity of advice, lack of fiduciary protection against conflicts of interest, 
and a problem called “hat switching.” With hat switching, a financial 
adviser has different levels of responsibility to the client depending 
on the circumstances. For example, under some circumstances in the 
United States advisers are required to provide advice in the best interest 
of their clients, while in other circumstances they are only required to 
provide advice that is suitable for their clients. For a financial adviser 
to provide quality advice, he must have some knowledge of the goals 
and risk tolerance of the client. This issue is sometimes formalized in 
“know your client requirements” that establish minimum standards for 
advisers concerning information they obtain from their clients. 
Financial advisers have conflicts of interest when they have a fi-
nancial stake in the advice that they provide. For example, that occurs 
if the adviser receives greater compensation when he recommends in-
vestments with higher fees for the recipient of the advice. If the adviser 
is also a salesperson, he will probably advise purchasing the financial 
products he sells rather than other products. 
Information that financial advisers provide to participants can be 
tainted by conflicts of interest that the advisers have. Mutual funds, 
for example, often provide information about investing, but rarely does 
that information include the advice to determine how much the person 
is paying in fees, and to look for low-cost providers and funds. Lack of 
knowledge about fees charged can lead to participants paying higher 
fees than if they were better informed. 
Part of the problem arising from conflicts of interest is that financial 
advisers do not have a fiduciary duty to their clients in some countries. 
For example, in the United States stockbrokers generally do not have a 
fiduciary duty to their clients when they advise them. Financial advis-
ers have a clear information advantage over their clients that they can 
exploit for their gain when they do not have a fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interest of their clients. This may result in agency costs, which 
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clients incur when an agent does not act in the best interest of the cli-
ent. Agency costs can include the client paying higher fees, taking on 
greater risk, and having too much trading of their portfolio (churning). 
A lack of both educational standards for advisers and uniform certifica-
tion requirements, combined with insufficient regulation of conflicts of 
interest, prevent financial advisers from achieving the quality expected 
of an advice professional. 
An audit study in the United States has documented a number of prob-
lems with the financial advice that clients receive (Mullainathan, Noeth, 
and Schoar 2012). The study finds that advisers push for actively man-
aged portfolios with high fees, even if clients start with well-diversified 
portfolios with low fees, and that financial advisers tend to profit from 
investor errors. For example, some investors sell during downturns and 
buy during upturns, known as “chasing returns.” Rather than “debiasing” 
their clients, some advisers support that strategy, presumably because it 
involves greater sales commissions for themselves, even though it results 
in worse outcomes for their clients. 
Australia has recognized the importance of pension participants re-
ceiving quality financial advice in its system of mandatory individual 
accounts. It recently commissioned a study where it rated the quality of 
financial advice that people received. Out of 64 cases reviewed, only 
two people received what was considered to be high-quality financial 
advice. The majority (37 people) received adequate advice, while a 
significant minority (25 people) received poor quality advice. People 
receiving poor advice received advice that was inappropriate for their 
situation. Forty-two percent of people do not trust financial advisers and 
would not follow their recommendations (Kell 2012). Most people are 
not capable of judging whether the advice they are receiving is good. In 
the Australian study, most people who received poor advice thought that 
they had received good advice (Kell 2012). People may have difficulty 
assessing the quality of advice they receive. Nonetheless, according to a 
survey by the Investor Protection Trust, about 20 percent of adults aged 
65 or older in the United States report having “been taken advantage of 
financially in terms of an inappropriate investment, unreasonably high 
fees for financial services, or outright fraud” (Infogroup/ORC 2010). 
A study conducted in Singapore concerning the quality of finan-
cial advice received by “mystery shoppers,” people who took part in 
the study, finds that frequently financial advisers did not obtain enough 
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information from their clients to make suitable recommendations (Mon-
etary Authority of Singapore 2012). For example, less than half asked 
about the clients’ risk preferences. The study also finds that fees were 
not disclosed or discussed in nearly half of the cases. In 28 percent of 
the cases, the advice was judged to be suitable by independent financial 
experts, in 40 percent the advice might be suitable, and in 28 percent the 
advice was not suitable for the clients’ needs.
Financial advice can provide a valuable service to clients. How-
ever, a U.S. survey finds that 83 percent of those surveyed indicated that 
they would be interested in receiving professional assistance in manag-
ing their 401(k) plans, but only 10 percent took advantage of that option 
when it was offered (Gray 2012).
Effects of Financial Advice
Several studies have examined the effects of advice. Hung and 
Yoong (2012) examine survey data relating to defined contribution 
plan participants to study whether advice resulted in improved results. 
They find little evidence of improved results. In an experiment, they 
find some evidence that unsolicited advice was ineffective, but when 
participants actively solicited advice the advice resulted in improved 
outcomes. Employees with low levels of financial literacy were more 
likely to solicit advice and to benefit from the advice.
Because of conflicts of interest, recipients of advice may actually 
have worse outcomes than those not receiving advice. A study in Ger-
many of bank customers who used a financial adviser compensated 
through commissions finds that the portfolios of those customers who 
used a financial adviser had lower rates of return net of costs (Hack-
enthal, Haliassos, and Japelli 2011). Similarly, a U.S. study finds that 
mutual funds recommended by financial advisers underperformed other 
mutual funds on a risk-adjusted basis, taking into account fees (Berg-
stresser, Chalmers, and Tufano 2009).
Financial Advice Reforms
A number of countries are considering the issues of the quality of 
financial advice and its cost, and are considering reforms that would 
increase consumer protection. 
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United States. The U.S. Department of Labor is working on pro-
posed regulations to improve the quality of advice to pension plan 
participants. Proposals have been made to extend fiduciary standards 
that apply to investment advisers and brokers.
United Kingdom. In order to improve the quality of advice, the 
UK has made it illegal for advisers to receive commissions for selling 
products to clients. Advisers who sell products tend to recommend the 
products they sell, which may not be the best products for particular 
clients. Instead, advisers will be required to charge their clients fees for 
their services, which will reduce conflicts of interest. It will have the 
further advantage that the compensation advisers receive will be more 
transparent. This reform is being made because the receipt of commis-
sions has been viewed as a root cause of the pension misselling scandal 
in the UK. Previously, financial advisers receiving commissions for 
making recommendations concerning pensions to clients had an obliga-
tion to make recommendations in the best interest of the client, but it 
had become clear that because of commissions that approach was not 
working. 
One criticism of banning commissions is that a single fee paid at the 
time of the advice may be too expensive for some clients, effectively 
preventing them from receiving advice. If the upfront fees are too ex-
pensive for a client to pay at one time, advisers in the UK are permitted 
to spread the fee charged over a period of time (BBC 2010).
An additional new requirement in the UK is that advisers will be 
required to tell their clients if their advice is independent, meaning that 
they provide advice over a full range of investment options, or if it is 
restricted, meaning that the advice they provide is only over a limited 
range of investments options, such as the options provided by the com-
pany they work for (Osborne 2010).
In addition, as of the end of 2012, a new agency in the UK, the 
Financial Conduct Authority, will be responsible for protecting con-
sumers in financial markets. A regulatory issue this agency will face is 
the trade-off between protecting some consumers from detriment by not 
permitting certain risky investment products, while limiting the choice 
of others.
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Australia. Australia is implementing legislation to improve the 
quality of advice (Kell 2012). To address problems associated with 
financial advice, Australia has instituted the Future of Financial Ad-
vice (FoFA) reform, which takes effect in July 2013. By eliminating 
commissions for advisers, the reform eliminates the problem of “hat 
switching,” which occurs when an adviser receives fees for advice but 
also receives commissions depending on what he advises that the cli-
ent purchases. In addition, advisers have a statutory requirement to act 
in the best interest of their clients, which is commonly considered to 
be a fiduciary duty. Thus, when they recommend a financial product, 
they will have the duty to recommend the product that is in the best 
interest of their client, not the one that is merely suitable. Also, the 
reform attempts to improve the transparency of fees. When advisers 
provide ongoing advice, they will be required to renew their fee agree-
ments with clients every two years. In addition, the reforms attempt to 
facilitate the provision of “scaled” advice, which would be advice on 
a limited set of issues, rather than a full-scale review of their financial 
situation. 
The Netherlands. The Netherlands Minister of Finance is consid-
ering legislation to improve the quality of advice, including requiring 
that every adviser have a college degree, that there be more emphasis on 
continuing education for financial advisers, and that examination ques-
tions for advisers’ certification correspond more to the actual situations 
for which they provide advice (Schlingmann, Schutte, and Somsen 
2012).
Singapore. Singapore is considering reforms of the way financial 
advice is provided. The Singapore regulator has already introduced lim-
its on fees (KPMG 2011).
India. India has banned load fees charged on purchases of invest-
ment products (KPMG 2011).
While a number of countries are taking steps to increase the avail-
ability of unbiased financial advice to pension participants, the question 
remains whether implementing costly reforms will help participants in 
terms of improving pension outcomes. 
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LEGAL ISSUES
As the foregoing discussion indicates, countries around the world 
face similar issues when structuring a legal framework intended to 
increase access to financial advice while also ensuring that advice is 
not degraded by conflicts of interest, fraud, or misrepresentation of the 
adviser’s qualifications. Examples also exist to illustrate the potential 
legal issues that result when a population is not financially literate. 
Misselling in the United Kingdom
In the late 1980s, UK citizens were permitted to choose more in-
dividualized pensions, known as personal pensions, where they could 
select the pension provider rather than participate in the public pension 
scheme or a scheme offered by their employers. Insurance companies 
and financial advisers aggressively sold personal pensions without 
complying with the regulations that required them to understand the 
risk preferences and financial positions of their customers. A study 
commissioned after the misselling came to the attention of regulators, 
who concluded that the lack of regulatory compliance was widespread 
(Muir 2009).
The misselling caused many employees who bought personal pen-
sions to be worse off than if they would have stayed in their employers’ 
occupational scheme. At least at the time, the benefits formulas of occu-
pational schemes tended to result in higher benefits than the investment 
returns on the personal pensions. Also, only employees (not employers) 
contributed to personal pensions. In comparison, employers typically 
did contribute to occupational schemes. So, the employees who were 
sold personal pensions forfeited their employers’ contributions and re-
ceived lower returns on the money they personally contributed (Muir 
2009).
Some experts held both the financial services industry and the regu-
latory system to blame for the misselling scandal. The financial services 
industry provided compensation incentives for their sales forces to mar-
ket personal pensions. This illustrates the potential effects of conflicts 
of interest, particularly when a new market opens up because of a rapid 
shift in a country’s retirement funding paradigm. At the same time, 
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regulators had little experience with the products being sold and the 
marketing techniques being used because of the shift in the paradigm to 
increase employee choice (Muir 2009). 
Australia’s Attention to Defaults
Australia does not have any history of shifting its government-run 
social insurance scheme to a privatization model. However, there is 
a sense in which there is a shadow privatization scheme in existence. 
Australia’s government-run system, known as the Age Pension, is a 
pay-as-you-go pension program that is both means and asset tested. 
Australia also has a mandatory employment-based system, known as 
the Superannuation Guarantee (SG System), which requires employ-
ers to contribute 9 percent of most income for most employees to an 
individual account (Muir 2011). Because the Age Pension is means and 
asset tested, retirees with higher SG System account balances are less 
likely to qualify for the Age Pension. Thus, there is a sense in which the 
SG System is a privatized Age Pension for those fortunate enough to 
accumulate substantial account balances.
In 2010, a panel constituted by the Australian government to study 
the SG System released its report, which has come to be known as the 
Cooper	Report. The two-part report addresses many perceived deficien-
cies in the SG System and made recommendations for improvement. 
The panel’s findings on the importance of defaults are of particular 
interest here. The panel determined that having a financially literate 
population as a long-term goal would be useful. But, critical to the 
Cooper	Report’s recommendation is its finding that shorter-term issues 
could not be resolved through education and financial literacy. Instead, 
it based its recommendation for a low-cost, more heavily regulated de-
fault system on the principle that not all members of the SG System are 
able or want to be involved in investment selection. Australia is cur-
rently in the process of moving toward the “MySuper” default product 
recommended in the Cooper	Report (Muir 2011).
Regulation of Investment Advice in the United States
The United States has not moved to privatize Social Security, al-
though as noted earlier such privatization has been considered. The 
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issues of financial literacy and financial advice, however, have become 
more important as the population ages, as the United States becomes 
increasingly reliant on a defined contribution paradigm, and as the twin 
problems of high unemployment and a volatile stock market challenge 
retirement wealth creation. 
A detailed discussion of the U.S. regulatory structure that applies 
to mutual funds, investment advice, brokers, and related financial 
services industry entities is beyond the scope of this chapter. At its es-
sence, the complexities derive from two sources. The first is the state 
government and federal government dichotomy. Each state has some 
regulatory power over financial services industry entities that are active 
in the state. The federal government effectively has regulatory authority 
over all financial services entities. In some instances a state or multiple 
states may impose higher standards than imposed by the federal regula-
tors. In others, the federal regulations may be more strict than those of 
the states. The second set of complexities results from the way regula-
tory power is allocated within a state and particularly at the federal 
level. The primary division of power at the federal level is between the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Employee Benefits 
Security Administration (EBSA). The SEC’s mandate is to focus on 
investor protection. EBSA is charged with overseeing the regulation of 
private-sector employer-based retirement plans, including defined con-
tribution plans (Turner and Muir 2012).
Over the past two years, the most controversial regulatory issue of 
import for this chapter has been whether the SEC or EBSA will apply 
fiduciary obligations to a larger set of financial services entities and 
individuals. EBSA proposed regulations to accomplish that in 2010 
and—after congressional hearings, widespread publicity, and signifi-
cant industry concern—withdrew the proposed regulations in 2011. 
Reportedly efforts continue to revise the proposed regulations for reis-
sue. In response to a legislative requirement, the SEC staff studied the 
differing levels of client obligation discussed above, from fiduciary to 
suitability, as well as the hat-switching problem. In a report issued in 
2011, the SEC staff recommended adoption of a single federal fiduciary 
standard that would apply to brokers as well as investment advisers. 
The costs and benefits of such an approach remain under study (Turner 
and Muir 2012).
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CONCLUSION
An aspect of social security privatization and employer-provided 
defined contribution systems that raises their costs is that they place 
greater responsibility on workers for making financial decisions. They 
shift financial decision-making from professionals to individual work-
ers. Proponents of privatization and defined contribution systems argue 
that workers should be capable of making these decisions, while oppo-
nents argue that many workers lack interest in acquiring the necessary 
knowledge. Studies have documented widespread financial illiteracy in 
many countries, with this issue being more important in countries with 
privatized social security systems. While lack of literacy and numeracy 
are causes of lack of financial literacy, financial literacy rates are con-
siderably lower than literacy rates. Furthermore, financial illiteracy is 
most prevalent among people who are already economically vulner-
able—women, minorities, and those with less education and income. 
The requirements for financial literacy placed on them by privatized 
social security systems only increase their economic vulnerability.
Financial education has been the focus of efforts to deal with fi-
nancial illiteracy, but studies have documented that it often has limited 
success, perhaps because many workers are not interested. Some pro-
grams of financial education may have been ineffective because they 
have been of limited duration. In addition, some workers have had dif-
ficulty following through on changes that they intended to implement 
following financial education. Thus, while some programs have suc-
ceeded in improving financial knowledge, they have done less well in 
changing financial behavior.
The limited effectiveness of financial education shifts the focus in 
some countries to issues of financial advice. Workers seeking financial 
advice, however, have encountered a number of problems, the most sig-
nificant of which perhaps is conflicts of interest that financial advisers 
may have, combined with not having a fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interest of their clients. Conflicts of interest arise because of the ways 
that the compensation of advisers is determined. For example, a finan-
cial adviser may receive higher compensation when he recommends a 
financial product that charges higher fees to the recipient of the advice. 
Studies in several countries have documented that many clients are re-
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ceiving financial advice that is not appropriate for their needs. The level 
of fees charged is another issue. Frequently, fees are not disclosed or 
are not disclosed in a manner that is salient to the client. Because of 
the problems with the quality and cost of financial advice, a number of 
countries are considering reforms of the ways that financial advice is 
provided.
Note
We have received valuable comments and assistance from David Rajnes.
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 fiscal sustainability of, 191–201, 193f,  
 197t, 198t, 200t, 215
 government assistance for, 185, 186,  
 201–203, 214, 215–216
 now and in future, 190–191, 191t,  
 203, 213, 215
	 See	also Ireland’s	plan, Old Age  
 Contributory Pension
Aging population
 financing support for, through  
 economic growth, 118–120, 124,  
 125n11
 pressure on public finance and, 117– 
 118, 123, 192–195, 193f
	 See	also Older workers
AIOS. See International Association of  
 Supervisors of Pension Funds
AMRF. See Approved Minimum  
 Retirement Fund
Annuities, 30, 273
 lifetime, as PRSA goal, 40, 44, 50
 obligations to purchase, 58, 293t
 option to purchase, 210, 214–215
Approved Minimum Retirement Fund  
 (AMRF)
 as annuity alternative for self- 
 employment in Ireland, 44, 60n3
 transfer of PRSA to, 58
Approved Retirement Fund (ARF),  
 transfers and, 58, 60n3
ARF. See Approved Retirement Fund
Argentina, 141
 social security in, 21, 22, 27, 271
ASFA. See Association of Superannuation 
 Funds of Australia
Asia, GPFG investments in, 146t
Association of British Insurers, fees, 34
Association of Superannuation Funds of  
 Australia (ASFA)
 better retirement income project of,  
 213–215
 lifestyle standards set by, compared to  
 Age Pension, 190–191, 191t, 214
Australia, 147t, 186, 314
 demographics in, 193–194, 207, 207t
 financial advice reform in, 314, 316
 government costs of retirement  
 income system in, 201–203, 202t
 three-pillar retirement system in,  
 185–186
Australian pensions, 8–9, 185–216, 305
 alternatives to, 23, 213–215
 as complex tax issue, 186, 195–201,  
 197t, 198t, 200t, 215
 equity challenge to, 195, 203–204
 government assistance and, 202–203,  
 202t
 helping those who really need  
 assistance, 204–209
 history of, 187–190
 mandated private, 18, 59, 186, 204,  
 205t, 214
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Australian pensions, cont.
 pacts with New Zealand about, 30,  
 199
 retirement ages for, 14–15, 185, 210
 retirement income streams and, 186,  
 202–203, 202t, 210–215
 voluntary, 185–186, 204
	 See	also Age Pension
Austria, 146t
 retirement in, 14, 17, 157t
Automatic adjustment mechanisms
 inflation as, 226
 social security solvency and, 4, 24–26
AVC. See Additional Voluntary  
 Contribution
Averting	the	old	age	crisis (World Bank),  
 arguments in, 39
Bahamas, The, provident funds and, 20
Bahrain, GPFG investments in, 147t
BASAL. See Basic Satisfaction Level
Basic Satisfaction Level (BASAL)
 benchmark comparison for, and  
 replacement rate, 274–276, 274t
 definition, 272–273
Belgium, 146t
 retirement in, 16, 157t
Belize, social pensions in, 29
Benefit generosity
 automatic adjustment mechanism and,  
 25, 34
 cutbacks of, 16–17, 18
 definition, 14
 to encourage later retirement, 16, 34
Benefits, 186, 206
 calculations for, 30, 102–103, 131
 indexing rules for, 103–104
 old-age, 19, 29, 219–220, 221, 225– 
 227
 reduction of, as reform focus, 104– 
 107, 105t, 107f, 122
 rights to, protected in Norway, 27, 131
Bermuda Islands, GPFG investments in,  
 147t
Bismarckian PAYG financing, some CEE  
 countries and, 155, 156
Bolivia
 benefits to international migrants,  
 29–30
 individual accounts in, 21, 22
Botswana, social pensions in, 29
Brazil, 23, 24, 29
 defined contribution pensions in,  
 274t, 275–276
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 as emerging market in global  
 economy, 141, 145, 146t
 pensions in, 32, 281tt, 282t
 social security benefits to 
international migrants in, 29–30
Brunei, two-tier mandatory system in, 21
Bulgaria, 159
 among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
 breakup of Soviet Union and, 7, 21
 encouraging later retirement with  
 reforms in, 15–16
Burundi, 263n1
 pension regulatory authority in, 250t,  
 251
 private sector pensions in, 252, 252t,  
 257
 public sector pensions in, 258t, 262
Burundian social security
 benefits, 249
 contribution rates, 245t, 249
 coverage, 27, 236–237, 237t
 National Social Security Fund, 236t,  
 237t, 239tt
 retirement age, 238t, 249
Canada, 26, 147t
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 encouraging later retirement with  
 reforms in, 15–16
 pensions in, 281tt, 282t
Cape Verde, social security systems  
 unification in, 19–20
Caribbean islands, defined contribution  
 plans with provident funds in, 20
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Cash balance plan, as U.S. hybrid  
 pension, 34
Cayman Islands, GPFG investments in,  
 146t
CEE (Central and Eastern European)  
 countries, 153–161
 Communist heritage and early  
 transition, 154–155
 EU member states in, and three-tier  
 old-age pensions, 156, 157t, 161
 financial crisis impact on pensions  
 and additional reforms in, 159–161
 structural pension reforms in, 155– 
 158, 160
	 See	also component	parts,	e.g.,  
 Central Europe; Eastern Europe
Central America, 269
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 272–276
	 See	also component	countries,	e.g.,  
 Costa Rica; Colombia; El  
 Salvador
Central Europe
 social security pension reform in, 7,  
 15, 21, 22
	 See	also component	countries,	e.g.,  
 Hungary; Poland; Slovakia
Chile, 19, 29
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 extending social security coverage in,  
 28, 29–30, 31
 financial education program  
 developed by, 33, 304, 305, 307
 investments in, 23–24, 141, 146t
 mandatory individual accounts in,  
 20–21, 22
 pensions in, 271, 281tt, 282t
China, 19, 146t
 demographics in, 9, 217
 as emerging markets in global  
 economy, 145, 146t
 resident classification in, 218, 223,  
 224
	 See	also Hong Kong
Chinese social security pension reform,  
 9, 15, 217–231
 benefits of three major systems in,  
 219–220, 221, 225–227
 cities with system variation, 220, 223,  
 227, 228
 contributions to three separate  
 systems and, 219, 220, 221, 223– 
 224, 227, 228
 coverage within, 4, 31, 219, 221,  
 222–223
 financing of, 7, 226, 228–231
 Government Employees’ Pensions,  
 228
 major separate systems within, 9,  
 218–219, 231
   (see	also National Rural Pension  
 Plan; Urban Employees’ Pension  
 Program)
 regional variations of, 220, 227, 231
 savings plan for retirement in, 27, 218
 Urban Residents’ Pension Program, 9,  
 218, 221
Collective bargaining agreements,  
 pensions and, 7, 31, 88, 187–188
Collective defined contribution plan, as  
 Dutch hybrid pension, 34
Colombia, 21
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 investments in, 23, 147t
 low-cost incentives for financial  
 education in, 33–34
 pensions in, 281tt, 282t
Common Market Protocol, EAC with,  
 235
Common Markets, 29, 235
Conflict of interest
 financial advisors’ compensation at  
 root of, 318–319
 as pension risk, 8, 287–292
 Polish pensions and, 292–296
Consumer Price Index, market basket  
 cost and, 269, 272–274
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Consumer protection, investors and,  
 307–309, 313–314
Costa Rica
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 pension fees and contributions in, 282t
 pension fund composition and returns  
 in, 281tt
Croatia, 15, 153, 156
Cuba, retirement age and gender in, 15
Cyprus, 146t, 157t
Czech Republic, 15, 21
 as emerging market in global  
 economy, 141, 146t
 pensions in, 156, 157t
Defined benefit social insurance plans,  
 20, 237–238, 237t
 decline of, 31–32, 35, 63–64, 186,  
 187, 252
 PAYG systems for, 20–21, 156
 poverty reduction proposal with,  
 59–60
Defined contribution pensions, 5–6, 7,  
 11, 30, 318
 government regulation of, 31, 63–64,  
 185, 251–252
 provident fund plans converted to, 20
 as second pillar in old-age system, 158
Defined contribution pensions’ efficiency  
 in the Americas, 10, 269–282
 analysis, 275–276
 countries studied with their  
 demographics, 272, 277t
 data description, 273, 279t, 280t,  
 281tt, 282t
 literature review of, 271
 methodology, 271–272, 276
 model, 272–273, 276
 replacement rates, 269–271
 results, 274, 274t
Defined contribution systems
 financial education and, 33–34
 notional or nonfinancial accounts as,  
 24, 156
 provident funds in, of former British  
 colonies and protectorates, 20, 237
 social security, and raising  
 contribution rates, 34–35
 types of, 32, 33
Denmark, 18, 157t
 encouraging later retirement with  
 reforms in, 15–16
 investments in, 136, 146t
Discrimination, employer-provided  
 pensions and, 30
Earnings, benefit calculations and, 103,  
 108–109
East African Community (EAC), 9–10,  
 235–263, 263n1
 extending coverage of retirement  
 system as major challenge in, 263
 languages and population of, 235
 pension regulation authorities in,  
 249–250, 250t 257, 263
 pension regulation country by  
 country, 250–251
 private sector pensions and, 251–253,  
 252t
 private sector pensions country by  
 country, 253–257
 public service pensions and, 257–258,  
 258t, 263
 public service pensions country by  
 country, 258–262
 purposes and committees to  
 accomplish them, 235–236
 social security country by country,  
 240–249
 social security overview in, 30, 236– 
 240, 236t, 237tt, 238t, 239tt
	 See	also component	countries,	i.e.,  
 Burundi; Kenya; Rwanda;  
 Tanzania; Uganda
East African Trade Union Confederation  
 (EATUC), members of, 263n1
East and Central African Social Security  
 Association (ECASSA), members  
 of, 240
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Eastern Europe
 increased minimum retirement age in,  
 14, 15
 social security pension reform in, 7,  
 21, 22, 39
	 See	also component	countries,	e.g.,  
 Bulgaria; Croatia; Estonia; Latvia;  
 Macedonia; Romania
EATUC. See East African Trade Union  
 Confederation
EBSA. See U.S. Employee Benefits  
 Securities Administration
Economic growth
 low, and increasing  
 unemployment, 120–122, 121t
 policies to promote, 119, 156
 promotion of, to support aging  
 populations, 118–120, 124,  
 125nn10–11
Economic policy
 NCE paradigm in, 101, 113, 120, 123
 objectives of pension reform and,  
 157, 216
 supply-side orientation of, 114, 124
Ecuador, benefits to international  
 migrants, 29–30
Education, pressure on public finance  
 for, 193f
Egypt, 146t
 social security in, 21, 24, 27
El Salvador, 21
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 pensions in, 281tt, 282t
 social security benefits to  
 international migrants, 29–30
Eligibility age. See Retirement age
Employees. See Workforce
Employees’ Pension-Insurance Funds,  
 14, 165
Employer-provided pensions, 30–34
 automatic enrollment and use of  
 defaults in, 32–33
 extending voluntary coverage of,  
 30–31, 32
 reform of, 4–5, 7–8, 163
 regulation of, 31
 risks in, 7–8
 third-pillar supplements as, 163
 trends in, 35
 See	also National Employment  
 Savings Trust (NEST); Personal  
 Retirement Savings Account  
 (PRSA)
Employers, 18, 33, 40
 contribution rate toward social  
 security pensions by, 111, 130– 
 131, 185, 187–188, 189–190, 
  197t
 as pension source, 40, 185–186
ENRSP. See European Network for  
 Research on Supplementary  
 Pensions
Estonia, 15
 among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
 cutbacks on privatization in, 22, 159
Ethiopia, extending social security in, 28
EU. See European Union
Europe, 14, 146t
 social security and pension reforms  
 in, 3, 4–8
	 See	also Central Europe; Eastern  
 Europe; and	specific	countries
European Central Bank, 111, 112, 114
European Commission, 111, 112
European Network for Research on  
 Supplementary Pensions  
 (ENRSP), conference, 3
European Union (EU), 30, 157t, 300
 culture of discipline in economic  
 policy and, 6, 114, 115
 influence on Portugal’s social security  
 pension reform, 101, 102, 112– 
 117, 123–124
 pension policy agenda of, 116–117,  
 120, 124
 poverty rates in, 6, 63
 social policy of, 112, 125n9
 social security OMC by, for member  
 countries, 7, 30, 115, 116, 117
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European Union Stability and Growth  
 Pact
 debt limits in, 7, 114
 tightened fiscal policies and, 115–116
Faeroe Islands, GPFG investments in,  
 146t
Financial incentives, later retirement  
 encouraged by, 15–16
Financial knowledge, 299–319
 education in, 33–34, 299–300, 305– 
 307, 318
 facilitating, for consumers (investors),  
 307
 illiteracy and, 11, 302–305
  (see	also	under Investment funds,  
 errors investors make)
 journalistic investigations and, 43–44
 legal issues and, 315–317
 quality, and government proposals,  
 313–314, 318–319
Financial markets and services, 55, 252,  
 300, 307
 government regulation of, 31, 45, 141
 investment risks in, 170–171, 170f,  
 299
 response to negative returns from,  
 142–145, 142t, 148
	 See	also under Investment funds,  
 financial advice about
Financial Services Volunteer Corps,  
 influence on EAC of, 263n1
Finland, 18
 benefit generosity and, 15, 25
 investments in, 136, 146t
 pensions in, 17, 157t
Fiscal policy, strict NCE rules for,  
 113–114
401(k) plan, 32
France, 16, 19, 157t
 GPFG investments in, 144, 146t
 increased contribution base and rates  
 in, 18–19
 retirement in, 15–16, 17, 26, 27
Gambia, provident funds and, 20
Gates Foundation, influence on EAC of,  
 263n1
GDP. See Gross Domestic Product
Gender, 304
 employment rate changes by, for  
 older people, 66–67, 67f, 68f
 income distribution from age 50 and  
 older by, 73f, 74f, 75f, 76f, 77
 pension coverage by, 187, 202–203,  
 202t, 211–212, 212t
 pension eligibility and, 14, 185, 226
 pension incomes by, 77–82, 78f–79f,  
 81f, 82f, 94f, 95f, 97
 Swedish assets by, 83–85, 84t–85t
 unisex pensions and annuities, 15, 30,  
 35
Georgia, GPFG investments in, 146t
Germany, 14, 304
 automatic adjustment mechanism in,  
 17, 26
GPFG investments in, 144, 146t
 pensions in, 32, 34, 157t
 politics in, and cutbacks in benefit  
 generosity, 16–17
Ghana, unification of social security  
 systems in, 19–20
Global economy
 emerging markets in, 141, 145
GPFG investments and, 6–7, 142, 142t,  
 143–145, 143f, 146t–147t
 recessions and, 55, 122–123, 159– 
 160, 192, 209
Government Pension Fund Global  
 (GPFG)
 development and principles of, 137– 
 138
 investment portfolio of, 141–148,  
 142t, 143f, 146t–147t, 148t,  
 149nn1–2
 investment strategy of, 138–141,  
 140t, 143f
 market value of, and dependent  
 factors, 136, 137f, 141–142, 142t
 Norwegian krone vs. international  
 currencies, 141–142, 149nn1–2
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Government Pension Fund Global  
 (GPFG), cont.
  oil extraction origin of, as larger part  
 of NGPF, 6–7, 129, 136, 138
Government Pension Fund Norway  
 (GPFN), as smaller part of NGPF,  
 6, 129, 135
Governments
 contribution rate toward social 
security pensions by, 130–131
 financial education provided by,  
 33–34
 national, and pension plans, 6–7, 13,  
 30–31, 222–227
 provincial, and social security plans,  
 9, 220, 228
 societal role of, and politics, 6, 111– 
 112
 as source of pension contributions,  
 186, 221, 223–224, 229–230
GPFG. See Government Pension Fund  
 Global
GPFN. See Government Pension Fund  
 Norway
Great Britain. See United Kingdom (UK)
Greece, 19, 26, 146t, 157t
 cutbacks in social security income,  
 15, 16, 17, 18
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), selected  
 countries and, 121t, 194, 228
Guernsey, GPFG investments in, 146t
Health care
 aging population and public finance  
 on, 192–193, 193f
 government spending for, 112, 186
Hong Kong, 9, 146t, 220, 228
Housing
 pre- and post-, bubble in Ireland,  
 53–54, 55
 as retiree assets, 83, 84t–85t, 186
Hungary, 15, 22
 addition of mandatory individual  
 accounts to social security in, 7,  
 21, 59
 among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
 as emerging market in global  
 economy, 55, 141, 146t
 fees for personal pension in,  
 compared to PRSA, 42t, 43
Ibero-American Multilateral Social  
 Security Agreements, delivery  
 of social security benefits to  
 international workers in Hispanic  
 countries, 29–30
IFSRA. See Irish Financial Services  
 Regulatory Authority
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Immigrants, 77, 119
 probability of low pension income  
 for, 8, 88t, 96–97, 97–98
Income, 65, 124
 deciles of, and tax relief, 56–57, 57f,  
 58–59
 worker, 205t, 206, 269
	 See	also Retirement income
India, 29, 314
 as emerging markets in global  
 economy, 145, 146t
 extending social security coverage in,  
 28, 31
Individual accounts as government  
 mandate, 5–6, 7–8, 9, 13
 defaults in, for investors who eschew  
 choice, 23, 32–33, 308
 drawdowns in, 208–209
 fees for, 22–23, 34, 296, 301
 financing benefits of, 228–229
 increased contribution rates for, 18,  
 34–35
 social security with, 20–21, 35, 59,  
 186, 204, 219, 271, 299
 worker’s financial literacy as issue  
 with, 11, 33–34, 302–305
Individual accounts as voluntary, 9, 10,  
 22–23, 28, 40, 103, 221
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),  
 as U.S. defined contribution  
 system, 32
Indonesia, GPFG investments in, 146t
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International agreements
 retirement benefits, 29–30, 77
 workforce cross-country mobility,  
 29–30, 239
International Association of Supervisors  
 of Pension Funds (AIOS), as data  
 source, 273
International currencies
 Australian dollar, 186
 Chinese renminbi with yuan units,  
 220, 221, 223, 232n1
 Norwegian krone vs., 141–142,  
 149nn1–2
International Labour Organization,  
 influence on EAC of, 263n1
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 111,  
 112, 263n1
International Network on Financial  
 Education, created by OECD, 33
International Organisation of Pension  
 Supervisors (IOPS)
 financial education and, 33, 305–306
 influence of, on EAC, 263n1
International	Update:	Recent		
	 Developments	in	Foreign	Public		
	 and	Private	Pensions (newsletter),  
 35n
Investment funds
 assets in, 55, 159–160, 205t, 207t,  
 212t, 253
 decisions about, and investor  
 protection, 23, 189, 308–309
 errors investors make with, 300–302
 financial advice about, 11, 34, 44,  
 171–172, 171f, 309–312
 financial advice reforms and, 312– 
 314, 318–319
 international, 6–7, 23–24
   (see	also Government Pension  
 Fund Global)
 management of, 189, 211, 220, 230– 
 231, 294–297
   (see	also Financial markets and  
 services)
 performance measures for, 175–176,  
 178t, 180n1, 269, 271
 rate of return on, 141–142, 281t, 295
 risk and, 33, 186, 208–209, 209t
   (see	also Pension risk)
IOPS. See International Organisation of  
 Pension Supervisors
IRAs. See Individual Retirement  
 Accounts
Ireland, 31, 39–60, 157t
 extending voluntary pension coverage  
 in, 30, 59
 five-part retirement income system in,  
 39–40
 GPFG investment in, 145, 146t
 national savings plan for retirement  
 in, 27
   (see	also Personal Retirement  
 Savings Account)
 pension reforms in, 4–5, 7, 31–32, 39,  
 59–60
 pre– and post–property bubble in,  
 53–54, 55
 raised retirement age in, 14–15
Irish Financial Services Regulatory  
 Authority (IFSRA), number of  
 PRSA providers predicted by, 45
Irish Insurance Federation, number of  
 PRSA providers predicted by, 44
Irish Life Assurance Company,  




 multitier pensions in, 17, 24, 26, 157t
 politics in, and cutbacks in benefit  
 generosity, 16–17
Japan, 304
 automatic adjustment mechanism in,  
 17, 26
 expanded taxes in, to fund retirement  
 benefits, 18–19
 pensions in, 14, 32
 politics in, and cutbacks in benefit  
 generosity, 16–17
 population growth rate in, 193–194
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Japan, cont. 
securities from, in GPFG, 144–145,  
 146t
 world’s largest pension fund in, 129,  
 136
Jensen’s Index, as investment  
 performance measure, 176, 178t,  
 180n1
Jersey, GPFG investments in, 146t
Job loss, 40, 55, 60n1
Journalistic investigations, PRSA fees  
 and, 43–44
Kazakhstan, 7, 21, 146t
Kenya, 10, 252
 defined benefit pensions and public  
 sector in, 31–32
 pension regulatory authority in, 31,  
 250, 250t
 private sector pensions in, 252t, 253– 
 256
 public sector pensions in, 258–259,  
 258t, 259t
Kenyan social security, 240–243
 benefits, 241–242
 contribution rates, 240–241, 245t, 263
 coverage, 4, 28, 236–237, 237t, 240
 National Social Security Fund, 20,  
 236t, 237t, 239tt
 reform, 16, 242–243
 retirement age, 238t, 242
KiwiSaver program, as nationwide  
 default savings, 33
Kuwait, rising retirement age in, 15
Labor market, supply-side orientation of  
 economic policy and, 114
Latin America, 28
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 272–276
 investments and, 147t, 302
 PAYG financing for social security in,  
 20–21
 retirement income problems in some  
 countries of, 39, 269
Latvia, 15
 among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
 automatic adjustment mechanism and  
 notional accounts in, 24, 26
 cutbacks on privatization in, 22, 159
Lesotho, social pensions in, 29
Life expectancy
 average, calculated and indexed,  
 24–26
 increasing, and longevity, 117–118,  
 211
 retirement age eligibility and, 4,  
 13–15
 sustainability coefficient and, 102– 
 103
 women compared to men and, 30, 97
Lithuania, 21, 22, 146t
 multitier pensions in, 156, 157t
Lobbying, Irish pension companies and,  
 41, 43–44
Luxembourg, 63, 146t, 157t
Maastricht Treaty (1992), EU economic  
 policy since, 112–114, 115, 123– 
 124
Macedonia, 7, 21, 153, 156
Malaysia, 146t
 extending social security coverage in,  
 28, 31
Maldives, The, social pensions in, 29
Malta, multitier pensions in, 157t
Mauritius, social pensions in, 29
Mbao Pension Plan, cell phone  
 technology and, 28
Mercosur. See Southern Common Market
Mexico
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 as emerging market in global  
 economy, 141, 146t
 financial education program  
 developed by, 33, 305–306
 mandated individual accounts in, 18,  
 21, 22
 pensions in, 271, 281tt, 282t
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Middle East, GPFG investments in, 146t,  
 147t
Monetary policy
 IMF and, 111, 112, 263n1
 NCE strict rules vs. discretionary  
 decisions for, 113–114
Morocco, GPFG investments in, 146t
Namibia, social pensions in, 29
National Employment Savings Trust  
 (NEST), United Kingdom and, 5,  
 33
National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF),  
 drawdown in Ireland of, 27
National Rural Pension Plan, 222–227
 benefits, 225–226
 China with, 9, 218
 contributions and rules for making  
 them, 223–224
 coverage of, 28, 217, 222–223
 noncontributory benefit of, 226–227
 regional variations in, 227
 voluntary nature of, 28, 31
National Welfare Fund, pension benefits  
 in Russia, 27
NCE (New Classical Economics). See  
 under Economic policy
Nepal, social pensions in, 29
NEST. See National Employment  
 Savings Trust
Netherlands, The, 146t, 304, 314
 pensions in, 34, 63, 157t
 retirement age in, 14, 26
New Pension Scheme, India, 28
New Zealand, 14, 147t
 financial illiteracy in, 23, 304
 low-rate poverty in, and pension  
 proposal, 59–60
 national savings plan for retirement  
 in, 27, 33
 pension pacts with Australia by, 30,  
 199
NGPF. See Norwegian Government  
 Pension Fund
Nigeria, unification of social security  
 systems in, 19–20
NOK (Norwegian krone), 132
 GPFG international investments in,  
 142, 142t, 143–145, 143f
 GPFN assets in, 135–136
 pension fund value in, 129, 137f, 138,  
 142t, 146t–147t, 148t
 pension funds from oil production in,  
 136, 141
Nonpensionable employment
 poverty reduction proposal for, 59–60
 PRSA and, 50, 54, 58
 workers with, as PRSA sales market,  
 50
North America, 147t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 272–276
	 See	also component	countries,	i.e.,  
 Canada; Mexico; United States
Norway, 136
 benefit rights protection in, 25, 27,  
 131
 organization of social security  
 program in, 129–131
 retirement income cutbacks in, with  
 reduced benefit accrual rate, 17,  
 18
 social security financing, 6–7, 18, 24,  
 27
   (see	also Norwegian Government  
 Pension Fund [NGPF])
 social security reform and principles  
 in, 24, 130, 131–134
Norwegian Government Pension Fund  
 (NGPF), 6–7, 129–149
 smaller part of, GPFN, 6, 129, 135– 
 136
	 See	also details	of	larger	part,	i.e.,  
 Government Pension Fund Global  
 (GPFG)
Notional account plans, 24, 65, 133, 156,  
 219
NPRF. See National Pension Reserve  
 Fund
Occupational pensions, 40, 50, 157t
 coverage by, 54–66, 54t
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Occupational pensions, cont. 
 fees for, 41, 42t
 investment effectiveness of, in  
 Poland, 174–178, 178t
 risk classification of, 165–167, 167t
 risk measurement of, in Poland, 167– 
 174
 as tier-II in Swedish system, 66, 80,  
 81f, 82f
 voluntary for employees, 41, 42t, 293f
Oceania, GPFG investments in, 147t
OECD countries. See Organisation  
 for Economic Co-operation and  
 Development countries
Oil extraction, Norway revenues from,  
 6–7, 129, 136, 138
Old Age Contributory Pension
 as mandatory social security in  
 Ireland, 40, 60n3, 157t
	 See	also Australia’s	plan, Age  
 Pension
Older workers, 188
 employment changes for, 66–67, 67f,  
 68f
 incentives to delay retirement, 104,  
 117, 120, 122
OMC (Open method of coordination).  
 See under European Union (EU)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation  
 and Development (OECD)  
 countries, 18, 55, 129, 271
 benefits in, 16, 19
 financial education and, 33, 305
 poverty rates, 59, 63
 retirement in some, 14–15, 15–16, 39
Pakistan, substitute for social security  
 in, 31
Panama, 21, 147t
Paraguay, social security benefits to  
 international migrants, 29–30
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing, 9, 22,  
 31
 in CEE countries, 7, 20, 155–156,  
 157–159, 164
 as claim on future production, 119–120
 Latin America and, for social security,  
 20–21, 156
 notional or nonfinancial accounts  
 with, 24, 156
 Portugal and, 6, 7, 102, 109–110
PAYG. See Pay-as-you-go financing
Pension companies, 207, 294
 Ireland and, 41, 43–44, 50
 misselling by, and UK scandal, 45,  
 315
 private, in CEE countries, 158, 176– 
 178, 177t
Pension Fund Associations (AFP),  
 competition for lowest investor  
 fees among, 23
Pension incomes, 124
 at 65–74 years of age, 81f, 105t
 average, in China, 220, 221
 government contributions to, 185, 202
	 See	also Retirement income
Pension Plan for Rural and Urban  
 Residents, as Wuhan city system,  
 227
Pension reforms
 age eligibility and, 4, 13–14, 40
 governance issues in, 10–11, 287–319
 increased workforce coverage with,  
 40–41
 international studies, 3–4
   (see	also specific	countries)
 rationale for, 11, 213–215
 trends in, 4–5, 7–8, 9–10, 30–34, 35
Pension risk, 23
 in employer-provided pensions, 7–8,  
 165–167, 167t
 governance issues and, 10–11
 investment portfolios and, 33, 186,  
 208–209, 209t
 most important, for employers, 169– 
 170, 169f
 principal–agent problem, 287–292
   (see	also under Polish social  
 security pension reform)
 ways to limit, in private funds, 32–33,  
 289–292
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Pension types
 defined benefit, 5, 31–32, 63, 157t
 disability, 87, 88t
 earnings related, 14, 64, 157t
 flat-rate, 14, 41, 157t
 government mandated, 18, 39, 59,  
 102, 157t, 293f
 guarantee, 65, 80, 93–94, 98, 188– 
 189, 204, 206
 hybrid plans, 34, 35, 66
 notional, 24, 65, 133, 157t, 158
 old age, as contributory, 60n3, 225
 open, 287, 293f, 295
 private, 59, 119, 187, 189
 social, as noncontributory, 29, 40,  
 221, 225, 226–227
 voluntary, 30–31, 39, 40, 119, 157t
	 See	also Defined contribution  
 pensions; Occupational pensions;  
 Personal pensions; and	under  
 Gender
People’s Republic of China. See China
PERAs. See Personal Equity and  
 Retirement Accounts
Personal Equity and Retirement  
 Accounts (PERAs), Philippines, 31
Personal pensions, 41–43, 42t, 46, 54– 
 55, 54t, 157t
 as tier-III in Swedish system, 66
Personal Retirement Savings Account  
 (PRSA)
 access to, 45–54, 46f, 47f, 49f, 58
 effect of, on pension coverage, 47f,  
 54–55, 54f
 employers and, 40, 45–48, 46f, 58
 fees, 40, 41–44, 42t, 58
 Ireland and, 4, 30, 45
 objectives of, 27, 39–41, 57–59
 owners of, and annuity alternatives,  
 44, 50, 60n3
 providers of, 40, 42t, 43–44
   (see	also Pension companies)
 results of, and inequities, 54–57, 54f,  
 56t, 57f, 58–59
 self-employment and, contracts,  
 48–54, 49f, 50f, 51f, 52f, 53f, 57f
 standard vs. nonstandard, plans  
 offered, 41, 44, 48f, 51, 52–53, 52f
Peru, 21, 28, 29
 investments in, 24, 147t
Philippines, The, 29, 30–31, 146t
Pillar reforms in social security, 39
 first pillar, 21, 131, 132, 158
 multi pillar, 22, 39, 132, 134, 155,  
 158, 185–186, 219
 second pillar, 155–156, 158, 159
 third pillar, 157t, 158, 163
Poland
 among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
 as emerging market in global  
 economy, 55, 141, 146t
Polish occupational pension reform,  
 164–180
 fund managers for, 176, 177t
 investment effectiveness of, 174–178,  
 177t, 178t, 180n1
 investment risks in, vs. broader  
 financial market, 170–171, 170f,  
 179
 irrational preferences expressed  
 about, 171–172, 171f, 179–180
 nonexistent Employees’ Pension- 
 Insurance Fund in, 165
 regulation opinions of employers  
 about, 173–174, 174t
 risk assessment survey of employers  
 and, 167–174, 169f, 170f, 179
 risk management and, 165–167, 167t,  
 172–173, 173f
 voluntary supplement yet  
 undeveloped in, 157t, 164–165
Polish social security pension reform,  
 7–8, 15, 157–160
 fees for personal pension in, 42t, 43,  
 293f, 295
 leadership within CEE countries, 153,  
 155, 156, 158
 notional accounts in, 24, 164
 PAYG in, 156, 158, 164
 principal–agent problem addressed in,  
 292–296, 293f
 privatization in, 22, 59, 163
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Polish social security pension reform,  
 cont.	
See	also Polish occupational pension  
 reform
Politics, 109, 160
 cutbacks in benefit generosity and,  
 16–17
 societal role of governments and, 6,  
 118
 speech in, to justify reforms, 112,  
 125n9
Portugal, 25, 101–125, 147t
 pensions in, 17, 19, 157t
 public sector in, and troika, 111–112
 social security benefits to  
 international migrants, 29–30
Portuguese social security pension  
 reform, 101–125
 aging population in, 120, 123
 critical analysis of, 104–110, 105tt,  
 107f, 123, 125n8
 economic performance and budgetary  
 equilibrium in, 117–120, 124,  
 125nn10–11
 economic policy and present crisis in,  
 101, 102, 120–123, 121t, 124
 EU influence on, 101, 102, 112–117,  
 123–124
 main legislative changes, 102–104,  
 125nn1–7
 PAYG in, 6, 7, 102, 109–110
 social rights retrenchment strategy,  
 16, 17, 111–112, 125n9
Poverty measurement, 59, 63
Poverty reduction
 defined benefit pension and, 59–60
 means testing for social assistance,  
 29, 40, 109
 methods to achieve, 117, 215–216
Principal–agent pension problem
 addressing, with Polish experience,  
 292–296
 risk of, 10–11, 287–292
Private sector, 9, 34, 102
 defined contribution pensions and, 31,  
 32, 66, 252–257
 retirement income managed by, 39,  
 58, 59, 158
Privatization, 316
 cutbacks in, 21–23, 159
 social security, with individual  
 accounts as government mandate,  
 20–21, 318
Provident funds, 20, 35, 237t, 238
PRSA. See Personal Retirement Savings  
 Account
Public sector, 19, 194, 228
 defined benefit pensions in, 31–32, 187
 EAC pensions for, 257–262, 258t
	 troika in Portugal and, 111–112
 workforce in, 9, 31, 102, 125n2
Residence pensions, as obligatory, 157t
Retirement, 17
 double payment problem in some  
 countries, 7, 22
 encouraging later, with reforms,  
 15–16, 86, 103
 international agreements to facilitate,  
 29–30
 lifestyle standards for, 190–191, 191t,  
 272–273
 working definition of, 99n6
Retirement age, 24, 67
 flexible, 40, 44, 58, 133, 210, 238t
 legal, 102, 132–133, 225.259t
 raising, as government mandate, 4,  
 13–15, 34, 66, 119, 160, 185
Retirement Annuity Contract, owners of,  
 50, 60n3
Retirement income, 39, 63...
 annuity alternatives for, 60n3
 Australian support for, 185–186,  
 202–203, 202t, 210–215
 benchmarks for, 269–271
 better, as ASFA project, 63, 213–215
 capital, and income inequality, 83–85,  
 84t–85t
 changing views about, and trends,  
 13–30
 comparing, of women and men (see		
	 under Gender)
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Retirement income,	cont. 
deciles of disposable, 87, 90t–91t, 92
 high-, countries and retirement, 4, 8,  
 9, 15, 27
 low-, groups and, 6, 9, 35, 86,  
 88t–89t, 97–98, 206–208, 212
 national savings plans for, 27, 39
 redistribution proposal for, 59–60
 replacement rates in, 16–17, 105–106,  
 107–108, 269–271
Ricardian equivalence, fiscal policy and,  
 113
Riester plan, as German hybrid pension,  
 34
Risks, employer-provided pensions and,  
 7–8
Romania
 among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
 cutbacks on privatization in, 22, 159
 upon breakup of Soviet Union, 7, 21
Rural areas, workforce in, 9, 27–28, 31,  
 222–227
Russia, 15, 21, 27
 as emerging market in global  
 economy, 141, 145, 147t
Rwanda, 235, 252
 pension regulatory authority in, 250t,  
 251
 private sector pensions in, 252t, 257
 public sector pensions in, 258t, 262
Rwandan social security
 benefits, 248
 contribution rates, 245t, 248
 coverage, 236, 237t, 248
 retirement age, 238t, 248
Social Security Fund of Rwanda, 236t,  
 237t, 239tt, 248
Saint Kitts–Nevis, provident funds and, 20
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,  
 provident funds and, 20
Savings plans, 66
 evaluation of newly introduced  
 products, 41, 44
 retirement income and, 5, 27, 33, 39,  
 117, 125n11, 203
Scandinavia, 6
 income distribution of older people  
 in, 76–77, 98–99n4
	 See	also component	countries,	i.e.,  
 Denmark; Faeroe Islands; Finland;  
 Iceland; Norway; Sweden
SEC. See U.S. Securities and Exchange  
 Commission
Self-employment
 annuity alternatives for, in Ireland, 44, 
  60n3
 contribution rate toward social  
 security pensions and, 130–131
 probability of low pension income  
 and, 86, 92–93, 98, 206
 PRSA contracts and, 48–54, 49f, 50f,  
 51f, 52f, 53f, 57f
 social security extension to, 28, 189,  
 206, 237t
Seychelles, provident funds and, 20
Sharpe ratio, as investment performance  
 measure, 175, 178t, 180n1
Sierra Leone, unification of social  
 security systems in, 19–20
Singapore, 18, 146t, 314
Slovakia
 among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
 cutbacks on privatization in, 22, 159
 mandatory individual accounts to  
 social security in, 7, 21
Slovenia, 7, 156, 157t
Small businesses, social security  
 extension to, 28, 237t
Social accounts, PAYG defined benefit  
 plan, 220
Social assistance, 63, 65
 means testing for, 29, 40, 109, 185,  
 186
 purpose of, 106–107, 110
Social insurance, as defined benefit plans, 
 237–238, 237t
Social Insurance Fund, 135, 237t
Social protection
 benefit rights as, 25, 27, 131
 supply-side economic policy and,  
 114–115
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Social security reforms
 cross-country mobility and, 29–30,  
 219, 239
 international studies, 3–4
   (see	also specific	countries)
 issues in and rationale for, 11, 39
 for pension coverage, 39, 102
   (see	also Pillar reforms in social  
 security)
 trends in, 4, 13–30, 34–35
 voluntary programs as, 9, 31
South Africa, 29, 146t
South America
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 269–282
	 See	also component	countries,	e.g.,  
 Brazil; Chile; Uruguay
South Korea, 16, 28, 146t
Southern Common Market countries,  
 mutual social security benefits  
 among, 29
Soviet Union, breakup of, 7, 21
Spain, 25, 147t
 encouraging later retirement with  
 reforms in, 15–16
 pensions in, 17, 157t
 social security benefits to  
 international migrants in, 29–30
Stakeholder program, limited fees on,  
 42t, 43
Superannuation, 316
 contribution increases for, 204, 206
 definition, 187
	 See	also under Australian pensions,  
 history of
Sustainability, pensions and, 27, 191– 
 201, 193f, 197t, 198t, 200t, 215
Sustainability coefficient, calculating  
 pension benefits and, 102–103
Swaziland, 15, 20, 29
Sweden, 18, 63–99, 304
 benefit generosity and automatic  
 adjustment mechanism in, 25, 26
 NGPF investments in, 136, 147t
 pension plans in, 5–6, 7–8, 157t
  (see	also Swedish pension system;  
 Swedish Premium Pension  
 system)
 retirement age in, 15, 16
 social security in, 16, 18, 24, 63...
Swedish pension system
 causes for income gaps in, 86–92,  
 88t–89t, 90t–91t
 income distribution from age 50  
 and older, 71–77, 71f–72f,  
 73f–74f, 75f–76f, 78f–79f
 income distribution measurements,  
 70–71, 98–99n4, 98n3
 income from capital and, 83–85,  
 84t–85t
 occupational pensions as tier-II, 63,  
 66, 94f, 95f, 163–164
 pension incomes by gender, 77–82,  
 78f–79f, 82f
 personal pensions as tier-III, 66, 94f,  
 95f, 96–97
 social security pensions (old and new)  
 as tier-I, 63, 64–66, 80, 81f, 82f,  
 94f, 95f
 unclear who is still working vs. has  
 retired, 67–69, 99nn5–6
Swedish Premium Pension system,  
 defaults for investment choices in,  
 23, 301
Switzerland, 14
 politics in, and cutbacks in benefit  
 generosity, 16–17
 securities from, in GPFG, 144, 145,  
 147t, 148t
Taiwan, GPFG investments in, 146t
Tanzania
 pension regulatory authority in, 31,  
 250t, 251
 private sector pensions in, 252t, 256
 public sector pensions in, 258t, 259t,  
 260–261
Tanzanian social security, 243–246
 benefits, 245
 contribution rates, 244–245, 245t
 coverage, 27, 236, 237t, 243–244
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Tanzanian social security, cont. 
National Social Security Fund, 20,  
 236t, 237t, 239tt
 Zanzibar, 243, 246
Tax penalties, proposed, 215
Tax relief
 Australian pensions and, 195–201,  
 197t, 198t, 200t, 202
 equitable, proposal from academic  
 research, 59–60
 personal pension savings plans and,  
 66
 private pensions with EET or TTE,  
 regimens, 252252t
 PRSA and, 55–57, 56t, 57f, 58–59
 self-employment lump sum and, 60n3
 voluntary contributions to defined  
 contribution plans and, 185, 186
Taxes, 29, 39, 190
 flat-rate, 186, 215
 income, 19, 192
 payroll, 18–19, 185
Thailand, 19, 21, 28, 146t
Tier-based social security. See Pillar  
 reforms in social security
Trade unions, 31, 66, 187, 220, 263n1
	 See	also Collective bargaining  
 agreements, pensions and
Transitional Retirement Benefit, New  
 Zealand, 14
Treynor ratio, as investment performance  
 measure, 175, 178t, 180n1
Trinity College Dublin, Pension Policy  
 Research Group, tax relief  
 proposal from, 59–60
Troika, components of, 111
Tunisia, extending social security in, 27
Turkey, GPFG investments in, 147t
Uganda, 20, 252
 pension regulatory authority in, 31,  
 250t, 251
 private sector pensions in, 252t, 256– 
 257
 public sector pensions in, 258t, 259t,  
 261–262
Ugandan social security, 246–247
 benefits, 247
 contribution rates, 245t, 246–247, 263
 coverage, 236, 237t, 246
 National Social Security Fund, 236t,  
 237t, 239tt, 247
 reform, 247
Ukraine, GPFG investments in, 147t
Unemployment, 98, 119
 Portugal and, 111, 120–122, 121t
 PRSA and, 49, 49f, 50–53, 50f, 51f,  
 52f, 53f, 54
United Arab Emirates, GPFG  
 investments in, 147t
United Kingdom (UK), 14, 17, 18
 fees and employees’ accounts in,  
 22–23, 34, 42t, 43, 60n2
 financial knowledge programs in, 33,  
 313
 former colonies and protectorates of,  
 20, 237–238
 GPFG investments in, 144, 145, 146t,  
 147t, 148t
 pension companies misselling scandal  
 in, 45, 315
 pension reform in plans provided by,  
 5, 33, 46
 pensions in, 31, 42t, 43, 60n2, 157t
United States (U.S.), 24, 31, 32
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution 
pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 fees and employees’ accounts, 22–23,  
 34, 282t
 financial knowledge reform in, 33,  
 304, 306, 313, 316–317
 GPFG investments in, 144, 145, 147t,  
 148t
 pension fund composition and returns  
 in, 281tt
 pension reform possibilities in, 7, 186
 politics in, and cutbacks in benefit  
 generosity, 16–17
 retirement age changes in, 15, 17
 social security system in, 16, 19
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U.S. Employee Benefits Securities  
 Administration (EBSA),  
 regulation of employer-provided  
 retirement plans by, 317
U.S. Securities and Exchange  
 Commission (SEC), regulation of  
 financial advice services, 317
U.S. Social Security Administration,  
 publications, 35n
U.S. Supreme Court, gender-based  
 pensions and, 30
Urban Employees’ Pension Program,  
 218, 219–220
 benefits, 219–220
 China and, 9, 19, 22
 coverage and contribution rate, 219
 regional variation in, 220
Uruguay, 21, 23
 demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
 efficiency of defined contribution  
 pensions in, 274t, 275–276
 pensions in, 281tt, 282t
VAT (value-added tax), 19
Vietnam, retirement ages in, 15
Voluntary contributions, sources of,  
 185–186
Wages
 minimum, linked to pension access,  
 187–188
 pension benefit calculations and,  
 103–104, 105t, 109
 race to the bottom for, 111, 123
Welfare state. See Social assistance
Workforce, 66, 119
 contributions for personal pension by,  
 46, 48, 58
 contributions to voluntary pensions  
 by, 134, 186
 contributions toward social security  
 pensions by, 130, 156, 158, 160,  
 188
 extending retirement coverage to  
 more of the, 27–28, 30–31, 32–33,  
 39–41, 188
 as investors in privatized social  
 security and defined contribution  
 pension systems, 11, 23, 32–34,  
 189, 299, 318
   (see	also	under Consumer  
 protection)
 multiple systems of social security  
 for, 9, 19–20
 preretirement income of, replaced by  
 pension, 269–271
 social security taxes on, 18, 198t,  
 199–201, 200t
 voluntary participation by, in  
 retirement income programs, 40,  
 112
	 See	also Older workers
Workplaces, financial education in,  
 306–307
World Bank, 39
 CEE pension reform and, 156, 163
 influence of, on EAC, 247, 263n1
Zambia, 19–20, 240
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